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This thesis offers a fresh interpretation and defense of epistemological 
disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. I adopt a multilevel approach 
according to which perceptual knowledge on one level can enjoy factive 
rational support provided by perceptual knowledge of the same proposition 
on a different level. Here I invoke a distinction Ernest Sosa draws between 
‘judgmental’ and ‘merely functional’ belief to articulate what I call the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. The view that results is a 
form of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge specifically 
at the higher judgmental level, layered over a straightforward externalism 
about perceptual knowledge at the lower merely functional level. 
 The first chapter orients the reader to epistemological disjunctivism—
with particular emphasis on the ‘reflective epistemological disjunctivism’ 
defended by Duncan Pritchard with inspiration from John McDowell. Here I 
review the arguments for thinking such a proposal true, as well as highlight 
some problems and three emerging challenges for the view: what I call the 
internalist challenge, the new access challenge(s), and the ‘new evil genius’ 
challenge. These challenges largely inspire the chapters to follow.  
 In the second chapter I present the positive proposal: a fresh 
interpretation of epistemological disjunctivism in terms of perceptual 
knowledge at the specifically judgmental level. I argue that this is a 
modification that epistemological disjunctivists should adopt since it 
inoculates their view against the internalist challenge: the challenge of 
explaining why perception should provide one with knowledge by providing 
one with motivating reasons for belief. 
 In the third chapter I motivate the view further in connection with the 
more familiar ‘basis problem’ for epistemological disjunctivism. I argue that 
this approach supports a unique strategy for solving that problem: one that is 
consistent both with what is known as ‘the entailment’ thesis and the thought 
that we can reduce perceptual knowledge to a kind of rationally supported 
belief.  
 In the fourth chapter I move to playing defense. I defend the proposal 
against the so-called ‘new evil genius’ challenge. This is the challenge to 
explain why subjects in pairs of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases can seem equally 
justified for sustaining their perceptual beliefs. I argue that what we are being 
sensitive to here, rather, is the fact that both subjects can be equally 
epistemically responsible and/or reasonable for believing what they do. 
Before concluding this chapter I also offer an error theory.  
 In the fifth chapter I defend the proposal against the new access 
challenges raised in chapter one. These alleged challenges for 
epistemological disjunctivism arise specifically for versions of reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism that hold that one’s rational support for 
perceptual beliefs is not only factive but reflectively accessible as well. 
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Rather than address the challenges head on, I try to dislodge the thought 
they depend upon—viz., that one’s factive rational support for perceptual 
beliefs is reflectively accessible to the subject. Here I argue that the reflective 
accessibility of one’s factive rational support is actually a wheel turning idly in 
the debate with the underdetermination-based radical sceptic—so that we 
can simply drop it without consequence. The result is an epistemological 
disjunctivism that is immune to access problems. I then offer a final summary 
and conclude.  
 At the end of this thesis I have attached an appendix, which is an 
excursion into religious epistemology and an exploration of a form of religious 
epistemological disjunctivism. Here I apply the epistemological disjunctivist 
insight to the case of religious perception in order to defend the idea that one 
can offer independent rational support for theistic belief by appealing to 
religious beliefs that are justified on the basis of religious experiences. This 
appendix chapter is in keeping with the general spirit of the thesis insofar as 
it seeks to developed epistemological disjunctivism in new and fruitful 
directions.     
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Epistemological disjunctivism as it is commonly conceived can seem fairly 
outlandish from a familiar Cartesian point of view. Both externalists and 
internalists in epistemology are apt to subscribe to a familiar Cartesian 
dogma that says that one’s radically deceived counterpart in the ‘bad case’ 
has every reason—or has the same level of rational support—that one has in 
the ‘good case’ for accepting one’s perceptual beliefs (cf. Schonbaumsfeld 
2016). After all it is thought that things seem or appear to your radically 
deceived counterpart just as they seem to you. But then doesn’t this suggest 
that seeming seeings are the place to begin—that one’s best reason for 
adopting a perceptual belief that p is something like the fact that one seems 
to see that p?  
 Epistemological disjunctivists will demur. They will remind us that 
appearances can be misleading, and that this can be true of one’s basic 
perceptual reasons as for anything else. In fact the epistemological 
disjunctivist will maintain that part of what makes being ‘radically deceived’ so 
epistemically bad is that one is tricked into thinking that one has reasons for 
accepting ordinary perceptual beliefs that one doesn’t in fact have—reasons 
that common sense suggests are the paradigmatic reasons for accepting 
ordinary perceptual beliefs in good cases.  
 Now which reasons these are is a matter of some controversy among 
epistemological disjunctivists. At the very least it seems to be agreed that 
these are factive reasons. Not because they consists of facts (although we 
will assume that throughout), but because they entail the truth of the ordinary 
‘everyday’ external world propositions they give one rational support to 
believe. Compare John McDowell (1982) (1995), for instance, who thinks that 
when one perceptually knows that p one believes that p for the reason that 
one sees that p to be the case. If that is the case then since seeing that p 
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entails that p one’s perceptual belief is rationally grounded only if what one 
believes is true.  
 Now if this is already beginning to seem like a radical or surprising 
thesis the epistemological disjunctivist will remind us that it only reflects plain 
common sense. For consider: no one who sees a tomato before them thinks 
that they have good reason to believe this because they only seem to see a 
tomato. Or at least arguably that is no one’s first reaction; not before they 
meet a philosopher. On the contrary if for example you were to try and 
defend your belief that there is a tomato before you to a third party wouldn’t 
you first want to cite reasons like “well, I can just see that there is a tomato 
before me”? The epistemological disjunctivist is quick to highlight that our 
ordinary thought and talk suggests that our basic perceptual reasons can be 
(as good as) factive reasons—which are precisely not the reasons the 
Cartesian picture has long suggested are the best we have. 
 Epistemological disjunctivism is most readily associated with the view 
defended by Duncan Pritchard with inspiration from John McDowell. Their 
brand of epistemological disjunctivism can seem even more radical yet. For it 
says that one can perceptually know that p because one believes that p for 
the reason that one sees that p—this reason being not only factive but 
reflectively accessible to the subject whose knowledge is in question. It is 
with this sort of view that we are largely concerned with in this project. 
 
* * * 
 
In this thesis I develop the sort of view that Pritchard defends in what I think 
is a new and fruitful direction by invoking a distinction between ‘merely 
functional’ and ‘judgmental’ perceptual belief (and knowledge). On the view I 
will defend one can enjoy perceptual knowledge at the judgmental level 
courtesy of rational support furnished by one’s perceptual knowledge of the 
same proposition at the merely functional level. It is an epistemological 
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disjunctivism about distinctively judgmental perceptual knowledge, where this 
is kept distinct from the kind of knowledge one enjoys at the merely functional 
level. 
 I think that there are good reasons to pursue a development of 
Pritchard’s view along these lines—two reasons in particular that I make a 
big deal about in this project. 
 First, an epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual 
knowledge is inoculated against what I call and later motivate as the 
internalist challenge. It is a key component of Pritchard’s view that perception 
provides one with knowledge by providing one with reasons—indeed factive 
and reflectively accessible reasons—for perceptual belief. This is meant to 
capture an important ‘internalist’ insight; something Pritchard clearly 
advertises as a virtue of his position. But recently it has emerged that 
Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism may be in need of further motivation 
on this score. For instance, why should anyone want to throw their hat in with 
the internalist in thinking that it’s because there is something that is the 
subject’s reason for believing that p that she perceptually knows that p when 
she does. You can imagine a thoroughgoing externalist wanting to know. In 
other words it’s hardly clear that there actually is some such internalist 
‘insight’ worth accommodating in a theory of perceptual knowledge. Now 
while it is certainly open for epistemological disjunctivists like Pritchard to 
follow McDowell (2011) in emphasizing that it is with respect to distinctively 
human perceptual knowledge that epistemological disjunctivism makes its 
claims, this only raises the further question: what is it exactly about such 
distinctively human perceptual knowledge that lends itself to the relevant 
internalist interpretation? This is the internalist challenge. It challenges 
disjunctivists like Pritchard to vindicate the internalist intuitions they claim to 
do well to protect.  
 Epistemological disjunctivists have had little if anything to say in 
response to the internalist challenge. Importantly however I’ll argue that this 
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challenge doesn’t even begin to take hold if we reconceive epistemological 
disjunctivism along the lines of my positive proposal—that is, in terms of 
judgmental perceptual knowledge; a species of specifically judgmental belief. 
That is because, as I maintain, there is an independently well-motivated 
conception of judgmental belief according to which this just is something that 
involves motivating reasons. The result is that the epistemological 
disjunctivist no longer has extra explaining to do about why they side with the 
internalist in thinking that perception should provide one with knowledge by 
providing one with reasons for belief. After all so long as it is part of the 
nature of the target knowledge-apt belief that it involve one’s believing 
something on the basis of a reason in this way, then epistemological 
disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge wears that explanation 
on its sleeve. 
 Not only that, I think that—secondly—an epistemological disjunctivism 
of the kind advanced here supports a novel solution to the so-called basis 
problem for epistemological disjunctivism. This is the problem of explaining 
how one could know that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p—as 
the disjunctivist maintains—if seeing that p entails knowing that p on account 
of being the way in which one knows that p (i.e. ‘the entailment thesis’). In 
order to manoeuvre around the problem Pritchard and others have tried to 
motivate rejecting the entailment thesis (or what we later call for perspicuity 
the SwK thesis, or ‘seeing as a way of knowing’ thesis). By contrast I’ll argue 
that epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge 
supports a different strategy for overcoming the basis problem—one that 
leaves the popular entailment thesis entirely intact. In particular, I will argue 
that once we integrate what I call the bifurcated conception of perceptual 
knowledge then we can help ourselves to a picture on which one can 
perceptually know that p on the judgmental level on the rational basis of 
one’s seeing that p without issue, and even if seeing that p entails knowing 
that p. As I argue, what is crucial here is that the perceptual knowledge that 
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seeing that p in entails is perceptual knowledge only on the merely functional 
level. 
 We will discover that while I am not the first to advance a form of 
epistemological disjunctivism that can be made consistent with the entailment 
thesis, our view is the first to be made consistent both with the entailment 
thesis and the thought that perceptual knowledge can be reduced to a kind of 
justified or rationally supported belief. We will see that this makes 
epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge unique 
insofar as it can be made consistent with the kind of reductive conception 
that Pritchard seems to be aiming at only without the apparent deficit of 
having to reject the thought that seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p. 
 
* * * 
 
That then is the positive proposal. Call it epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge: in paradigmatic cases of judgmental 
perceptual knowledge one knows that p in virtue of sustaining a perceptual 
judgment to the effect that p for the reason that one sees that p—where this 
factive reason is a way of knowing that p on the merely functional level. 
Potentially our proposal faces a number of new challenges that have arisen 
more recently for epistemological disjunctivism. In this thesis I endeavour to 
defend our positive proposal by confronting some of these challenges head 
on. Most important are the ‘New Evil Genius’ challenge and a flurry of new 
challenges surrounding the reflective accessibility component associated with 
popular presentations of epistemological disjunctivism.  
 Start with the new evil genius challenge. Like any epistemological 
disjunctivist view, ours entails that one’s reasons in the ‘good case’ are much 
better than the reasons one has in the corresponding ‘bad case’ (where one 
is radically deceived) for sustaining a given perceptual judgmental belief. For 
it goes without saying that if one is in the bad case and so is radically 
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deceived then one doesn’t see anything at all, much less see that anything is 
the case. While things may certainly seem otherwise in the bad case, the 
lesson is not that one’s basic perceptual reasons are something other than 
what common sense says they are. Rather according to the epistemological 
disjunctivist this only indicates that one can be fooled into thinking that one is 
in possession of factive reasons for sustaining perceptual judgments. 
 But this immediately creates a problem for our view and really any 
epistemological disjunctivist view—a problem that has yet to receive explicit 
treatment in this context. We can view the problem this way. Surely subjects 
in the bad case are in some sense faultless for sustaining perceptual 
judgments that p when they seem to see that p. And it seems implausible 
that this is only a brute fact about their situation. Cartesians can provide a 
straightforward explanation of this: a subject in the bad case has every 
reason a subject has in the corresponding good case for sustaining the 
relevant perceptual judgment (later on we call this the ‘new evil genius’ 
thesis). And that is why subjects in the bad case are faultless for sustaining 
their perceptual judgment in the relevant way. This line of explanation is 
clearly unavailable to the epistemological disjunctivist, however.  
 This is one way of getting at the ‘new evil genius’ challenge for 
epistemological disjunctivism—a challenge that we will tackle here. In so 
many words I argue that the disjunctivist can explain why subjects in the bad 
case are faultless or blameless for believing what they do without having to 
concede to the Cartesian that they have every reason one has in the good 
case for sustaining perceptual judgments. To think otherwise, I contend, is to 
confuse sustaining a judgment in a way that is epistemically responsible 
and/or reasonable with actually having good epistemic reasons for sustaining 
the judgment at issue. That much addresses the relevant ‘first-order’ 
problem. But a complete response to the new evil genius challenge should 
also address what I call the ‘diagnostic’ problem: the problem of explaining 
what then motivates the Cartesian (or ‘classical internalist’) to assimilate 
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epistemic responsibility and/or reasonability with actually having good 
reasons for sustaining perceptual judgments upon reflecting on the 
justification available in pairs of good and bad cases. Here I propose 
tentatively that this is rooted in a commitment on their part to provide a 
certain ‘vindicating’ conception of the rational support available for perceptual 
knowledge.  
 Lastly, I say something to address the flurry of recent challenges for 
epistemological disjunctivism to emerge in connection with the idea that one 
can have specifically reflective access to the fact that one sees that p. As I 
explain these new ‘reflective access’ challenges are slightly different from the 
more familiar ‘access problem’ for epistemological disjunctivism. What they 
all have in common, of course, is that they depend upon our incorporating a 
reflective accessibility condition in our presentation of epistemological 
disjunctivism. At the end of this thesis I say something to undercut the force 
of these challenges—in particular by offering reasons to suspect that we 
need maintain that factive reasons are reflectively accessible as opposed to 
non-reflectively (i.e. straightforwardly empirically) accessible. This opens the 
door to simply dropping the reflective accessibility component altogether, at 
which point any challenge that turns on that component simply evaporates.  
 I attempt to accomplish this through what may at first seem like a 
circuitous route. I embark upon an analysis of the underdetermination-based 
radical sceptical problem, and in particular of Pritchard’s claim that his 
reflective epistemological disjunctivism is indispensible for overcoming that 
problem. What I hope to show in the end is that Pritchard is wrong about 
that—that we needn’t think that unless one enjoys reflective access to one’s 
factive reasons we cannot provide the sort of solution to the radical sceptical 
problem that Pritchard thinks we should be aiming for. But then, I suggest, 
this puts considerable pressure on the reflective accessibility component. For 
if in order to answer the radical sceptical challenge it isn’t necessary that one 
subscribe to rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible 
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(as opposed to empirically accessible), then it can seem as though the 
reflective accessibility condition isn’t doing much work at all in the theory. For 
this reason I conclude that at least for the time being it isn’t clear that 
disjunctivists need subscribe to the reflective accessibility condition.  
 
* * * 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters and an appendix. The first orients the 
reader to epistemological disjunctivism, providing what I think is a well-
organized summary of the relevant literature. The second and third chapters 
introduce and then motivate epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental 
perceptual knowledge, first in connection with the internalist challenge and 
then with respect to the familiar basis problem for epistemological 
disjunctivism. The fourth and fifth chapters then serve to defend our positive 
proposal against challenges that have recently emerged for epistemological 
disjunctivism more generally, and which we have just now summarized. 
Chapter four confronts the new evil genius challenge. And chapter five 
discusses Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism in connection with 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism in order to say something to 
defend our view against a flurry of new challenges that have emerged in 
connection with the idea that factive rational support can be accessible upon 
reflection alone. I then offer a concluding statement. In the appendix I make 
an excursion into religious epistemology. Here I explore the ramifications of a 
distinctively religious epistemological disjunctivism for the epistemology of 
ordinary theistic belief. My main goal here is to challenge the widespread 
assumption that since the ‘theist in the street’ is unaware of any potentially 
convincing arguments for theism he or she is not in position to offer 
independent rational support for believing that God exists. I make my case by 
defending a ‘Moorean’-style proof for theism—a proof for the existence of 
God that parallels in structure G.E. Moore’s original proof for the existence of 
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an external world. In making this defense I appeal to an epistemological 
disjunctivism about religious perceptual knowledge—which states that when 
one knows that God is manifesting Himself to one in a given way on the basis 
of a suitable religious experience one can enjoy factive and reflectively 
accessible rational support for this belief. The appendix is aligned well with 
the more general ambitions of this thesis—viz., to model how epistemological 
disjunctivism might be fruitfully developed in new directions.  
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          CHAPTER ONE 
 





 Introduction  
 
This opening chapter orients the reader to epistemological disjunctivism, with 
a view toward pointing the way to the chapters that follow. Here is the plan. I 
begin by introducing epistemological disjunctivism in very general terms, 
before narrowing in to consider the specific version of the view at issue in this 
project. In the opening section I highlight some of the key differences among 
those who advance epistemological disjunctivist views in the literature, 
followed by my providing what I think is a helpful rubric for conceptualizing 
the relevant territory. The rest of the chapter targets the specific version of 
epistemological disjunctivism with which we are concerned in this project: 
that defended by Duncan Pritchard with inspiration from John McDowell. In 
the second section I consider the positive case for a view of this kind, before 
finally highlighting some problems and challenges for it. This opening 
chapter—more than providing a tour of the relevant literature—provides the 
reader with some helpful perspective on the topics we address later on. 
 
 §1 Introducing Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
Epistemological disjunctivism is usually understood as view about the rational 
support that can be made available for ordinary perceptual knowledge. In 
particular a disjunctivist will maintain that when one knows that something is 
so because one sees that it’s the case, one can enjoy a kind of factive 
rational support for believing this that one would not enjoy if one were instead 
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merely hallucinating. For example John McDowell (1982) (1995) (2011) 
advances a view that entails that when one knows that there is a tomato 
before one on the basis of seeing it there one enjoys rational support for 
believing this that “puts one in position” to know it. For McDowell that is to 
say that one enjoys factive rational support comprised of one’s seeing that 
there is a tomato—‘factive’ insofar as seeing that there is a tomato entails 
that it’s true that there is a tomato. Notice that this is rational support that one 
could not possibly enjoy if it had only seemed to one that there is a tomato as 
a result of a hallucination. After all in absence of a tomato one cannot enjoy 
rational support that entails the presence of one. Very well. But what makes 
the position disjunctivist? Why does that locution apply? 
 
1.1 What Is So ‘Disjunctivist’ About Epistemological Disjunctivism? 
 
Let’s say that anything that is introspectively indistinguishable from an event 
of seeing that p is a visual experience that p. This means that visual 
experiences that p are neutral between hallucinations that p and events of 
seeing that p—at least on the standard interpretation of what hallucinations 
are.1 With this bit of terminology in tow we can distinguish certain ‘good 
cases’ from their corresponding ‘bad cases’. In the good case one 
perceptually knows that p because one’s visual experience that p is a seeing 
that p. In the bad case one does not perceptually know that p because one’s 
visual experience that p is instead a hallucination that p. 
 Now on a familiar Cartesian conception the kind of rational support 
one enjoys in the good case—where one perceptually knows that p—is the 
same as the kind of rational support one enjoys in the corresponding bad 
case.2 It makes no difference which case one is in—not where rational 
support for suitable perceptual beliefs is concerned. Where that is concerned 
the good and bad cases are of the same kind. Or in other words it doesn’t 
matter whether one’s case is such that one sees that p—all that matters is 
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whether one’s case is such that it’s introspectively indistinguishable from a 
case in which one does. You can put this Cartesian idea to work in advance 
of an argument against McDowell’s idea that in good cases one can enjoy as 
good as factive rational support for suitable perceptual beliefs: 
 
 Argument from Introspective Indistinguishability 
 
1) The ‘good case’ in which one perceptually knows that p is 
introspectively indistinguishable from a corresponding ‘bad case’ in 
which one thinks one knows that p but merely hallucinates that p. 
2) Therefore, one has rational support for believing p in the good case 
only if one has the same level of rational support for believing p in the 
corresponding bad case. 
3) One does not enjoy better than non-factive rational support for 
believing p in the bad case. 
4) Therefore, one does not enjoy better than non-factive rational support 
for believing p in the good case.   
 
The intermediate conclusion (2) is effectively the Cartesian claim that for any 
pairing of good and bad cases these cases are the same insofar as the 
rational support available for suitable perceptual beliefs is concerned. It is 
important to notice that a view like McDowell’s will reject that idea outright. 
The claim here is that it is by no means obvious that (2) should follows from 
(1).3 Rather we should think that the most perspicuous characterization of the 
case in which one visually experiences that p is a disjunctive one: it is either 
a case in which one enjoys factive rational support for the relevant perceptual 
belief, or else it is a case in which one does not (perhaps one enjoys only 
nonfactive rational support).  
 The result is a disjunctivism that is distinctively epistemological in 
character. After all, it isn’t (necessarily) owing to some crucial mental (or 
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metaphysical) difference between cases in which one visually experiences 
that p that these get sorted into different kinds. But rather it is owing to a 
difference in the kind of rational support available for suitable perceptual 
beliefs. 
 
1.2   Varieties of Epistemological Disjunctivism     
  
By now there is considerable variety among those who advance 
epistemological disjunctivist views. For a start Duncan Pritchard (2012a) 
(2016), Alan Millar (2010) (2011a) (2011b) (2014) (2016) and John McDowell 
(1982) (1995) (2011) all endorse the idea that the kind of rational support 
available for perceptual knowledge in good cases is not only factive but 
reflectively accessible as well. But not every proponent of epistemological 
disjunctivism seems to agree. 
 Susanna Schellenberg (2013) (2016), for example, denies this. While 
she defends a view on which subjects in good cases enjoy both ‘phenomenal 
evidence’ and ‘factive evidence’ for perceptual beliefs, she maintains that it is 
always “unbeknownst to the subject” whether one enjoys factive evidence in 
addition to phenomenal evidence (2016, p. 880), adding that “we need not 
think that what is accessible from the first-person perspective dictates what is 
rational to heed” (ibid., 881).4 
 Moreover some describe Timothy Williamson’s (2000) E=K thesis as 
entailing a kind of epistemological disjunctivism (cf. Smithies 2012). That 
seems easy enough to accommodate, given the rather general terms in 
which we have characterized epistemological disjunctivism. Consider that if it 
is true that your evidence includes all and only what you know (E=K)—or 
even all and only what you know non-inferentially (E=NIK) (cf. Littlejohn 
2011)—then it seems to follow that one enjoys a kind of factive evidential 
support in the good case that one doesn’t enjoy in the corresponding bad 
case for a given perceptual belief.5 After all since in the good case but not the 
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bad case one knows that, say, there is a tomato before one, one enjoys a 
kind of factive evidential support for believing this consisting solely of the fact 
itself. But, crucially, no one should think that the fact that there is a tomato 
before one is reflectively accessible. The view is thus similar to 
Schellenberg’s in this regard.   
 Secondly some epistemological disjunctivists develop their view in 
advance of a conception of perceptual warrant—that is, the stuff in the good 
case that turns true belief into perceptual knowledge. Pritchard for example 
will argue that perceptual knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by the 
kind of factive (and, for him, reflectively accessible) rational support at issue. 
By contrast someone like Alan Millar (2008a) (2010), while in agreement that 
perceptual knowledge can enjoy factive rational support, has a very different 
idea about what makes for perceptual knowledge in such cases. For him one 
enjoys perceptual knowledge by virtue of exercising certain perceptual-
recognitional abilities—where these are not abilities to come to know things 
on the basis of reasons, factive or otherwise. Instead he advances his 
epistemological disjunctivism in service of a conception of perceptual 
justification, which isn’t itself a component of perceptual knowledge. For him 
perceptual beliefs are justified although not known on the basis of factive 
rational support. Note that we will come back to discuss Millar’s view in more 
depth in chapter three in connection with the so-called ‘basis problem’ for 
epistemological disjunctivism.   
 Lastly, epistemological disjunctivists differ still more concerning the 
role of perceptual experiences in all this. In principle you can imagine a 
proponent of epistemological disjunctivism reserving no role at all for 
perceptual experience in explaining why one has factive rational support for 
perceptual beliefs in good cases. For example you can imagine a proponent 
of E=K adopting a form of reliabilism about perceptual knowledge that entails 
that perceptual experiences are irrelevant for explaining why the mechanisms 
that produce perceptual beliefs are reliable mechanisms. On the view that 
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results one enjoys factive evidential/rational support for their perceptual 
beliefs in good cases, but never on account of some feature of one’s 
perceptual experiences. 
 More familiar are disjunctivist views that, by contrast, make it very 
clear that it is the business of perceptual experiences themselves to furnish 
factive rational support for perceptual knowledge. John McDowell (2013) for 
example thinks that it’s owing to the kind of representing an experience does 
when it puts one in position to know that things are as it represents them to 
be that one enjoys factive rational support for perceptual beliefs. In particular 
he writes that: 
 
“If an experience is a seeing, we can say that the representing it does 
is its revealing or disclosing a certain environmental reality; that is, its 
bringing a certain reality into view for the subject” (2013, p. 147).6 
 
By contrast, if an experience is not a seeing—if in particular it is a mere 
hallucination—then one’s experience represents in a way that merely 
appears to do that.  
 It is important to notice that for McDowell it is not as though it is an 
accidental feature of a visual experience that it ‘discloses an environmental 
reality’ to an experiencing subject. Rather for him this looks to be part of the 
nature of the visual experience, impacting as it does on the experiences 
“subjective character”. It seems safe to say then that on a view like 
McDowell’s it is part of the nature of one’s experience that it furnishes one 
with factive rational support for a suitable perceptual belief when it does.7 But 
we should not lose sight of the fact that this is strictly optional. Alternatively, it 
may be owing to the way one’s perceptual experience is produced that it 
furnishes one with factive rational support, where of course it’s being 
produced in a given way needn’t have any impact on its subjective character.  
 Ernest Sosa (2011), for example, defends a version of epistemological 
disjunctivism according to which experiences play their role in just this way. 
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For him it is because a given visual experience is an apt experience that it 
furnishes one with factive rational support in good cases—rational support in 
terms of one’s seeing that p to be the case. An apt experience is one that is 
produced in a particular way. It is one that represents the world accurately in 
a way that manifests an ability on the part of the subject to do so well 
enough: in Sosa’s terms it is a visual experience that is accurate because 
competent (or adroit). But, importantly, Sosa need not think that an 
experience’s manifesting competence in this way impacts upon its subjective 
character. For why couldn’t one enjoy an experience of the same mental kind 
as an apt experience while in the bad case? Here we seem to have an 
epistemological disjunctivism on which perceptual experiences can provide 
subjects with factive rational support for perceptual beliefs, without it being 
part of the nature of a perceptual experience that is provides this factive 
rational support.  
 That’s enough to provide the reader with a sense of the diversity that 
exists among proponents of epistemological disjunctivism. I think we can do 
a better job of schematizing all this. In the next subsection I’ll provide what I 
think is a helpful rubric not only for classifying existing versions of 
epistemological disjunctivism, but also for charting the kinds of possibilities 
there are for the view. 
 
1.3 The Possibilities for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
I think that we can helpfully represent the possibilities for epistemological 
disjunctivism in terms of three levels, with two options at each level. As it 
ascends the levels epistemological disjunctivism becomes more involved, 
progressing from minimal, to standard, to a robust conception of 
epistemological disjunctivism. Moreover we can imagine that horizontally 
there are at least two options at each level—what I will call the warrant option 
and the reflective accessibility option—so that by adding either one or both 
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options we can further ‘beef up’ a given disjunctivist view. I think that this is a 
helpful scheme for mapping out the relevant territory. I’ll introduce the levels 
first, and then the two options. Note that we will refer back to the essential 
elements of this scheme in the final chapter of this thesis when we bring our 
positive proposal to bear on the issue of underdetermination-based radical 
scepticism.  
 At our first level, then, epistemological disjunctivism says simply that 
when one knows that p on the basis of visual perception one’s rational 
support for believing that p can be as good as factive rational support—
rational support that one could not have unless p were true. This represents 
so far only a minimal epistemological disjunctivism, since it’s potentially the 
least committed version on offer. In particular, at this first level we are not 
obliged to hold that it’s owing to some feature of one’s visual experience that 
one enjoys factive rational support in good cases.  
 That obligation you incur upon ascending to the second level. Here we 
assign it to visual experiences to furnish one with factive rational support for 
perceptual beliefs. Here we have something closer to the standard 
conception of epistemological disjunctivism, since I think it’s closer to how 
most conceive of the view. That is to say that probably most conceive of 
epistemological disjunctivism not merely as a view about there being factive 
rational support available for perceptual beliefs, but more particularly a view 
about the capacity of visual experiences to furnish such factive rational 
support.8 Still, on the second level we reserve the right to say that it’s only an 
accidental feature of visual experiences that they make available factive 
rational support when they do. In particular there is no obligation here to think 
that this part of the nature of one’s visual experience in good cases.9 
 That obligation you incur, finally, upon ascending to the third level. On 
the robust conception of epistemological disjunctivism that results it is 
assumed not only that perceptual knowledge can enjoy factive rational 
support courtesy of visual experiences, but more than that it is part of the 
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nature of one’s visual experience that it furnish the factive rational support at 
issue. In other words it is because of some important mental difference 
between one’s visual experience in the good and bad cases that one’s 
experience in the good case makes available factive rational support. An 
epistemological disjunctivism at this level thus seems committed to a form of 
metaphysical disjunctivism.10 
 With our three levels now in view, what are the two options? At each 
of our three levels we can imagine adding one, both, or neither of two 
options: what we can call the warrant option and the reflective accessibility 
option. 
 A version of epistemological disjunctivism, at whichever level, takes 
the warrant option if it conceives of the factive rational support at issue as 
functioning to warrant one’s perceptual belief in good cases—that is, by 
providing whatever extra ingredient takes true perceptual belief to perceptual 
knowledge.11 It’s natural to conceive of an epistemological disjunctivism that 
accepts the warrant option as aiming for a reductive analysis of perceptual 
knowledge in terms of believing something on the basis of a factive reason.12  
 A version of epistemological disjunctivism, at whatever level, takes the 
reflective accessibility option if it conceives of the kind rational support 
available in the good case as not only factive but reflectively accessible as 
well. A version of epistemological disjunctivism along these lines is thought to 
secure an important ‘internalist’ desideratum with respect to perceptual 
knowledge. For it seemingly subscribes to a form of ‘accessibilist’ internalism 
that requires a subject to have good reflectively accessible reasons for what 
they claim to know.13  
 I think that this scheme helps us to imagine a spectrum of views 
ranging from barely minimal to maximally robust versions of epistemological 
disjunctivism. We can conceive of a barely minimal epistemological 
disjunctivism in terms of a first-level view that accepts neither the warrant nor 
the reflective accessibility options. At the opposite end we can conceive of a 
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maximally robust epistemological disjunctivism in terms of a third-level view 
that accepts both the warrant and the reflective accessibility options. 
Maximally robust versions have been defended by Duncan Pritchard and 
John McDowell, and have received nearly all the attention in the literature. 
For this reason the discussion that follows will be conducted largely in terms 
of the debate surrounding this sort of view. In the next section I review the 
positive case for an epistemological disjunctivism of the sort Pritchard and 




§2 The Case for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
Duncan Pritchard advances an epistemological disjunctivism according to 
which in paradigmatic cases one knows that p by virtue of believing that p for 
the reason that one sees that p—this being not only factive but reflectively 
accessible to the subject. It is meant to be that the view preserves an 
‘internalist’ insight to the effect that perception provides one with knowledge 
by providing one with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing 
what they do—something we’ll discuss further below. Let’s follow 
Cunningham (2016) and call this specific version of epistemological 
disjunctivism ‘reflective epistemological disjunctivism’ or RED.  
 What is it about RED that makes it attractive? Exactly what do we 
stand to gain if RED is true? It has been claimed in this connection that RED 
represents a rapprochement between ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ thinking in 
epistemology, and also that it frees us from the grip of certain radical 
sceptical problems. I’ll discuss each of these in what follows, before turning 
to review arguments for thinking that RED is true. 
 
2.1 The Significance of Epistemological Disjunctivism  
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2.1.1 Internalism vs. Externalism 
 
It’s easy to appreciate why RED can seem like a tantalizing view. For if one’s 
rational support for perceptual knowledge can be both factive and reflectively 
accessible then there seems to be scope for accommodating within a single 
view both internalist and externalist insights in epistemology in 
unprecedented fashion. After all if one’s rational support is factive then we 
secure the robust connection between one’s epistemic support and the truth 
that externalists often complain is missing from standard internalist 
accounts.14 But if this rational support is reflectively accessible as well then 
we also vouchsafe the kind of robust epistemic responsibility that internalists 
often complain if missing from standard externalist accounts of perceptual 
knowledge.  
 In this way you might think that RED reflects a kind of ‘internalist 
externalism’ that goes far beyond the sort defended by William Alston (1988). 
For according to RED it is not as though one has reflective access only to 
one’s grounds for an item of perceptual knowledge and not also to the 
adequacy of those grounds to rationally support the perceptual belief at 
issue—as things stand on Alston’s view. Rather if one enjoys reflectively 
accessible rational grounds in terms of one’s seeing that p—as RED 
maintains—then the fact that those grounds are adequate to support 
believing that p is seemingly read straight off the grounds themselves. That 
seeing that p entails p is something that one can determine easily upon 
reflection, and so it seems to follow that one has reflective access both to 
one’s perceptual grounds and to the adequacy of those grounds to support 
one’s belief in a case of perceptual knowledge.15 It is in this connection that 
Pritchard conceives of RED as the ‘holy grail’ of epistemology (cf. 2012a, p. 
1). 
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 Some are sceptical, however, that RED properly accommodates the 
internalist’s insight (cf. Boult 2017; Goldberg 2016). After all it is standard 
fare for internalists to accept the so-called ‘New Evil Genius’ thesis (NEG). 
This is the thought behind the Cartesian conception of perceptual reasons 
already mentioned in §1 above: that one’s reflectively accessible rational 
support in the good case is no better than it is in the corresponding bad case, 
say, where one is a ‘brain in a vat’ (BIV) under the control of an evil genius. 
In this way it is thought that we should restrict the range of facts that are 
reflectively accessible to one in the good case to those also available to 
one’s non-factive mental state duplicate in the corresponding bad case. As 
we have already seen, however, the epistemological disjunctivist doesn’t see 
that there is ultimately any good reason to be restrictive in this way. And so if 
there is supposed to be some classical internalist insight that hinges on our 
accepting the NEG thesis, the epistemological disjunctivist will want to hear 
more about why this represents a genuine insight. Until then she will be 
perfectly content to advertise her position as a non-classical internalist view.  
 Of course that still leaves the proponent of RED with the task of 
providing some alternative explanation of the intuitions that seem to motivate 
the NEG thesis. That’s an important challenge for epistemological 
disjunctivism that we’ll describe further below. Indeed it’s a challenge that we 
address directly and in detail in chapter four of this thesis. 
 
2.1.2 Radical Scepticism 
 
Arguably epistemological disjunctivism is most alluring in connection with 
radical scepticism about ordinary perceptual knowledge. Epistemological 
disjunctivists have invoked their view for solving both the closure-based and 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical problems (cf. Pritchard 2012a, 
2016a; Schonbaumsfeld 2016; Neta 2002, 2003).  
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 Genia Schonbaumsfeld (2016) promotes epistemological disjunctivism 
in connection with this familiar closure-based radical sceptical argument: 
 
 Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Argument 
 
1) If I know I have two hands, then I know I’m not a BIV. 
2) I don’t know I’m not a BIV. 
3) Therefore, I don’t know I have two hands. (Schonbaumsfeld 2016, p. 
7) 
 
This argument is closure-based since it trades on a simple closure principle 
for knowledge to the effect that you can know anything you recognize to be 
logically implied by what you know. Fred Dretske (1970) (2005) is well known 
for having disputed premise (1) of this sceptical argument by rejecting the 
closure principle. By contrast Schonbaumsfeld employs epistemological 
disjunctivism in service of a different response to this argument—one that 
rejects premise (2) instead.16 Of course an obvious benefit of this approach is 
that it is consistent with what many regard as an eminently plausible closure 
principle.  
 Schonbaumsfeld argues that it is because Dretske could not see how 
the reasons supplied by perceptual experience transmit to more 
‘heavyweight’ propositions such as that one is not a BIV that he thought it 
necessary to deny the closure principle. But the reason he couldn’t see 
that—argues Schonbaumsfeld—is because he was under the spell of the 
Cartesian conception of perceptual reasons, or the “reasons identity” thesis, 
which says that “the perceptual reasons that the good case gives one access 
to […] are the same as the reasons that the bad case provides one with” 
(ibid., p. 3). But if that is false, since in the good case one has reasons 
Schonbaumsfeld captures in terms of “factive experiences”, then there is no 
obvious reason for thinking that such reasons cannot also be reasons for 
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thinking that, say, one is not a BIV. Thus Schonbaumsfeld thinks that if we 
adopt epistemological disjunctivism we are afforded a means of rejecting 
premise (2) of the closure-based sceptical argument at the same time that we 
are able to diagnose why some have (mistakenly) found it so compelling.17    
 Pritchard (2016a) argues that RED is particularly suited for 
overcoming the underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox: 
 
 The Underdetermination-based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
 
1) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s perceptual belief 
that p over the hypothesis that one is only a BIV merely hallucinating 
that p. 
2) Unless one can enjoy rational support that favors one’s perceptual 
beliefs in this way, one cannot have rationally supported knowledge 
that p. 
3) One can enjoy rationally supported perceptual knowledge that p. 
(adapted from Pritchard 2016, p. 34) 
 
This is an underdetermination-based rather than closure-based radical 
sceptical problem since its second claim hinges on what Pritchard calls the 
underdetermination principle: 
 
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S 
lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks rationally 
grounded knowledge that p. (Pritchard ibid.) 
 
Pritchard argues that since we ought not reject this principle the only viable 
solution to the paradox is to motivate some rejection of claim (1). Fortunately 
that seems a rather straightforward task for the proponent of epistemological 
disjunctivism: for this is only a matter of the same bad Cartesian thinking 
getting in the way again. Claim (1) only looks compelling because it has 
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seemed impossible to make room for epistemological disjunctivism, leading 
us to think that we have no other option but to accept the NEG thesis. But 
this entails what Pritchard calls the insularity of reasons thesis: the thought 
that the kind of rational support one enjoys even in good cases is of a sort 
that is consistent with one’s being widely mistaken in one’s perceptual 
beliefs. It’s this thought that makes claim (1) seem true—that makes it seem 
that even in good cases where one knows that there is a tomato on the table 
one’s reasons for thinking so cannot favor this belief over the hypothesis that 
one is only hallucinating a tomato that is not there.  
 But of course this Cartesian package is precisely what is contested 
between proponents of RED and their detractors. Since on RED one enjoys 
rational support for perceptual knowledge that one could not have unless 
what one believed were true, one enjoys rational support that is clearly better 
than the kind one would have in the bad case—indeed which is inconsistent 
with one’s being wildly mistaken in one’s perceptual beliefs. But then surely 
it’s obvious how such rational support can favor one’s perceptual beliefs in 
the required way. In this way RED promises an escape from the above 
paradox by furnishing resources for rejecting claim (1), even in step with what 
Pritchard calls an ‘undercutting’ anti-sceptical strategy.18 
 This is just a sampling of how epistemologists have put 
epistemological disjunctivism to work for getting to grips with radical sceptical 
problems.19 We will return to think about underdetermination-based radical 
scepticism in connection with RED in the final chapter of this thesis. There I 
explore this radical sceptical problem in more detail, and challenge 
Pritchard’s suggestion that his version of epistemological disjunctivism is not 
only sufficient for overcoming that problem, but necessary as well (“vital”, in 
his terms). Part of what will emerge here is that whether one’s factive rational 
support is ‘reflective accessible’ is actually a wheel turning idly in the debate 
with the underdetermination-based radical sceptic. That is a potential game 
changer for epistemological disjunctivism, since it relieves entirely the 
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pressure that has been building for the view from new modifications of the 
so-called ‘access problem’ (to be discussed below).   
 
2.2 Arguments for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
I will now turn to discuss arguments for thinking that epistemological 
disjunctivism is true. I think you can discern at least three such arguments in 
the literature: an argument from common sense; an argument to do with the 
termination of inquiry and responsible vouching for what we see or have seen 
to be the case; and an argument from ‘reflective luck’. In what follows I will 
describe each argument in turn, with apologies that we haven’t the space to 
evaluate any in great depth.  
 
2.2.1 The Argument from Common Sense 
 
To start, proponents of epistemological disjunctivism often claim that their 
view follows from simply taking our ordinary justificatory practices at face 
value. When we imagine for example what reasons we have to think 
ourselves entitled to our ordinary perceptual beliefs we don’t usually think of 
reasons we might have anyway even if what we believed were false. In 
particular we don’t imagine ourselves as being entitled to our perceptual 
beliefs on the basis of visual experiences conceived in such a way so that 
they are neutral between seeings and mere hallucinations. Rather we 
ordinarily have something more robust in mind—e.g. that we can just see that 
there is, for example, a tomato—something that entails the presence of a real 
tomato. And moreover it’s factive considerations like this that we typically 
appeal to when asked to defend ourselves for holding a given perceptual 
belief.20  
 In this way proponents of epistemological disjunctivism argue that 
theirs is the default view. The idea being that since disjunctivism represents 
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the pre-theoretical or common sense conception it should be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. It matters a great deal then whether the view can 
weather the storm of the kinds of challenges and problems that have been 
raised for the view that we’ll discuss later in the final section. But before 
getting to that I’ll review two more arguments for epistemological 
disjunctivism—one advanced by Alan Millar and the other from John 
McDowell.  
 
2.2.2 The Argument from Inquiry and Responsible Vouching 
 
One can discern from Alan Millar’s (2010) (2011) work a kind of argument 
from the best explanation for thinking that epistemological disjunctivism is 
true. Millar argues that unless perceptual knowledge is sometimes “well 
founded” in a sense that entails epistemological disjunctivism, certain 
ubiquitous phenomena seem entirely inexplicable. He highlights two such 
phenomena in particular. First, that inquiries into whether p are often 
terminated by one’s coming to see that p in a way that satisfies one’s 
concern to know whether p is true. And secondly, that we are often able to 
responsibly vouch for the truth of things that we see or have seen to be the 
case. These are routine matters, thinks Millar, because often in coming to 
see that p we get into positions in which it can be settled for us that p. His 
idea is that we are hard pressed to explain how we so often get into these 
positions short of invoking the idea that perceptual knowledge can enjoy 
reflectively accessible factive rational support. 
 Imagine for example that you want to learn whether there are 
tomatoes in the fridge before setting off for the grocery store. Looking in the 
fridge you see and thereby come to know that you already have tomatoes. 
Naturally we think that this should ‘settle it’ for you that you have tomatoes in 
a way that satisfies your concern to know whether you do, so that at this 
point your inquiry into the matter is properly terminated. Consider that we 
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would think it very odd if this were not enough for you—if you were to go on 
investigating whether you have tomatoes by, for example, seeking out a 
second opinion. More than that having now seen that you have tomatoes we 
now think that this puts you in position to responsibly vouch for the fact that 
you have some if a third party were interested to know. Millar suggests that 
all this is very natural if epistemological disjunctivism is true. For if by looking 
in the fridge you can acquire factive rational support for thinking that you 
have tomatoes furnished by the fact that you can see that you have some, 
then—on Millar’s view—that makes all the difference between realizing that 
you know that you have tomatoes as opposed to realizing only that you have 
some evidence for thinking so. That’s important since merely realizing that 
one has some evidence for thinking that something is true is not to have 
things settled on the matter so that one can responsibly vouch for its being 
true or terminate one’s inquiry in a way that satisfies one’s wanting to know 
the truth. For it would seem as though one would need some kind of 
insurance that one’s evidence is not misleading. 
 To better see Millar’s point imagine that epistemological disjunctivism 
is false. Imagine that the NEG thesis is true so that by looking in the fridge 
the kind of rational support you acquire for thinking that you have tomatoes is 
rational support you might have anyway even if you had no tomatoes. Say for 
example you acquire only nonfactive rational support in terms of its looking to 
you as though you have tomatoes in the fridge. Now even if on some 
conception this can add up to your coming to know that you have tomatoes in 
the fridge, Millar’s thought is that it doesn’t add up to your realizing that you 
know this as opposed to realizing only that you have some evidence for 
thinking this is true—evidence that may in the end, for all you know, turn out 
to have been misleading. But that hardly sustains a basis for explanation of 
why, by coming to see that p, it is so often settled for us that p so that we can 
conclude our inquiries into whether p in a way that satisfies our wanting to 
know the truth of the matter. Much less how coming to see that p puts you 
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into position to responsibly vouch for p. (Consider how this sounds: p but I 
can’t tell whether I know this rather than only having some evidence for 
thinking it is true). In any case this seems to be Millar’s argument. An 
evaluation will have to wait for another occasion.               
 
2.2.3 The Argument from ‘Reflective Luck’.      
 
For McDowell human knowledge is a species of a wider genus including 
other kinds of knowledge—for instance knowledge of a sort that even 
nonhuman animals and infant children can enjoy. In this respect he seems in 
agreement with Sosa that there are at least two kinds of knowledge that we 
do well to keep distinct21 (we seize upon this theme later in this thesis). But it 
is the ‘higher’ of these kinds that McDowell is interested in—the kind of 
knowledge that is distinctive of language-using creatures such as ourselves. 
McDowell following Sellars thinks that such knowledge is a “standing in the 
space of reasons”—the space of “justifying and being able to justify what one 
says” (Sellars 1963, p. 169).  Thus on this conception it looks as though 
knowledge requires not only justification, but, if this is different, that one be 
able to justify one’s claim to have knowledge in the context of challenge. With 
ordinary perceptual beliefs in view, McDowell is interested to lay bare what 
he thinks are “the justifications available to us for claims about the external 
world.” (2002, p. 98).22   
 In his “Knowledge and the Internal” (1998) McDowell argues that 
nothing that obeys what we calls the ‘hybrid conception’ of knowledge can 
add up to knowledge of this kind—knowledge that involves one’s occupying a 
suitable position in the space of reasons. On the hybrid (or orthodox) view 
one doesn’t know something simply by virtue of occupying a suitable position 
in that space—rather the truth of one’s belief is conceived of as an additional 
component. The result is that whenever one is supposed to perceptually 
know something, whether what one believes is true is something “external to 
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the [one’s] rational powers”, or, what comes to the same thing, external to 
one’s “operations in the space of reasons”. But McDowell writes: 
 
“(…) if it’s being so is external to her operations in the space of 
reasons, how can it not be outside the reach of her rational powers? 
And if it is outside the reach of her rational powers, how can its being 
so be the crucial element in an intelligible conception of her knowing 
that it is so […]? It’s being so is conceived as external to the only thing 
that is supposed to be epistemologically significant about the knower 
herself, her satisfactory standing in the space of reasons” (1995, p. 
884).  
 
For those unsure about what the intuitive problem here is supposed to be, 
McDowell, elaborates: 
 
“[On the hybrid conception] the extra that we need for knowledge—the 
fact that the case in question is not one of those in which a largely 
reliable habit or policy of belief-formation leads the subject astray—is, 
relative to the knower’s moves in the space of reasons, a stroke of 
good fortune, a favor that the world does her” (ibid.). 
 
In another place McDowell writes in this connection that this “involves 
conceding that whether what one has is knowledge is to some extent a 
matter of luck, outside the control of reason” (1998, p. 440).  
 Now here is my gloss on this: McDowell is imploring that it’s 
inconsistent with one’s knowing that p that, relative to what one is permitted 
to cite in defense of a claim that p, it is sheer luck that this is one of those 
times when what one believes it true instead of being one of those times that 
an otherwise highly reliable although fallible process leads one to believe 
something false. But that’s precisely the position that the hybrid conception 
has us in with respect to our perceptual beliefs. Even in the best cases our 
best reasons for believing what we take ourselves to know fall short of the 
fact itself, so that for all we are in position to cite in defense of a claim to 
know it we might not even have the truth about it. Put another way it can 
seem difficult to make out how this amounts to one’s knowing that p is true as 
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opposed to knowing only that p is (perhaps even very) probable given one’s 
evidence.  
 The only alternative, thinks McDowell, is that we learn to see how 
states like seeing that p can constitute suitable positions in the space of 
reasons—or, what comes to the same thing, learn to see how seeing that p 
can itself be available to cite in defense of a claim about the external world. 
For only then would it not be ‘reflectively lucky’, as we might say—that is, 
lucky relative to what one has available as citable reasons for their belief—
that what one takes oneself to know is true.23  
 That’s one kind of argument you can find from McDowell for thinking 
that epistemological disjunctivism is true. It’s an argument stemming from 
supposedly intuitive considerations to do with knowledge as involving a 
suitable standing in the space of reasons, and reflective luck. Problems 
remain that we haven’t time to take up in detail. For one, we’ll need some 
explanation of how one has factive rational support in terms of one’s seeing 
that p that doesn’t launch upon an infinite regress, or else force us to say 
implausible things about perceptual experience (for related discussion see 
Littlejohn 2017 and forthcoming b). 
 
§3 Problems and Challenges for Epistemological 
Disjunctivism 
 
That concludes our brief review of the positive case for reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism (or RED)—the view most closely associated 
with what Pritchard defends with inspiration from McDowell. In this final 
section I’ll review some of the problems that RED is thought susceptible to, 
and how epistemological disjunctivists like Pritchard have responded to those 
problems. We’ll also review three challenges for RED that have emerged 
more recently—challenges with respect to articulating RED’s ‘reflective 
accessibility’ condition, as well as with respect to accommodating what seem 
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like conflicting intuitions about justification in cases of radical deception. But 
first the problems. There are thought to be four of them.   
 
3.1 Four Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
3.1.1 The Basis Problem 
 
First, RED can seem susceptible to what Pritchard has called the ‘basis 
problem’ for epistemological disjunctivism (cf. Pritchard 2011, 2012a, 2016). 
The problem, Pritchard writes, “concerns the very idea of a factive reason 
providing epistemic support for knowledge” (2012a, p. 21). Recall that RED 
holds that in paradigmatic cases one perceptually knows that p by virtue of 
believing that p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p to be the case. 
Trouble is that many have thought that seeing that p entails knowing that p 
on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p (cf. Williamson 
2000; Stroud 2010; Cassam 2007; Dretske 1969). But if an entailment 
thesis24 like this is correct then it can seem difficult to make out how one can 
know that p on the epistemic basis of one’s seeing that p, unless perceptual 
knowledge is somehow epistemically supporting itself.25   
 We should note two things straightaway. First, it seems that only 
views like RED that take what we called in §1 ‘the warrant option’ are 
susceptible to the basis problem. For example, the above entailment thesis 
seems innocuous against an epistemological disjunctivism like the kind Alan 
Millar (2010) defends according to which perceptual knowledge is justified 
but not warranted on account of one’s seeing that p. Even if seeing that p is 
just knowing that p in a particular way, it isn’t clear why one cannot know that 
p on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p if it isn’t part of the picture that 
one’s seeing that p is helping to carry one’s true perceptual belief to 
perceptual knowledge.26 If this is unclear just now then not to worry! We’ll 
come back to discuss this in more detail in chapter three. Second, only 
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disjunctivist views that conceive of one’s factive rational support in terms of 
one’s seeing that p seem susceptible to the basis problem. For example the 
basis problem doesn’t arise for views on which one’s factive reason is one’s 
merely seeing a situation in which p (French 2015), or one’s seeing p to have 
some property (Haddock 2011). 
 But for those who do advance versions of epistemological 
disjunctivism like RED that are susceptible to the basis problem, there seems 
available at least two lines of response. 
 First, one might deny the entailment thesis. Pritchard (2012a), 
McDowell (2002), and Sosa (2011) take this line. Pritchard and McDowell 
argue, for example, that while seeing that p is like knowing that p in being 
both factive and robustly epistemic, seeing that p merely ‘puts you in position’ 
to know that p—insofar as you need then only believe that p in order to know 
that p. This is because, they think, while we cannot divorce believing that p 
from knowing that p we can divorce believing that p from seeing that p. 
Pritchard and McDowell provide cases that seem to suggest as much. For 
example, if you see a tomato but fail to believe that you do because you have 
been misled to think it is something else in disguise, it might seem perfectly 
permissible for you to say, in hindsight, after having learned of the deception 
in play, that you saw that there was a tomato before you even though at the 
time you didn’t think that there was.27  
 On the second line of response one might accept the entailment thesis 
but argue that it need not entail that one cannot perceptually know that p on 
the epistemic basis of one’s seeing that p—that in particular it need not entail 
that one’s perceptual knowledge is epistemically self-supporting in some 
vicious or otherwise unacceptable fashion. While Pritchard (2011, p. 441-42) 
suggests that he has “some sympathy with this line of response”, it is a 
position that remains without any defense or exploration in the literature. 
Notably, then, in chapter three of this thesis I stage a defense of RED along 
just these lines. I employ our epistemological disjunctivism about distinctively 
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judgmental perceptual knowledge in service of a view that both accepts the 
warrant option while remaining consistent with the entailment thesis. This I 
maintain is a point in favor of developing epistemological disjunctivism in the 
desired direction.  
 
3.1.2 The Access Problem 
 
Second, RED can seem susceptible to what Pritchard has called the ‘access 
problem’. It can seem that one has rational support for a perceptual belief 
that p that is both factive and reflectively accessible only if p itself is 
reflectively accessible as well. After all if one can know by reflection alone 
that one sees that p, and one can know by reflection alone that one can see 
that p only if p, doesn’t that enable a purely reflective route to the fact that p 
via a suitable inference? But, of course, here p is supposed to be an 
empirical proposition—not the kind of thing that one should be able to acquire 
purely reflective knowledge of in this way.  
 Arguably, the strongest version of this objection assumes that one 
could have reflective access to the fact that one sees that p short of believing 
that p. For only then is it imaginable that one could acquire a belief that p on 
the basis of a suitable inference from facts one can know by reflection 
alone—viz., the facts that one can see that p and that one sees that p only if 
p. However Pritchard (2012a, p. 46-52) explains that the epistemological 
disjunctivist needn’t commit to this assumption. Rather the claim is that it is 
only in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge that one has reflective 
access to the factive rational support at issue, where the paradigmatic case 
is one in which one already knows that p (and so believes that p) on the 
rational basis of one’s seeing that p. The result is that any purely reflective 
route to acquiring knowledge that p is clearly shut off, since it’s impossible 
that one have reflective access to one’s seeing that p short of believing that p 
to be the case.  
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 Now a different weaker version of the objection assumes that even if 
it’s impossible to acquire the putative empirical knowledge in question on the 
rational basis of information one has purely reflective access too, even still, 
just enjoying putative perceptual knowledge that p on the rational basis of a 
reflectively accessible factive reason entails that one has purely reflective 
access to p. But it’s not at all clear why that should follow. For as Pritchard 
(2012a) notes, the factive reason at issue is the empirical reason that one 
sees that p. But then if one has reflective access to factive rational support 
only insofar as one knows that p on the rational basis of an empirical reason, 
then surely the knowledge in question is empirical and not purely reflective 
(or a priori). Pritchard concludes that while in paradigmatic cases one may 
have purely reflective access to the fact that one’s rational basis for knowing 
that p entails that p, one does not have purely reflective access to p itself.28  
 Now Tim Kraft (2015) argues that this still leaves RED with what he 
calls ‘epistemological disjunctivism’s genuine access problem’, which 
likewise has to do with one’s having reflective access to factive rational 
support. The difference is that the problem is not that having reflective 
access to factive rational support seems to entail that one can have reflective 
access to empirical propositions. Rather the problem is to explain how one’s 
access is legitimately reflective (or a priori) at the same time that it’s access 
to factive rational support, without having to admit that states like being 
surprised that p constitute reflectively accessible factive rational support as 
well. This is one element of an important emerging challenge for RED to be 
considered in more detail below—the challenge to explain just how one has 
reflective access to one’s factive rational support without having to give up on 
certain other things that we should want to maintain.    
 
3.1.3 The Distinguishability Problem 
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The third problem for RED is what Pritchard (2012a) calls the 
‘distinguishability problem’. It is a datum that a good case and its 
corresponding bad case are in some sense subjectively indistinguishable 
from one another. However the proponent of RED who takes the reflective 
accessibility option claims that in the good case one has reflective access to 
the fact that one can see that p. But then since one also knows by reflection 
alone that one sees that p only if one is in the good case and not in the bad 
case, does it not follow that the good case is not subjectively 
indistinguishable from the bad case, contrary to hypothesis? 
 Pritchard argues on independent grounds that we have reason to 
disambiguate two senses of ‘distinguishability’ in play here. Yes, it follows 
from the fact that in the good case one has reflective access to the fact that 
one can see that p that one can reflectively distinguish one’s case from the 
corresponding bad case. It is in this connection that Pritchard claims that 
one’s seeing that p constitutes favoring rational support for the target belief. 
But that does not entail that one can then introspectively distinguish one’s 
case from the corresponding bad case—that is, tell one’s case from the latter 
case on the basis of introspection alone. It is in this connection that Pritchard 
claims that seeing that p, in the relevant context, does not constitute 
discriminatory rational support for the target perceptual belief. 
   Consider this case for illustration. Imagine that you are at the zoo and 
while looking at a zebra wonder to yourself whether it might be a cleverly 
distinguished mule instead. It can be tempting to think that at this point 
unless you are in position to rationally discount the cleverly disguised mule 
hypothesis you cannot sustain your rationally grounded knowledge that it’s a 
zebra (so thinks Pritchard, anyway; see Pritchard and Carter 2016). However 
rather than deny that you know any longer that it’s a zebra before you, 
instead Pritchard argues that by virtue of enjoying relevant background 
information you are in position to rationally discount the cleverly disguised 
mule hypothesis—and so know that this is a zebra rather than a cleverly 
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disguised mule. You know for example that it is highly unlikely that this is a 
cleverly disguised mule, given the disincentive that exists for intentionally 
misrepresenting the animals (think of the risk to the zoo’s reputation). And so 
by virtue of being in possession of such background information Pritchard 
argues that you are in position to reflectively distinguish your case from a 
case in which you’re being confronted with a cleverly disguised mule. 
However it remains that you cannot introspectively distinguish the two cases, 
since zebras and cleverly disguised mules, by hypothesis, visually look 
exactly the same to you. And so Pritchard will maintain that examples like 
this one give us reason to think that even though one can reflectively 
distinguish one’s case from another case this needn’t entail that one can 
introspectively distinguish between the two cases at issue. 
 In the end then Pritchard’s big idea is that reflective distinguishability 
need not entail introspective distinguishability. And so it is open to the 
disjunctivist to maintain that it is introspective indistinguishability that we have 
in mind when we say that—even by RED’s lights—the good case can be 
subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding bad case. RED is 
therefore not obviously in tension with the relevant datum.        
 
3.1.4 The Assertion Problem 
 
The fourth problem for RED Pritchard never names although he does treat it 
in considerable depth. We can call it ‘the assertion problem’ for 
epistemological disjunctivism (cf. Pritchard 2012a, pp. 141-50). As Pritchard 
explains the problem concerns making “explicit knowledge claims” in radical 
sceptical contexts.  
 Imagine for example that you are seated at a table upon which sits a 
bright red tomato. You see it clearly, and thereby take yourself to know that 
it’s a tomato. Now imagine that the sceptic comes along and raises an error 
possibility to the effect that it might not be a tomato because you are a BIV 
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only seeming to see a tomato that isn’t there. Notice how in this radical 
sceptical context it now seems illegitimate for you to assert, “no, in fact I 
(perceptually) know that it’s a tomato”. This is potentially problematic 
because it seems like something that RED is unable to explain. For why 
exactly should it be wrong to assert that one knows that p in radical sceptical 
contexts since, as the proponent of RED maintains, it’s true that one knows 
that p and moreover one is in possession of factive rational support to back it 
up? 
 In fact Pritchard argues that there is nothing here that the 
epistemological disjunctivist cannot explain. The reason it seems strange for 
one to enter explicit knowledge claims in radical sceptical contexts is not 
because what one claims is false, or because one doesn’t possess 
knowledge that is suitably enough rationally grounded, even grounded in 
terms of factive rational support—no.29 The reason it seems strange or 
conversationally inappropriate, Pritchard suggests, is that by claiming that 
one perceptually knows that p in a context where some not-p error possibility 
has been raised, one thereby implies that one is able to introspectively 
distinguish between the relevant error possibility and the target belief. But of 
course that is a false implicature where radical sceptical error possibilities are 
concerned, since it’s impossible that one be able to perceptually discriminate 
between p and not-p where the relevant not-p scenario is a radical sceptical 
one. In this way, Pritchard argues, we can explain why it should be 
conversationally inappropriate to assert that one (perceptually) knows that p 
in radical sceptical contexts consistently with it’s being the case that one 
indeed knows that p, and even on the basis of reflectively accessible factive 
rational support.30 
 
3.2 New Challenges for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
3.2.1 New Reflective Access Challenge(s)  
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Finally I would like to highlight three new challenges for RED. The first is a 
kind of new access challenge, which really begins where we just left off the 
epistemological disjunctivist’s response to the distinguishability problem. It 
challenges the disjunctivist to elaborate further how one’s factive rational 
support for perceptual knowledge is something one can have reflective 
access to without incurring further problems. For example, while Boult (2017) 
worries whether one can provide such an account while remaining true to the 
thought that the good and bad cases are truly introspectively 
indistinguishable, Kraft (2015) worries about remaining true to the thought 
that while factive states like seeing that p may constitute epistemic support 
for perceptual beliefs certain other factive states like being surprised that p 
cannot.  
 To get a grip on the sort of worry that Boult (2017) gestures at it will be 
helpful to consider a recent paper by J.J. Cunningham (2016). Cunningham 
argues that in order to explain how one has reflective access to one’s seeing 
that p one ultimately needs to make sense of how one can be in a position to 
bring the fact that one sees that p to mind through some introspective 
process (ibid., 119-24). However if a certain ‘constitution principle’ is correct, 
Cunningham argues, then one can introspect that one sees that p only if 
one’s seeing that p constitutes the phenomenal character of the relevant tract 
of one’s subjective experience (p. 119). Cunningham notes that this plausibly 
entails a form metaphysical disjunctivism according to which what it is like for 
example to see a tomato in the good case is different from what it is like to 
hallucinate one in the corresponding bad case. 
 But now it seems that we have put considerable pressure on the idea 
that the good case is introspectively indistinguishable from the bad case. 
After all why should it be impossible from within the good case to distinguish 
one’s case from the bad case if what it is like to be in the good case is 
different from what it is like to be in the bad case (i.e. if in fact they are 
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phenomenally different cases)? You can see how if Cunningham is correct 
then it may be difficult for the proponent of RED to elaborate how one can 
have reflective access to one’s seeing that p without compromising on the 
idea that the good case is subjectively indistinguishable from the bad case by 
virtue of one’s being unable to tell the good case apart from the bad case via 
introspection alone. I’ll point to two possible lines of response. 
 First, the proponent of RED might concede Cunningham’s point that 
one can have reflective access to one’s seeing that p in the good case only if 
in the good case one can—after all—tell one’s case apart from the bad case 
via introspection. But then we are owed some alternative explanation of what 
it means to say that the good and bad cases are subjectively 
indistinguishable. Here’s one such explanation: while the two cases are 
introspectively distinguishable from within the good case, they are not 
introspectively distinguishable from within the bad case. The two cases are 
subjectively indistinguishable, then, in this sense. For any good case from 
within which one can introspectively distinguish one’s case from the bad 
case, there exists a bad case from within which one is tricked into thinking 
that one can do this. That is, there exists a bad case from within which it only 
seems as though one can introspectively distinguish one’s case from the bad 
case (a case isn’t introspectively distinguishable from itself, after all). Of 
course this comes down to saying, in a nutshell, that by introspectively telling 
apart one’s case from the bad case one exercises fallible capacities to do so. 
But that shouldn’t lead us to think, on this view, that when we set out to 
introspectively tell our case apart from the bad case while in the good case 
this isn’t precisely what we succeed at doing.   
 A second response may dispute Cunningham’s idea that we can 
elaborate how one can have reflective access to one’s seeing that p only in 
terms of one’s having introspective access to that fact. Cunningham thinks 
this because he thinks that one can have reflective access to one’s seeing 
that p only if either one has introspective access to this fact, or else one can 
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infer that one sees that p from other things one can know by reflection alone. 
But this misses an important third option: why cannot one come to non-
inferentially know that one sees that p via some non-introspective process of 
bringing one’s seeing that p to mind? 
 For example, one might appeal to the existence of a second-order 
recognitional (or non-inferential) capacity to tell of something one sees to be 
the case that one sees it to be the case. Alan Millar (2008) claims that one 
can gain reflective knowledge of one’s seeing that p by exercising a capacity 
of just this sort. He writes explicitly that this is not “an introspective ability, for 
there is no inner scrutiny of anything”, adding, for example, that “I do not 
think about or introspect my experience in the case in which I judge that I see 
azaleas any more than I do when I tell that the shrubs are azaleas by way of 
response to the same experience (ibid., p. 342). By these means we might 
explain how one has reflective access to one’s seeing that p without having 
to admit that one need ultimately have introspective access to this fact, and 
so without feeling pressured to admit that the good and bad cases are not 
anymore introspectively indistinguishable from one another. A potential 
drawback of this line of response is that it may seem that it merely defines 
into existence just what one needs so that it is potentially ad hoc on this 
score. But an even further problem may stem from the fact that we still 
haven’t quite said enough. 
 For surely one also has recognitional capacities to tell that one is 
surprised about something when something surprises one. Moreover to be 
surprised that p is factive—one cannot be surprised that p unless p is true. 
But then why should the fact that one sees that p constitute reflectively 
accessible epistemic support for believing that p while the fact that one is 
surprised that p cannot? Tim Kraft (2015) suggests that the answer may 
have to do with the fact that one’s mode of access to these types of factive 
state is different. For example perhaps one’s seeing that p is transparent in a 
way that one’s being surprised that p is not. But appealing to transparency 
	   42	  
isn’t open to the proponent of RED, Kraft maintains, since it entails that one 
has access to one’s seeing that p by virtue of coming to know that p in a 
particular visual-empirical way. But then it is not at all clear how this amounts 
to one’s having reflective access to an empirical reason anymore—that is, 
access that doesn’t constitutively depend one one’s acquiring the relevant 
empirical knowledge at issue (see especially Kraft 2015, pp. 325-330).  
 This Kraft says is epistemological disjunctivism’s “genuine access 
problem”. But it serves nicely to further bring out the sense in which 
proponents of RED have more explaining to do. Namely, with respect to the 
mechanisms involved in one’s having purely reflective access to factive 
propositional seeings. Part of what I’ll be doing in this thesis is motivating a 
conception of epistemological disjunctivism on which this new ‘explanatory 
problem’ evaporates. Watch for when I argue in the final chapter that 
epistemological disjunctivism has nothing to lose—in particular with respect 
to its anti-sceptical import—by dropping the reflective access component 
altogether.  
 
3.2.2 The ‘New Evil Genius’ Challenge 
 
In §2 above we noted that the classical internalist is wedded to the ‘new evil 
genius’ thesis (NEG) according to which one’s rational support in the good 
case cannot be any better than the rational support available to one in the 
corresponding bad case. After all upon reflecting on one’s situation in the bad 
case it can seem that one has every reason to adopt one’s perceptual belief 
that one has in the good case—that in fact one is equally justified in doing so. 
We can call this the ‘parity intuition’.31 Insofar as the proponent of RED 
rejects the NEG thesis they owe some alternative explanation of the ‘parity 
intuition’ that can otherwise seem to entail it. If one does not have every bit 
as much rational support in the bad case as one has in the good case then 
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why can that seem like the right thing to say? This is the ‘new evil genius’ 
challenge. 
 Early on appeals were made to blamelessness (cf. Williamson 2000; 
Pritchard 2012a; McDowell 2002; Littlejohn 2009). Neither you nor your 
radically deceived duplicate is at fault for believing that there is a tomato 
before you when you seem to see one. And that is the reality undergirding 
the parity intuition. But Brent Madison (2014) for example argues that mere 
blamelessness is insufficient for the task. After all a brain lesion victim is also 
blameless for believing that he sees a tomato when this is the result of his 
suffering a brain lesion. Plausibly though your radically deceived duplicate 
performs in a way that is epistemically better than the brain lesion victim in 
believing what his or her visual experiences seem to report. That each is 
merely blameless for believing what they do will obviously not account for this 
distinction. The parity intuition seems to run deeper than the epistemological 
disjunctivist anticipates.  
 In chapter four of this thesis we tackle this new challenge head on. 
Part of what we say there may be seen as a development of Clayton 
Littlejohn’s “A Plea for Epistemic Excuses” (forthcoming b).32 Here Littlejohn 
points out that subjects can be made blameless for different reasons. For 
example sometimes a subject is blameless because she either “lacked the 
rational capacities needed for assuming responsibility for her actions and 
attitudes or because these rational capacities were compromised.” Then she 
is blameless because exempted. But other times a subject is blameless for a 
wronging, not because she is exempt but because she is excused. Littlejohn 
writes that “excusing conditions really only excuse when they are present 
alongside a display of virtue” […] “affirming the excellent use of the subject’s 
capacities in spite of the wrong (…)”. In chapter four I elaborate what I think 
the epistemological disjunctivist should say these ‘displays of virtue’ consist 
in. In particular I argue that they are the subject’s having believed in a way 
that is both epistemically responsible and reasonable in ways that I flesh out. 
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With these distinctions in tow, I argue, the epistemological disjunctivist has 
what she needs in order to confront the ‘new evil genius’ challenge in its most 
recent incarnations.            
 
3.2.3 The Internalist Challenge 
     
Finally, epistemological disjunctivists confront what I am going to call ‘the 
internalist challenge’. While those who push the ‘new evil genius’ challenge 
doubt that epistemological disjunctivism can accommodate the internalist’s 
insight concerning perceptual knowledge, others doubt that there is so much 
as an internalist insight here to begin with. For example Littlejohn (2015) 
(2017) is sceptical of the very idea that perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for 
believing what they do. Littlejohn thinks that perception provides us with 
reasons alright, but that is because it provides us with knowledge of the 
world. Not because it provides us with something prior to perceptual 
knowledge that a subject then exploits to acquire that knowledge.  
 I think Littlejohn is right to push epistemological disjunctivists on this 
score. I don’t think disjunctivists have said enough to vindicate the supposed 
‘internalist insight’ they claim their view does well to accommodate. I engage 
this internalist challenge immediately in the next chapter. It provides a 
suitable occasion for introducing this thesis’ main positive proposal: it’s 
because perception provides one with judgmental perceptual knowledge that 
it provides one with knowledge by providing one with (factive) reasons. For 
judgmental perceptual knowledge just is a kind of knowledge whose essential 
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In this opening chapter I think I have presented the relevant territory so as to 
afford some helpful perspective for approaching the current project. Not only 
have I provided some sense of the diversity that exists among proponents of 
epistemological disjunctivism, I have also reviewed the considerations that 
are thought to motivate the specific kind of epistemological disjunctivism that 
I’ll be concerned with in this project—the sort of ‘reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism’ advanced by Duncan Pritchard with inspiration from John 
McDowell. I have also provided an up-to-date review of various problems and 
challenges this view is thought to face, highlighting those that will receive 
particular treatment in what follows in terms of the positive proposal to be 



















Notes	  to	  Chapter	  One	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In these terms even a naïve realist can allow some sense in which seeings of a tomato and 
hallucinations as of a tomato are the same visual experience—the same insofar as both are 
introspectively indistinguishable from an event of seeing an actual tomato. 
2 Also known as ‘the new evil genius thesis’ (Pritchard 2012a), or the ‘reasons identity thesis’ 
(Schonbaumsfeld 2016). 
3 Some epistemological disjunctivists have an easier time resisting the move from (1) to (2) 
than others. In particular, those who like McDowell subscribe to rational support that’s both 
factive and reflectively accessible will have a tougher time than those who don’t subscribe to 
the latter idea, such as Williamson (2000) and Schellenberg (2015). For it can seem that 
those who follow McDowell open themselves up to a kind of ‘explanatory challenge’ (Boult 
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2017)—otherwise known as the ‘indistinguishability problem’ (Pritchard 2012a). More on this 
below. 
4	  Note that Schellenberg doesn’t describe her view as a form of epistemological 
disjunctivism. But in applying this term to Schellenberg’s view I am following Bryne and 
Logue (2008) who suggest that a difference in available evidence for perceptual beliefs 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases suffices for an epistemological disjunctivist view. Consider 
for example this quote from Byrne and Logue (2008, p xvi): “So McDowell thinks the good 
and bad cases are epistemologically very different: your evidence in the good case is much 
stronger than it is in the corresponding bad case. He is thus and epistemological 
disjunctivist” (emphasis added).  	  
5 Here we assume that if E is evidence for p then E offers some evidential support for p. 
Perhaps that inference is dubious. If so then we should say that while Williamson thinks that 
one can have radically different evidence for a perceptual belief that p in the good and bad 
cases, this does not entail an asymmetry in evidential support between the good and bad 
cases.   
6 In another place McDowell describes the kind of representing as the making of a fact 
manifest to its subject (1982, p. 389). 
7 While Schellenberg (2015) agrees with McDowell that it’s part of the essential nature of an 
experience that it furnish it’s subject factive evidence, she’s clear that this doesn’t have an 
impact on an experiences’ subjective or phenomenal character. On her view, while pairs of 
matching experiences in the good and bad case are the same mental event in one respect, 
they’re different mental events in another. And it’s because of this difference that two 
experiences sustain a different rational support value in each case. The experiences are the 
same insofar they share the same ‘content type’, where this is described as a ‘potentially 
particularized content’, a content that purports to be of particular objects in the world. The 
experiences differ, however, with respect to their ‘token contents’. In the good case one’s 
experience succeeds in singling out a particular, which it doesn’t in the bad case, resulting in 
a ‘gappy’ token content. For Schellenberg, it’s this difference in token contents that makes 
for the difference in rational support value between the two experiences, so that in the one 
case but not the other one enjoys factive rational support—or ‘factive evidence’—for one’s 
perceptual beliefs.   
8 Commentators on epistemological disjunctivism are clearly prone to interpret the thesis in 
connection with perceptual experience in this way. For example, Smithies (2012) writes that 
epistemological disjunctivism is a “thesis about the nature of rational support—that is, the 
reasons, justification, or evidence—that perception provides for beliefs about the external 
world” (emphasis added). Logue (2015, p. 206) claims that on “disjunctivism about 
perceptual evidence […] veridical experiences provide less evidence than hallucinatory 
experiences do for claims about one’s environment” (emphasis added). Soteriou (2014) 
claims that the epistemological disjunctivist thinks that “one’s experience provides one with 
grounds for making knowledgable perceptual judgments about the mind-independent world 
that would be lacking if one were merely hallucinating” (emphasis added). Finally Lyons 
(2016) characterizes epistemological disjunctivism as saying that “the reason we are justified 
in the good case but not in the bad is that a veridical perceptual experience is a distinct type 
of mental state from a hallucination (…)” (emphasis added). 
9 Millar (2010) and Sosa (2011) clearly defend versions of epistemological disjunctivism on 
the second-level. 
10 McDowell’s view, for instance, pretty clearly seems committed to a form of metaphysical 
disjunctivism, as does Schellenberg’s view (2013) (2015). For a particularly accessible 
discussion of different forms of metaphysical disjunctivism see Logue (2015).  
11 Notice that to take the warrant option is also to deny that whatever rational support one 
has in cases of hallucinatory experiences (if any) is sufficient to play the warranting role in 
the good case (Byrne and Logue 2008 refer to this as a ‘common justifying element’). For 
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otherwise why would that rational support not be playing the warranting role in the good 
case, contrary to hypothesis? 
12 Although even this doesn’t seem mandatory. You can imagine a view of perceptual 
warrant that says that it’s one’s believing that p for the reason that one sees that p that takes 
one’s perceptual belief to perceptual knowledge, and yet offers an analysis of what it is to 
see that p in terms of perceptually-based knowledge (i.e. to see that p is just to be in position 
to know that p, or some such).    
13 Pritchard (2012a) (2016a), McDowell (1983) (2011) (2013) and Millar (2010) (2014) 
(2016) all opt for this option. 
14 Pritchard (2012a, p. 3) writes that “according to epistemological disjunctivism the [truth] 
connection is very direct indeed, since being in possession of the relevant epistemic support 
actually entails that the proposition believed is true.” 
15 Compare McDowell when he writes that when one knows something perceptually one 
exercises a “capacity to get into positions in which one knows that it is through one’s 
perceptual state that one knows something about the environment—and so knows that one’s 
perceptual state conclusively warrants one in the belief in question” (my emphasis) (2011, p. 
42). 
16 See Neta (2003) for an interesting contexualist variant of Schonbaumsfeld’s anti-sceptical 
strategy.	  
17 Pritchard (2012a) also explores a response to closure-based skepticism along similar 
lines. Although in matter of fact he prefers a different Wittgensteinian approach, one that 
limits the scope of rational evaluations in a certain way. For more on Pritchard’s ‘biscopic’ 
approach to coping with radical skepticism see Pritchard (2016a).   
18 It is an ‘undercutting’ strategy insofar as it removes the support for premise two, rather 
than providing independent reasons to think it false. A ‘rebutting’ strategy of the latter kind 
admits that the paradox is legitimate, issuing naturally from our most basic thinking in 
epistemology. An undercutting strategy by contrast reveals the paradox as illusory, as 
issuing from a piece of philosophical theory (NEG thesis) that’s actually optional, but 
pretends to be common sense. 
19 For other discussions of disjunctivism in connection with radical skepticism, see McDowell 
(1995), Millar (2008) (2012), Pritchard and Ranalli (forthcoming). 
20 McDowell (2008, p. 385) writes that ‘the canonical justification for a perceptual claim is 
that one perceives that things are as it claims they are (…)”. 
21 See, e.g., Sosa (2009) for discussion of his famous distinction between ‘animal’ 
knowledge and ‘reflective’ knowledge. Although since Sosa (2011) (2015), the distinction is 
now between a kind of animal knowledge and a kind of ‘knowing full well’ that entails 
reflective knowledge. 
22 That is one way of making sense of what McDowell says about such knowledge 
elsewhere: “whose instances are self-conscious rationally at work” (2011, p. 10). For unless 
the credentials by virtue of which one knows a given thing are available to one’s self-
conscious awareness, one can’t very well appeal to those credentials in conversation in 
defense of their believing it to be true. 
23 For a discussion of ‘reflective luck’, compared to other forms of knowledge-undermining 
luck, see Pritchard (2005, p. 175). 
24 What we will later call the ‘seeing = way of knowing’ or SwK thesis in chapter three. 
25 As Pritchard (2011, p. 441) puts it, “then it is hard to see why seeing that p could 
constitute one’s rational basis for knowing that p since seeing that p already presupposes 
knowledge that p.” 
26 Ghijsen (2015, p. 1155) points this out as well, and Millar (2016) himself suggests as 
much in a footnote. 
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27 See Ghijsen (2015) for critique of this move. Ghijsen is also sceptical that Pritchard 
(2012a) can even make sense of idea that seeing that p merely puts one in position to know 
that p without invoking perceptual knowledge itself. The result would be that there’s no scope 
for invoking this conception in a reductive account of perceptual knowledge (pp. 1150-52). 
28	  See also Neta and Pritchard 2007.	  
29	  Although note that this is precisely the sort of response Ram Neta is in position to give to 
the assertion problem (cf. Neta 2003, 2004). Unlike Pritchard Neta embeds his 
epistemological disjunctivism within what he calls a “dogmatist contextualism” (2004, p.211). 
The reason why according to Neta it’s inappropriate to enter explicit claims to perceptually 
know that p in radical sceptical contexts is because in these contexts these knowledge 
claims are actually false. After all perceptual knowledge that p requires having conclusive 
rational support for believing that p. And while in ordinary nonsceptical contexts one can 
enjoy conclusive evidence (or rational support) for perceptual beliefs, in contexts where 
certain sceptical hypotheses are raised one enjoys only nonconclusive (or nonfactive) 
evidential or rational support for perceptual beliefs.	   
30 For criticism see Schonbaumsfeld (2015), and Pritchard (2015) for a response.  
31 In fact this isn’t exactly the characterization of the parity intuition that I favor. For further 
discussion see chapter four.  
32 For another project written in the same spirit see also Williamson (forthcoming).	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CHAPTER TWO 
 







In the last chapter we explored epistemological disjunctivism in rather 
general terms, before honing in on what is arguably the most well-known 
version of the view: what we there called ‘reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism’. Recall that according to this view perceptual knowledge can 
enjoy rational support that is not only factive but reflectively accessible as 
well.2 We said that Duncan Pritchard is notable for advancing this view in 
service of an account of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge—
according to which perception provides one with knowledge by virtue of 
providing factive and reflectively accessible rational support for perceptual 
beliefs.3   
 We noted also that it’s an important part of the significance of 
epistemological disjunctivism that it claims to accommodate both internalist 
and externalist insights with regard to perceptual knowledge. Insofar as one’s 
epistemic support is factive it entails that what one believes is true—
capturing the externalist’s insight that there should be a robust connection 
between one’s epistemic support and the fact known. But insofar as that 
epistemic support is also reflectively accessible it entails that one can be 
made aware that one has it without any fuss—capturing what is meant to be 
the internalist’s insight that it is by providing one with good reflectively 
accessible reasons that perception provides one with knowledge of the world. 
 But just before finishing we noted that while some are sceptical that 
epistemological disjunctivism succeeds in securing the internalist’s insight,4 
others are sceptical that there is even an internalist insight here to begin with. 
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Clayton Littlejohn (2015) (2016) for example challenges the epistemological 
disjunctivist to explain why we should think that perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with reasons at all, let alone factive reasons, for 
believing what one knows. I think it is important that epistemological 
disjunctivism have something substantive to say in this connection. 
Otherwise it isn’t clear why it is a virtue of the view that it aligns itself with an 
internalist approach. This we called ‘the internalist challenge’. I think 
Littlejohn is right that disjunctivists should feel challenged to defend 
themselves on this score.  
 In this chapter I outline a fresh approach to epistemological 
disjunctivism with a view toward addressing this challenge head on. On the 
view I want to recommend perception provides one with knowledge by 
providing one with reasons because the kind of knowledge at issue is a 
species of judgmental belief (cf. Sosa 2015). I’ll explain this further below. 
But the initial idea is that it is on account of its providing one with judgmental 
perceptual knowledge that perception provides one with reasons—indeed 
what are even factive reasons—that are the subject’s reasons for believing 
what they do.  
 Here is the plan for this chapter. In the first section I motivate ‘the 
internalist challenge’ for epistemological disjunctivism—which was given 
rather short shrift earlier. Again, in a nutshell this challenges the disjunctivist 
to vindicate the supposed internalist insight that she boasts to be able to 
protect—viz., the notion that perception provides one with knowledge by 
providing one with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what 
she does. Here I highlight especially that nothing that disjunctivists have said 
so far gives us any good reason to suspect that this is the right way to 
approach ‘everyday’ perceptual knowledge. Then in the second section I 
provide the framework that I rely on for advancing my positive proposal; 
which, we’ll see, entails an epistemological disjunctivism for which the 
internalist challenge doesn’t so much as arise. Here I rely largely on Ernest 
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Sosa’s work in Judgment and Agency (2015) to differentiate between what 
he calls ‘judgmental belief’ and ‘merely functional belief’, and to describe 
more generally what I’ll call ‘the bifurcated conception of perceptual 
knowledge’. Then in the third section I articulate in the context of that 
conception the sort of epistemological disjunctivism I want to recommend, 
showing how it overcomes the internalist challenge. I then summarize and 
point our way to the chapters that follow.   
 
§1. The Internalist Challenge for Epistemological 
Disjunctivism  
 
Begin by recalling that on Pritchard’s view perception is supposed to provide 
one with knowledge by providing one with factive reasons that are the 
subject’s reasons for believing what it is they know. More specifically, recall, 
when one knows that p this is because one believes that p for the reason that 
one sees that p—so that the fact that one sees that p is the subject’s reason 
for believing what they do. That is just to say that one’s seeing that p 
functions here as a motivating reason.5 But now what are those? 
 If something is your motivating reason then it captures the light in 
which you took something you did to be appropriate or fitting, given your 
circumstances (including, importantly, your aims) (cf. McDowell 1978). For 
example if your reason (i.e. motivating reason) for going to the restaurant is 
that they have great wine, then it is in light of the fact that they have this wine 
that you take going there to be appropriate or fitting, as opposed to going 
somewhere else or even nowhere at all. Similarly, if your reason for believing 
that p is that you see that p then it is in light of the fact that you see that p 
that you take believing p to be appropriate or fitting, as opposed to, say, 
disbelieving or suspending judgment on the matter. So then by leveraging 
motivating reasons in this way Pritchard’s reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism can seem to capture what may be regarded as a key internalist 
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insight: unlike on typical externalist views, here perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with reasons that are subject’s reasons for 
believing what it is they know.  
 As the overview provided in the last chapter suggests, Pritchard 
(2012a) (2016b) has spent most of his energy defending the view against 
arguments for thinking it false (essentially, arguments for thinking that one 
could not have factive motivating reasons for perceptual beliefs).6 But of 
course that assumes that the view is worth defending in the first place—that 
in particular there are reasons for thinking it true that perception provides one 
with knowledge by providing one with reasons on the basis of which one 
believes what one does about the world. And yet it is not at all clear what 
those reasons are supposed to be—something I’ll try to bring out presently. 
This is what constitutes the ‘internalist challenge’ for epistemological 
disjunctivism: the challenge to say something to vindicate the supposed 
internalist insight that they claim their view does well to protect.  
 So then why think that perception provides us with knowledge by 
providing us with motivating reasons? What have disjunctivists so far had to 
say? You will recall from the previous chapter that in motivating their view it is 
typical for disjunctivists to claim that it simply reflects a face-value 
assessment of our ordinary justificatory practises—that on that account 
epistemological disjunctivism represents the common sense or default view 
for thinking about perceptual knowledge. They will ask us to consider that in 
response to a challenge to a claim to know something on the basis of 
perception, one would not ordinarily cite considerations that may be true 
even if the target belief were false. For example, if I asked you why you 
thought that there was a tomato on the kitchen countertop it would be odd for 
you to respond by citing only the fact that this is anyway how things seem to 
you to be at the moment. Rather ordinarily we would expect you to cite 
something more epistemically robust—“I can see that there is a tomato on 
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the countertop”—or something that at least entails the presence of a tomato. 
In Pritchard’s own words: 
 
“(…) in response to a challenge to a claim to (perceptually) know I 
might well respond by citing a factive perceptual reason in defense of 
my claim, which suggests that we do, ordinarily at least, allow factive 
reasons to offer sufficient rational support for our perceptual 
knowledge” (2012a, p. 17). 
 
Fair enough. But notice that these practices hardly vindicate the supposed 
internalist insight at issue. Assuming that we have characterized these 
justificatory practises fairly, it is not at all clear that they give us good reason 
to think that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with 
motivating reasons for perceptual belief.  
 First, notice how these practises do not suggest that perceptual beliefs 
are believed for reasons so much as that if they are believed for reasons then 
these can be as good as factive reasons. After all even if one customarily 
appeals to some reason in defense of a claim to know something, that need 
not indicate that one knows that thing in virtue of believing it for the reason 
one cites. For example one might customarily appeal to something like the 
design argument in defense of a claim to know that God exists. But that need 
not indicate that one believes that God exists on the rational basis of the 
reasons contained in that argument. More realistically one believes that God 
exists on the basis of a series of seemingly compelling religious experiences.  
 But then notice second that even if these justificatory practises were 
indicative of one’s believing something on the basis of a reason, it is not clear 
why the belief in question should be the perceptual belief that p and not the 
belief that one knows that p instead. Notice that even in the excerpt quoted 
from Pritchard above it is supposed to be in response to a perceived 
challenge to perceptually know that p that one commonly cites that one sees 
that p to be the case. But then if this practise is supposed to be indicative of 
one’s believing something on the basis of a reason, then is it not rather one’s 
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belief that one knows that p that one believes on the basis of the reason one 
cites, rather than one’s belief that p, contrary to the disjunctivist’s proposal?  
 These are just some reasons to be sceptical that our ordinary 
justificatory practises vindicate the target internalist insight—that perception 
provides one with knowledge by providing one with reasons that are the 
subject’s reasons for holding the relevant belief. 
 Very well. But perhaps instead the disjunctivist can vindicate the 
internalist insight in connection with epistemic responsibility. Perception 
provides one with knowledge for which one can be held responsible. And that 
is why it provides one with knowledge by providing one with motivating 
reasons for belief.7 Unfortunately that quick little argument misfires once we 
distinguish between weak and strong forms of epistemic responsibility. The 
argument assumes that one could be epistemically responsible for one’s 
perceptual knowledge only if one believed the relevant proposition on the 
basis of good reasons. But there are weaker interpretations of epistemic 
responsibility that do not require one to believe something motivated by 
reasons for thinking it true.  
 Imagine for example that you are so angry that you punch a hole 
through the wall. There need not be anything that was your reason for doing 
this (for example it need not be that you were trying to stage some kind of 
diversion). Perhaps you were just really angry. But surely for that you are no 
less responsible for what you did—not least because you should have paid 
attention to the reasons not to do this (i.e. it is an expensive fix, and now the 
children are crying and the dog is upset). In this way it seems that you can be 
held responsible for doing something just so long as your doing it should be 
sensitive or responsive to reasons, even if there was nothing that was your 
reason for doing it. But then why cannot we be made responsible for our 
perceptual beliefs in a similar fashion? In particular it seems that we can be 
made responsible for these short of believing them on the basis of reasons, 
so long as we are appropriately sensitive to reasons for giving them up or 
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withholding belief (i.e. to what are called ‘defeaters’). This suggests then that 
there need not be anything that is your reason for doing something in order to 
be held responsible for doing it, whatever it is, so long as you are 
appropriately responsive to reasons (cf. Littlejohn 2015; Greco 2010, chapter 
2; Sosa 2011, chapter 2).  
 The result is that even if it is true that perception provides one with 
knowledge for which one can held responsible, it simply doesn’t follow that 
this need be the robust kind of responsibility that requires that you believe 
what you do on the basis of reasons rather than the weaker kind that requires 
that you believe in a way that is only responsive to reasons. We do not yet 
have a straightforward vindication of the internalist’s supposed insight.8  
 One more try. But does not perception provide one with knowledge 
that one can be held responsible for in a particular way? That is to say does 
it not provide one with knowledge that one can be made answerable for. But 
if that is the case then it is not clear how one is answerable for their 
perceptual knowledge if they are only weakly responsible for it as that has 
been glossed above. Here is the relevant argument modified to reflect 
answerability: Perception provides one with knowledge for which one can be 
made answerable for, and that is why it provides one with knowledge by 
providing one with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for adopting the 
relevant perceptual belief. What should we think of that argument? 
 Here is the problem. In order to be answerable for something one 
knows it seems entirely sufficient that one be able to cite how one knows 
what one does. But explanatory reasons are not all motivating reasons.9 That 
means that we need some further argument to the effect that in the 
perceptual case the reason one cites is not merely an explanatory reason but 
is also (or instead) be the subject’s reason for adopting the relevant belief. 
Note that it is not at all clear why that should be the case. For example you 
seem perfectly answerable for your knowledge that some mathematical proof 
is correct just so long as you can cite how you know it in response to a 
	   56	  
challenge. “I worked it out with pencil and paper”—you might say. Yet it is 
hardly obvious that this is also your reason for believing the answer to the 
proof. (Are not your reasons represented in the various steps of the proof?).  
 Thus when all is said and done it looks as though epistemological 
disjunctivism currently labours under what I am calling the internalist 
challenge. Disjunctivists defend the claim that perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with factive reasons that are the subject’s 
reasons for believing what they do, and thereby claim to protect a key 
internalist insight about perceptual knowledge. Unfortunately it is not at all 
clear that there is even an internalist insight here to protect. Why think in the 
first instance that perception provides one with knowledge by providing one 
with motivating reasons—let alone factive motivating reasons?10   
 
§2. Introducing the Bifurcated Conception of Perceptual 
Knowledge 
 
I now want to begin laying the groundwork for the positive proposal of this 
thesis. On the view I mean to advance, perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons because perception 
provides one with specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge—that is, 
knowledge that is a species of judgmental belief. In this section I contrast 
‘judgmental’ with ‘merely functional’ belief, as these are described in Ernest 
Sosa’s Judgment and Agency (2015), to generate what I will call the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. Then in the section that 
follows I’ll describe a new vision for epistemological disjunctivism, which I 
advance within the context of the framework developed here. I show how this 
new view overcomes the internalist challenge for epistemological 
disjunctivism. 
 In his book Judgment and Agency Sosa writes that “we can 
distinguish between two sorts of ‘belief’, one implicit and merely functional, 
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the other not merely functional, but intentional, perhaps even consciously 
intentional” (2015, p. 80). He writes later that this distinction has “animal, 
action-guiding beliefs on one side, and reflective judgments on the other” 
(ibid., p. 209). For our purposes we are especially interested in what Sosa 
calls “reflective judgmental belief”. He writes that this kind of belief (…) 
 
“(…) is a disposition to judge affirmatively in answer to a question, in 
the endeavor to answer correctly (…), reliably enough or even aptly. 
And this “judgment” that one is disposed to render is a distinctive 
conscious act or consciously sustained state” (ibid., p. 209). 
 
Elsewhere Sosa adds that these judgmental beliefs are sustained through a 
“freely adopted evidential policy” on the part of the subject whose judgmental 
belief it is—a policy sustained through the subject’s will, even (ibid., p.210). 
What this suggests is that on Sosa’s conception it is part of what judgemental 
beliefs are that they depend upon evidence or epistemic reasons for thinking 
the relevant proposition is true. Since I am most interested in judgmental 
beliefs in connection with perception, it will be helpful to consider a concrete 
case in this regard.   
 To that end then imagine that you perceive a tomato on the countertop 
in the ‘good case’ where everything is normal. What does it mean to believe 
that there is a tomato before you, where this is a species of what Sosa is 
calling ‘judgmental’ belief? I take it that on Sosa’s account what that means is 
that, in this moment, in recognition of good reasons you take yourself to have 
for thinking that this proposition is true, you sustain a certain perceptual 
evidential policy. This policy requires that upon explicitly considering the 
proposition that there’s a tomato before you with a view toward affirming it 
only if you would thereby affirm it knowledgably, you would affirm it to 
yourself with that end in mind.11 12 So then by sustaining this judgmental 
belief under these circumstances it seems that you reveal that you take your 
perceptual reasons to be good enough to warrant affirming that ‘there is a 
tomato before me’ with a view toward affirming this knowledgably. It may be 
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helpful here to contrast yourself with a Pyrrhonian sceptic, for example, who 
we can easily imagine sustains a very different perceptual evidential policy 
under these circumstances. Since he would think that his perceptual 
evidence or reasons are never good enough for this kind of free judgmental 
affirmation, he would have sustained a policy that required suspending on all 
such matters whenever he explicitly considered them with the relevant aim in 
mind. Very well then. 
 Now in addition to your intentionally representing that there is a tomato 
before you when you see one, we should not lose sight of the fact that you 
also at the same time merely functionally represent this proposition as well. 
According to Sosa these latter merely functional beliefs implicate no such 
ability as we have underscored above—an ability to freely and intentionally 
affirm the truth of a given proposition. Rather by occasionally referring to 
them as ‘animal beliefs’ Sosa suggest that they are the kinds of 
representational attitudes we may have in common with animals and small 
children. These, Sosa says, are “passive states that we cannot help entering” 
(ibid., p. 54). Moreover he says that they are “fully wired-in forms of 
representing” (ibid., p. 94) that are “acquired automatically” by way of “normal 
automatic processing” (ibid., p. 53). It is these doxastic states that are 
principally at issue in action explanation. Plausibly they are what Daniel 
Dennett conceives of as “deep, behaviour disposing states” that “one’s 
behaviour is consonant with automatically” (1978, p. 307, 308). They are the 
sort of beliefs that even the Pyrrhonian relies on, for example, to guide his 
behaviour when he reaches for the tomato in order to make a sandwich.   
 In Sosa’s exposition then we find contrasted two kinds of doxastic 
state. Merely functional beliefs we find ourselves saddled with as a result of 
the execution of sub-personal cognitive processing. These can manifest 
themselves in intentional action, independently of any more sophisticated 
judgmental belief on the part of the subject. These latter sorts of beliefs, by 
contrast, themselves have the look of an intentional action. These are states 
	   59	  
of the subject sustained through an act of the will: through the choosing of a 
policy that requires the subject to affirm or vouch for the truth of a 
proposition, upon explicit consideration, with the purpose of thereby affirming 
knowledgably, in light of what the subject takes to be good reasons for doing 
so. What all this means is that when one sees a tomato one may not merely 
functionally represent that there is a tomato so that they can reach out and 
grab for it, but one may also intentionally represent that there is a tomato so 
that they can vouch for its being true. 
 Now doubtless one might have objections with respect to how these 
different kinds of belief relate to one another within an individual. To entertain 
too many of them now would take us too far afield. What I am coming on to—
what my main purpose in this chapter is—is to show that by advancing an 
epistemological disjunctivism within the framework Sosa provides we have 
an easy way around the internalist challenge that I motivated in the first 
section. I will consider just one objection, however, if only to motivate Sosa’s 
framework a bit further.  
 You might have this question. Perhaps it is not unusual to suggest that 
human beings believe things in ways that are different from how infants and 
other non-human animals believe things. Perhaps human beings believe 
things in ways that are distinctively reflective, even intentional, as Sosa 
suggests. But why think that we engage in both judgmental and merely 
functional belief? Here are at least two independent considerations for 
thinking so.13   
 First, Michael Frede (1998) suggests that we need to make some such 
distinction between what we are calling ‘judgmental’ and ‘merely functional’ 
belief in order to make proper sense of the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s psychology. 
According to Frede these sceptics really believed that they ought to suspend 
judgment about everything. But obviously they could not have ‘believed’ this 
in whatever way they were at the same time calling for a general suspension 
of judgment—not on any charitable interpretation of the Pyrrhonian sceptic. 
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In order to make sense of this Frede distinguishes “having a view” on a 
matter from “taking a position” on it. Frede’s idea is that while the Pyrrhonian 
sceptic believed that he ought to suspend judgment about every matter, this 
was merely his view, or his impression of things, and not his considered 
position. After all positions on things are not the kinds of things that we are 
supposed to have, according to Frede’s Pyrrhonian. Frede also points out 
that with this distinction in hand we can explain in a similar fashion how the 
Pyrrhonians were able to go about their lives safely, despite not having any 
‘beliefs’. For what it is they never actually had were positions on things. But 
while it might never have been their official position that, say, a wagon was 
barrelling down the street towards them, this might easily have been part of 
their more instinctive view on the world.  
 Secondly, in his fascinating Essay in Aid to a Grammar of Assent 
(1870) John Henry Newman also provides some motivation for thinking that 
human beings are capable of adopting two kinds of doxastic attitude. Being 
himself deeply religious, Newman was puzzled by the fact that so many 
religious persons could seem to sincerely avow belief in religious 
propositions that had little if any effect on shaping their behaviour and 
general attitude toward the world. Such folks seemed to sincerely ‘believe’ 
statements of religious faith in one sense, and yet clearly not in another. As it 
is commonly said, they believed sincerely ‘with the head’ but not ‘with the 
heart’. Well anyway, partly to make sense of this Newman distinguished 
between notional assent and real assent—between beliefs in ideas and 
beliefs in realities—which, if you read the Grammar, bear striking similarities 
to how Sosa distinguishes judgmental from merely functional beliefs, and 
how Frede distinguishes ‘positions’ from ‘views’.14  
 Very well. With our bifurcated conception of human belief now on the 
table, it is easy to see how this enables at least two species of perceptual 
knowledge. There is perceptual knowledge that is a species of merely 
functional belief. And there is perceptual knowledge that is a species of 
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judgmental belief. We can call perceptual knowledge of the former kind 
merely functional perceptual knowledge, and perceptual knowledge of the 
latter kind judgmental perceptual knowledge. Call the package the bifurcated 
conception of perceptual knowledge. 
 With the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge now in tow, 
we are in position to clearly articulate a new vision for epistemological 
disjunctivism whose first virtue is that it is entirely inoculated against the 
internalist challenge. I turn to this now.     
 
 
§3. A New Vision for Epistemological Disjunctivism: 
Disjunctivism about Judgmental Perceptual Knowledge 
 
According to epistemological disjunctivism perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons—reasons that are the 
subject’s reasons—for adopting the perceptual beliefs at issue. We noted 
that on that score disjunctivists claim that they protect an important internalist 
insight to the effect that perceptual knowledge consists in believing 
something on the basis of good reasons for thinking the relevant belief is 
true. The challenge for the disjunctivist however is to explain why we should 
think that perceptual knowledge is at all like that. Why think that it consists in 
believing something for reasons at all—let alone factive reasons? That is the 
internalist challenge for epistemological disjunctivism that we motivated in the 
first section.   
 I think that part of the reason why the internalist challenge has a grip 
on epistemological disjunctivism is that so far the view has been 
underspecified in a way that we are now in position to appreciate. Namely it 
has been underspecified as to whether it has merely functional perceptual 
knowledge or rather judgmental perceptual knowledge in view. If 
epistemological disjunctivists leave their critics free to conceive of their target 
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as a species of merely functional perceptual belief then I think it is no wonder 
that one should find it mysterious why perception should provide one with 
knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons for belief. After all 
merely functional perceptual knowledge is something we think even animals 
and small human children can enjoy. And we do not typically think that in 
order to enjoy such knowledge these subjects need to hold their perceptual 
beliefs in light of what they take to be good reasons for thinking them true. Or 
at least in nothing like the way demanded by the kind of robust epistemic 
responsibility requirement on perceptual knowledge that epistemological 
disjunctivism seems interested to accommodate.  
 By contrast notice that if we advance epistemological disjunctivism 
explicitly in connection with judgmental perceptual knowledge then that is a 
potential game-changer. Call this idea epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge. For if perception provides one not only 
with merely functional perceptual knowledge by also judgmental perceptual 
knowledge, too, then it is obvious why perception should provide one with 
(one kind of) knowledge by providing one with reasons that are the subjects 
reasons for accepting the relevant proposition. After all we have just seen 
that to judgmentally believe something just is to be disposed toward an 
intentional performance of a sort that is executed in the light of reasons—in 
the case at issue, reasons for thinking that by affirming the relevant empirical 
proposition with the aim of thereby affirming knowledgably, one would 
thereby succeed. In this way judgemental perceptual beliefs are strictly 
dispositions to do something for a reason, sustained by very basic perceptual 
evidential policies that, for example, differentiate one from a Pyrrhonian 
sceptic.  
 It is rather straightforward, then, how an epistemological disjunctivism 
about specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge has resources for 
overcoming the ‘internalist challenge’. There is an internalist insight that 
epistemological disjunctivists are right to protect since in theorizing about the 
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epistemology of perception is it right to be sensitive to the fact that perception 
provides one not only with merely functional but also judgmental perceptual 
knowledge. On our positive proposal, then, it can all be put neatly like this: 
disjunctivists should think with internalists that perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons because the kind of 
knowledge at issue is of a sort for which it’s essential that one have 
motivating reasons for adopting the relevant proposition.  
 Now it remains to be seen how to fill out the rest of the picture. 
Epistemological disjunctivism claims that perception provides one with 
knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons. And on our proposal 
this is because it provides one with judgmental perceptual knowledge. But it 
is also part of the disjunctivist’s picture that these reasons are meant to be 
factive reasons—in particular, reasons in the form of one’s seeing that p to 
be the case. How do I propose that we accommodate these reasons on my 
proposal?  
 Well given that we are already trafficking within the context of the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge I think the materials lay close 
to hand. When you judgmentally believe that p in light of the fact that you see 
that p to be the case, I want to say that your seeing that p is none other than 
your perceptually knowing that p on the ‘animal’ or merely functional level. In 
other words on this proposal perception provides one with judgmental 
knowledge that p by providing one with merely functional knowledge that p, 
where this merely functional perceptual knowledge constitutes one’s rational 
basis for the judgmental knowledge in question. 
 So for example: in paradigmatic cases, when one sees a tomato and 
recognizes it for what it is, one comes to merely functionally know that there 
is a tomato before one (where as far as I can tell this can be given a purely 
‘externalist’ analysis. That is to say that acquiring knowledge on this level 
need not have anything to do with believing anything on the basis of 
reasons). But in the paradigmatic case not only do you recognize the tomato 
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as a tomato, you also recognize it as something you see and thereby know to 
be a tomato in that merely functional way.15 Then—as I view things—in light 
of this recognition you come to sustain a perceptual evidential policy that 
requires you to affirm that there is a tomato before you upon explicitly 
considering the matter with a view toward affirming this proposition only if 
you’d thereby affirm it knowledgably.  
 That is the picture. That is epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge. It seems to me to be an entirely natural (if 
slightly over-technical) characterization of what we ordinarily think is going on 
when we know that there is a tomato before us while staring right at one. We 
know that it is a tomato. And we recognize that we know this. And that 
enables a kind of cognitive purchase on the fact that is distinctive of the sort 
of unique language-using creatures that we are—that goes to comprise what 
we can conceive of as judgmental perceptual knowledge of the fact.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I set out to cast a new vision for epistemological disjunctivism 
in light of what has recently emerged as an important new challenge for the 
view. This is the internalist challenge that we introduced in chapter one and 
motivated here in greater depth: the challenge to vindicate the supposed 
internalist insight that epistemological disjunctivism has heretofore seemed 
only to assume is worth protecting. I argued in this chapter that if we can help 
ourselves to a framework for thinking about ‘belief’ that Ernest Sosa has 
independently motivated, then we can articulate an epistemological 
disjunctivism that is inoculated against that challenge. This is an 
epistemological disjunctivism about particularly judgmental perceptual 
knowledge—the main positive proposal of this thesis. 
 The big idea is that perception provides one with knowledge by 
providing one with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what 
they do insofar as perception provides one with knowledge that is a species 
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of judgmental belief. Moreover these reasons can be as good as factive 
reasons—in terms of one’s seeing that p to be the case—on account of the 
fact that perception also provides one with merely functional perceptual 
knowledge, which is importantly distinct from judgmental perceptual 
knowledge, for reasons I tried to make clear. 
 For these reasons I think that there is much be gained already by 
adopting an epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual 
knowledge, one that is advanced within the context of the bifurcated 
conception of perceptual belief. In the next chapter I will argue that our 
proposal enjoys even further benefits. For it supports a novel solution to what 
is thought to be the ‘basis problem’ for epistemological disjunctivism—a more 
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1 This chapter is largely adapted from my “Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist 
Challenge’ forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly.  
2 See for example Pritchard (2012a) (2016a); McDowell (1983) (1995) (2011); and Millar 
(2010) (2016). 
3 For Pritchard this isn’t a general claim concerning the epistemic basis of perceptual 
knowledge. Rather perceptual knowledge enjoys rational support that’s both factive and 
reflectively accessible only in paradigmatic cases. We assume this throughout. 
4 See for example Goldberg (2016), Boult (2017), and Madison (2014). 
5 A motivating reason is a kind of explanatory reason. All motivating reasons are also 
explanatory reasons. If you believe that p for the reason that you see that p then you believe 
that p because you see that p. Not all explanatory reasons, though, are motivating reasons. 
You might believe that p as a result of knock on head. But that needn’t imply that this is also 
you’re reason for believing what you do. For a good discussion of reasons and their various 
roles, see Alvarez (2010). 
6 Recall especially the problems we called attention to earlier in chapter one, following 
Pritchard (2011) (2012a) (2016a), the ‘basis problem’, the ‘indistinguishability problem’, the 
‘access problem’, and the ‘assertion’ problem in connection with one’s seemingly being able 
to claim one’s perceptual knowledge in radical sceptical contexts. 
7 Pritchard (2012a, p. 3-4) writes that because on his view “(…) we have the reflective 
access to the factors relevant to our epistemic standings […] we can retain the appeal of 
epistemic internalism when in comes to the issue of epistemic responsibility.” 
8 Pritchard (2015, p. 634) seems to miss this point in response to Littlejohn (2015). In 
response to virtually the same challenge that we have raised here, Pritchard responds: 
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“Often, however, I think the mature knower exercises an epistemic responsibility of a very 
different kind, one which does involve reflectively accessible rational support. […] It is this 
more robust kind of epistemic responsibility, which is essentially internalist, that I want to 
capture in my formulation of epistemological disjunctivism.” Right. But the pertinent question 
is why go through the pains of capturing that robust kind of epistemic responsibility? Why 
think to begin with that we’re robustly responsible for our perceptual beliefs in this way? 
“Internalists have always said so” shouldn’t be the desired answer. 
9 See again footnote 5. 
10 Littlejohn (2016) discusses two other possible arguments for thinking that perception 
provides one with knowledge by providing one with motivating reasons. There isn’t any need 
to discuss those here since I think they struggle to support their conclusion for the same 
reasons Littlejohn thinks so. Neta (2009) argues for something close to what we are after 
here—a view he calls ‘reflectionism’. Reflectionism is the view that “if S is a creature capable 
of inquiry, then: S knows that p only if S has a reflectively accessible entitlement to believe 
that p” (ibid., p. 122). However note that it isn’t clear that it follows from the fact that 
perception provides one with knowledge by providing one with reflectively accessible 
entitlements for belief that perception provides one with knowledge by providing one with 
reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what he/she knows. And so it isn’t clear 
that Neta sets out to motivate the same internalist insight under consideration here.   
11 In what follows I substitute ‘knowledgeably’ where Sosa would say ‘aptly’. I think this is a 
safe substitution for our purposes. This is merely to avoid having to address the 
technicalities of Sosa’s view of aptness with respect to belief, which would take us too far 
afield. Suffice it to say that, on Sosa’s view, an apt belief is not simply both true and 
competently formed, but true because competently formed. 
12 This isn’t something you do, for instance, when merely guessing the answer to a question 
in a game show. Here you might affirm that, say, Columbus sailed in 1492 with the aim of 
affirming truly (after all you want the prize, and you need true answers for that!). But you 
wouldn’t be affirming to thereby affirm knowledgably, on Sosa’s view. For him a truly 
judgmental belief isn’t manifested in an intentional truth-aimed affirmation that amounts to a 
mere guess. 
13 If it isn’t clear yet, it will become clear in what follows, and especially in the next chapter, 
why it is important for the sort of epistemological disjunctivism advanced here that human 
beings go in for both judgmental and merely functional perceptual beliefs.  
14 For other examples of authors that seem to distinguish between at least two kinds of 
belief, see Coliva (2016), Dennett (1978), Gendler (2008), and Stevenson (2002), who 
actually distinguishes up to six different conceptions of belief. 
15 Compare Alan Millar (2010) (2011) (2014) (2016). Although while he agrees that, typically, 
in recognizing a tomato to be a tomato one also recognizes oneself as recognizing the 
tomato for what it is, he doesn’t conceive of this as enabling a kind of judgmental perceptual 
knowledge as we have here. 
	   67	  
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Epistemological Disjunctivism about 







In the last chapter I argued that epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge enjoys an advantage in connection with 
answering the so-called ‘internalist challenge’. In this chapter I aim to show 
that it enjoys advantages besides—particularly in connection with the better-
known basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.  
 Recall that it is a central component of epistemological disjunctivism 
that one can enjoy rational support for a perceptual belief on the basis of 
one’s seeing that p to be the case. And since seeing that p entails that p this 
provides one with a kind of factive rational support that one would not have 
unless p were true. But does not seeing that p also entail knowing that p? It 
can seem natural to suppose so on account of its just being a particular way 
of knowing that p.2 But if that is right then it seems that one can motivate this 
argument for thinking that epistemological disjunctivism is false: 
 
 The Basis Argument Against Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
1) Seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being a way 
of knowing that p. (SwK thesis).3 
2) If seeing that p entails knowing that p in this way, then seeing that p 
cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that p.  
3) Therefore seeing that p cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that 
p.  
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This argument expresses what we identified in the first chapter as the basis 
problem for epistemological disjunctivism (cf. Pritchard 2011a, 2012a, 
2016a).4 There we noted that it is standard for disjunctivists like Pritchard and 
McDowell to shy away from premise (2) and try to motivate a rejection of 
premise (1) instead—or the SwK thesis. Contrary to what we might have 
thought at first, they argue that seeing that p does not entail knowing that p 
since seeing that p does not entail believing that p (and knowledge entails 
belief).5 This response is familiar to those who know the debate. What 
remains unclear is what the prospects are for rejecting premise (2) instead. I 
think that those sympathetic to epistemological disjunctivism have good 
reasons for investigating those prospects. 
 First Ghijsen (2015) offers reasons for thinking that we should be 
suspicious of Pritchard’s (2011a) (2012a) case against the SwK thesis. 
However Ghijsen’s reasons hold up, I think disjunctivists should like to have 
some idea of how else to avoid the basis problem if not by rejecting the SwK 
thesis—if only as a matter of insurance. Secondly, the idea that seeing that p 
entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one 
knows that p can seem highly intuitive, or at least very natural to assume (cf. 
Williamson 2000; Stroud 2009; Cassam 2007; Dretske 1969).6 So if it were 
possible to defend epistemological disjunctivism against the basis problem 
without having to compromise that idea, that should be a welcome result for 
anyone interested in pursuing an epistemological disjunctivist approach.  
 In this third chapter, then, I highlight two strategies for a defense of 
epistemological disjunctivism against the basis problem that leave the SwK 
thesis entirely intact. The first I have mentioned already in passing in chapter 
one but will be more carefully considered here. This strategy situates 
epistemological disjunctivism within the context of a ‘knowledge-first’ 
approach to the relationship between perceptual knowledge and factive 
rational support for perceptual beliefs.7 This view has going for it that it can 
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be made to look consistent with the SwK thesis. That is because, as I explain 
further below, it puts one in position to reject premise (2) on the basis of its 
wrongly assuming that we are advancing epistemological disjunctivism in 
service of a reductive account of perceptual knowledge—reducing it to a kind 
of rationally supported belief. While this strategy is no doubt suitable for 
knowledge-firsters, it is not a strategy available to those like Pritchard who (I 
take it) mean to advance their view in service of an account along just those 
lines.  
 I claim that is it just here that our epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge enjoys a unique advantage. For as I’ll 
explain, by invoking the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge 
introduced in the previous chapter we are afforded a different rationale for 
rejecting premise (2), one that does not depend on having to adopt a 
knowledge-first approach. This is an advantage of the view because it means 
that it can be made consistent both with the SwK thesis and the thought that 
we can reduce (one kind) of perceptual knowledge to a kind of rationally 
supported perceptual belief. This will all become clearer in due course. 
 
§1 A Knowledge-First Solution to the Basis Problem 
 
1.1 The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
I begin by reviewing the core of the basis problem for epistemological 
disjunctivism. As we have just finished saying this problem turns crucially on 
premise (2) of the argument above: the idea that if the SwK thesis is true then 
seeing that p cannot function to rationally support perceptual knowledge that 
p. But now why is that? What is so difficult about knowing that p on the 
rational basis of seeing that p if seeing that p entails knowing that p on 
account of being simply the way in which one knows that p? 
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 Well the first thing to get clear on is what we mean by a way of 
knowing here. In what sense is seeing that p the way in which one knows 
that p so that it seems to compromise epistemological disjunctivism in the 
relevant way? Well certainly it isn’t merely that seeing that p is the means by 
which one knows that p. That cannot be the operative conception since 
something could be a means of acquiring knowledge that p without entailing 
knowledge that p. For example reading that p is a means of acquiring 
knowledge that p, and yet one could read that p without coming to know 
anything at all (cf. Cassam 2007). That suggests that so long as seeing that 
p is a way of knowing that p so that it entails knowing that p, ‘way of knowing’ 
here doesn’t mean merely that seeing that p is a means of knowing that p. 
Rather I think we mean here instead something like seeing that p is identical 
to an item of proposition knowledge, or at least the specific “realization base” 
of an item of propositional knowledge (cf. French 2014, who is interpreting 
Williamson 2000). We mean that seeing that p is a way of knowing that p like 
being red is a way of being coloured.  
 I think this gives us a clearer idea of how the SwK thesis makes trouble 
for the thought that one could know that p on the rational basis of seeing that 
p. For if seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of being a way of 
knowing that p in the operative sense, then it seems that seeing that p is just 
knowing that p in a visual-perceptual way. But what sort of daylight is there 
between perceptually knowing that p and knowing that p in a visual-
perceptual way? The result is that if the SwK thesis is true it can seem that 
epistemological disjunctivism is recommending a picture on which one 
perceptually knows that p on the rational basis of knowing that p in a visual-
perceptual way. But is that really any different from an account on which 
perceptual knowledge is epistemically supporting itself? (cf. Ghijsen 2015).8 It 
can certainly seem to ‘presuppose’ perceptual knowledge in a way that 
makes it difficult to see how this is supposed to be an illuminating account of 
perceptual knowledge.  
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1.2 A ‘Knowledge-First’ Strategy 
 
But now notice that perhaps this only seems unilluminating because we are 
imaging in the background that the epistemological disjunctivist is advancing 
their proposal in service of a traditional reductive account of what perceptual 
knowledge is. That is, an account that seeks to explicate the epistemic basis 
of perceptual knowledge in terms of the availability of factive rational support, 
all the while without having to refer to the perceptual knowledge at issue. 
Certainly seeing that p seems ill-suited to serve as the epistemic basis of 
perceptual knowledge in an account like that, so long as seeing that p entails 
knowing that p on account of just being the way in which one knows that p in 
the operative sense. Surely that’s not an implausible account of what is going 
on here.9 But what if we simply abandon that traditional aspiration? What if 
instead we advance epistemological disjunctivism as an account merely of 
the rational support available for perceptual knowledge with no view toward 
reducing perceptual knowledge in terms of the rational support at issue? That 
would seem to open the way to a rejection of premise (2) on grounds of its 
resting on the false assumption that we are aiming for a traditional reductive 
account of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge. But how exactly 
might an epistemological disjunctivism like this work? 
 Alan Millar (2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 2016), for example, defends 
just such a view. For him perceptual beliefs are rationally supported (or 
‘justified’) although not known on the rational basis of one’s seeing that p to 
be the case.10 In fact, Millar is explicit that it is in part because one 
perceptually knows that p that one enjoys this factive rational support.11 Millar 
writes that his account: 
 
“(…) reverses the traditional philosophical order of explanation as 
between knowledge and justification in cases of perceptual knowledge 
(…). Possession of justification in these cases arises out of what we 
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know about our environment and about our mode of perceptual 
access to it” (2011a, p. 238).  
 
For Millar we explicate the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge not in 
terms of the availability of a rational basis to believe anything, but in terms of 
exercising certain perceptual recognitional abilities (cf. Millar 2008a, 2009, 
2010). These are abilities to come to non-inferentially know of things in one’s 
environment that they are of some kind from the way they look. And so if for 
example on some occasion one comes to know by seeing that something 
before one is a tomato, that is because one has exercised an ability to 
recognize tomatoes as tomatoes from the way they look—not because one 
has exploited some rational basis provided by one’s experience for thinking 
that it is a tomato.  
 But now if seeing that something is a tomato is not the epistemic basis 
of one’s knowing that something is a tomato, it might still function as the 
rational basis of one’s knowledge to this effect.12 Millar insists upon this. But 
how exactly does that happen? Well on his view when one comes to know 
that something is a tomato on the basis of seeing one there, one typically 
exercises not only an ability to tell of a tomato that it is a tomato from the way 
it looks, but also a higher-order ability to tell that one has exercised that 
lower-order ability. That is, one also exercises an ability to tell of a tomato 
that it is a tomato that one sees is a tomato (cf. Millar 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 
2016). And so the idea is that in response to the same visual experience one 
can come to recognize (and so know) not only that something is a tomato, 
but also that one sees that something is a tomato.  
 Crucially, this sets the stage for an explanation of how one’s seeing 
that something is a tomato could serve as one’s rational basis for knowing 
that it is a tomato. The idea here is that—absent any other reasons—it is only 
so long as one thinks that one is seeing a tomato that one thinks that there is 
a tomato before one, so that if one were to abandon the former belief, for any 
reason, one would abandon the latter as well. Millar’s thought here is that it is 
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in virtue of helping to sustain one’s belief that there is a tomato in this way 
that one’s awareness of the fact that one sees that there is a tomato serves 
as the rational basis for the bit of perceptual knowledge that, Millar is happy 
to allow, is entailed by one’s seeing that there is a tomato.13 
 Thus by following Millar in situating epistemological disjunctivism 
within the context of a ‘knowledge-first’ approach it seems we are afforded an 
easy way out of the basis argument against epistemological disjunctivism. 
There is no need to have to reject the SwK thesis. For one can motivate a 
rejection of premise (2) instead. The thought there only seems plausible 
insofar as we are assuming that we are advancing epistemological 
disjunctivism in service of a reductive account of perceptual knowledge—
reducing it to a kind of rationally supported perceptual belief. For in that case 
it does seem that we are relying on perceptual knowledge itself to provide an 
allegedly reductive explication of the epistemic basis of perceptual 
knowledge—which does seem clearly illegitimate. By contrast once we 
abandon that aspiration within the context of the knowledge-first approach it 
is no longer clear what the relevant problem is supposed to be—in particular 
why perceptually knowing that p cannot furnish its own factive rational 
support. 
 Objection: what Pritchard first called the ‘basis problem’ for 
epistemological disjunctivism is not about whether if the SwK thesis is true 
then can seeing that p be the rational basis of perceptual knowledge that p in 
a suitably reductive account (even if perhaps this is a further ‘basis problem’ 
deserving of the name). Rather the main issue concerns whether if the SwK 
thesis is true then can seeing that p be the rational basis of perceptual 
knowledge that p in any account at all (i.e. whatever else we want to say 
about the sort of account we mean to advance). The thought here is that if 
one sees that p no sooner than believes that p, then one cannot believe that 
p on the rational basis of seeing that p. But since if the SwK thesis is true then 
seeing that p entails believing that p on account of entailing knowledge that 
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p, it seems to follow that if the SwK thesis is true then one sees that p no 
sooner than one believes that p. The end result is that if the SwK thesis is 
true then seeing that p cannot serve as one’s rational basis for knowing that 
p—never mind about whether it is also supposed to serve as one’s epistemic 
basis for knowing that p in a suitably reductive account. There is simply not 
enough ‘space’ between seeing that p and knowing that p for that to happen.  
 While admittedly Pritchard isn’t entirely clear about this, I don’t think 
that this is the basis problem that he has mind. First because there is zero 
textual evidence in support of it. If you read Pritchard’s discussions of the 
basis problem he always couches things in terms of the epistemic basis of 
perceptual knowledge, not the rational basis (cf. 2011a, 2012, 2016).14 
Moreover if this were Pritchard’s basis problem then you might expect in his 
discussion of it some mention of the debate surrounding the ‘basing 
relation’—the debate surrounding what it takes to believe something for a 
reason. But you never see any of that, either. Second because this hardly 
seems to be a problem at all (that is, it seems too easy to answer). It is 
hardly clear why one cannot believe that p on the rational basis of seeing that 
p if one sees that p no sooner than one believes that p. The relevant 
distinction here is between a belief that is acquired inferentially and one that 
is sustained inferentially. The assumption is that only beliefs that are 
acquired inferentially can be believed on the basis of reasons. But why 
should that be? Why aren’t beliefs merely sustained inferentially also 
believed on the basis of reasons?  (Consider again our discussion of Millar’s 
view above). I have to conclude that after all we do have the basis problem 
zeroed in on correctly. 
 Very well. So this amounts to a nice result for epistemological 
disjunctivists like Millar who are happy to embrace a kind of knowledge-first 
approach. Unfortunately this strategy for rejecting premise (2) is unavailable 
for disjunctivists like Pritchard who seek to advance a form of epistemological 
disjunctivism more in step with the relevant tradition. So long as we want to 
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advance the view within the context of an approach that seeks a reductive 
conception of the nature of perceptual knowledge we will have to find some 
other way to dispel the impression that if seeing that p is just a way of 
knowing that p then—if epistemological disjunctivism is true—perceptual 
knowledge is viciously self-supporting. 
 Enter in again epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental 
perceptual knowledge. Here, too, I think the view pays dividends. For by 
situating epistemological disjunctivism within the bifurcated conception of 
perceptual knowledge introduced in the previous chapter we are afforded an 
altogether new strategy for rejecting premise (2) of the basis argument 
against epistemological disjunctivism. We can reject it on grounds different 
from those considered above—instead we can reject it on grounds that it 
rests mistakenly on a univocal conception of perceptual knowledge. This is 
great because it means that we are afforded a conception of epistemological 
disjunctivism that is not only consistent with the SwK thesis, but also the 
thought that (one kind of) perceptual knowledge is reducible to a kind of 
rationally supported belief.  
 
§2 The Basis Problem and Epistemological 
Disjunctivism about Judgmental Perceptual Knowledge 
 
Above we noted that one strategy for rejecting premise (2) of the basis 
argument embeds epistemological disjunctivism within a wider knowledge-
first approach to the issues. That route is closed to Pritchard or at least to 
anyone seeking to advance epistemological disjunctivism in service of a 
reductive account of perceptual knowledge. At this point it can seem as 
though we have to make a choice between advancing an account like this 
and the SwK thesis. But if we should like to accommodate both then I think 
that epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge is 
uniquely suited for this. Let me explain. 
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 Recall that our view invokes the bifurcated conception of perceptual 
knowledge to the following effect: that perception provides one with 
specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge that p by providing one with 
factive reasons in the form of one’s seeing that p. Crucially, however, we said 
that we should think that seeing that p just is a way of knowing that p—that 
is, knowing that p on the merely functional level. On this picture, then, in 
paradigmatic cases we have judgmental perceptual knowledge being 
rationally supported on the basis of something that entails only functional 
perceptual knowledge of the same proposition. We have something that 
entails perceptual knowledge on one level rationally supporting perceptual 
knowledge on an entirely different level.  
 This is crucial first because it means that epistemological disjunctivism 
about judgmental perceptual knowledge is clearly consistent with the SwK 
thesis.15 It is true that seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of 
being the visual-perceptual way in which one knows that p. That is because, 
on our account, this is identical to one’s merely functionally knowing that p in 
a visual-perceptual way.  
 This is crucial secondly because this hardly precludes our advancing 
epistemological disjunctivism in service of a traditional reductive account of 
perceptual knowledge—one that explicates the epistemic basis of (at least 
one kind of) perceptual knowledge without having to refer to the very 
knowledge in question. After all the target perceptual knowledge is 
judgmental perceptual knowledge that p. And while it is true that its rational 
basis is being understood in terms of knowing that p in a visual perceptual 
way, this is perceptual knowledge at another level—viz., merely functional 
perceptual knowledge that p. The result is that no perceptual knowledge here 
looks to be viciously epistemically supporting itself. Judgmental perceptual 
knowledge enjoys rational support on the basis of merely functional 
perceptual knowledge. And merely functional perceptual knowledge enjoys 
rational support on the basis of nothing at all—for all we need to be 
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committed to here. (Although for what it is worth it seems natural to me to 
think that what one knows at this merely functional level one knows not in 
virtue of there being something that is the subject’s reason for believing what 
they do. We will revisit this point in the final section of this chapter).  
 So we can see that epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental 
perceptual knowledge is like Millar’s view insofar as it accepts the SwK thesis 
without hesitation. But unlike Millar’s view it is also in the spirit of the sort of 
view that I think Pritchard means to advance—insofar as it represents a 
reductive conception of the epistemic basis of (one kind) of visual-perceptual 
knowledge of the world. Very well. But it remains to be seen how exactly this 
supports a strategy for undermining premise (2) of the basis argument 
against epistemological disjunctivism.  




The Basis Argument Against Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
1) Seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of simply being a way 
of knowing that p. (SwK thesis). 
2) If seeing that p entails knowing that p in this way, then seeing that p 
cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that p.  
3) Therefore seeing that p cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that 
p.  
 
We are now in position to recognize that premise (2) can be made to look 
objectionable on grounds other than its wrongly assuming that we are aiming 
for a reductive account of perceptual knowledge. Particularly, if it doesn’t 
mistakenly assume that then it clearly assumes that the kind of perceptual 
knowledge that seeing that p entails is the very kind that at the same time it 
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functions to rationally support. But now that we are equipped with the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge we can expose that as a false 
assumption. For since we have not only one but two levels of perceptual 
knowledge with which to appeal, we can claim that was is actually going on 
here is that perceptual knowledge on one level is rationally supporting 
perceptual knowledge on another level entirely: judgmental perceptual 
knowledge is rationally supported by one’s seeing that p, and seeing that p 
entails knowledge that p, only knowledge that’s a species not of judgmental 
but merely functional perceptual belief.  
 Premise (2) then is objectionable on the grounds that is mistakenly 
assumes that we must operate with a univocal conception of basic perceptual 
knowledge. But, crucially, once we have made it clear that there are these 
two levels of perceptual knowledge in play, it seems we have removed any 
basis for the complaint that if the SwK thesis is true then perceptual 
knowledge that p can be rationally supported by seeing that p only if 
perceptual knowledge epistemically supports itself in some vicious manner. 
Thus epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge 
affords us a strategy for rejecting premise (2) of the basis argument that even 
disjunctivists like Pritchard can avail themselves of. For unlike Millar’s 
strategy it does not require that we part so drastically with tradition: On our 
proposal we safeguard the idea that perceptual knowledge (i.e. judgmental 
perceptual knowledge) can be reduced to a kind of rationally supported 
perceptual belief.16 
 
§3 Can Our Positive Proposal be Reconciled with The 
Original Motivations Behind Epistemological 
Disjunctivism? 
 
Very well. Now before shifting in the next chapter to playing defense I’d like 
to consider and respond to two objections. Both concern whether 
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epistemological disjunctivism about judgemental perceptual knowledge—as 
that has been presented here and in the previous chapter—can be reconciled 
with certain original motivations for epistemological disjunctivism. In this final 
section I consider and remove what might appear to be grounds for 
scepticism about that. If nothing else my considering these objections should 
help to further clarify the view I mean I endorse.17  
 First, recall that it is typical for epistemological disjunctivists to 
motivate their view by claiming that it captures both internalist and externalist 
insights with regard to perceptual knowledge. But isn’t our proposal now in 
conflict with that ambition, since it allows merely functional perceptual 
knowledge into the picture—knowledge of a kind that appears to be 
thoroughly externalist in nature? I don’t think so. For keep in mind that even if 
our proposal requires a kind of perceptual knowledge that is thoroughly 
externalist in this way, this is not the knowledge that it targets for a 
disjunctivist analysis. Rather the relevant target is judgmental perceptual 
knowledge. But then why shouldn’t it suffice for capturing the original 
motivation at issue that our theory of judgmental perceptual knowledge 
accommodate what internalists have complained is missing from typical 
externalist accounts (i.e. that one should need to have good reasons for 
accepting what it is they know), and what externalists have complained is 
missing from typical internalist accounts (i.e. a sufficiently tight connection 
between epistemic support and the fact known)? But doesn’t our account of 
judgmental perceptual knowledge accomplish just that? Put another way it 
isn’t clear why our proposal cannot be seen to accommodate both internalist 
and externalist motivations unless it can be seen to accommodate these with 
respect to both merely functional and judgmental perceptual knowledge. For 
this reason I don’t see that our proposal is in any deep tension with 
epistemological disjunctivism’s original aim of providing an account of 
perceptual knowledge of the world that accommodates core internalist and 
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externalist insights in epistemology.18 It does that with respect to perceptual 
knowledge that is a species of judgmental belief.  
 Second, some seem to motivate epistemological disjunctivism about 
perceptual knowledge on grounds that knowledge in general requires a kind 
of internalist factive rational support (cf. McDowell 1982, 1995, 2011; 
Littlejohn 2016). But clearly we cannot avail ourselves of this line of 
motivation once we have allowed for a kind of merely functional perceptual 
knowledge that need not require ‘internalist’ rational support at all—much 
less factive rational support. I’d like to say two things in response.  
 First it is not clear that our proposal need conflict with the thought that 
knowledge in general requires factive rational support. I only said before that 
I think we are free to give merely functional perceptual knowledge a 
thoroughgoing externalist analysis—that indeed this seems most natural—
not that we are by any stretch compelled to. For all that I need to commit to 
here, for example, it may be that merely functional perceptual knowledge too 
enjoys factive rational support. Of course we would not want to say that this 
rational support can be made available in the form of one’s seeing that p to 
be the case, for that would generate a new kind of basis problem at the 
deeper level, not to mention multiply notions of ‘seeing that p’ well beyond 
necessity. But it may be open to say instead that one’s rational support for 
merely functional perceptual knowledge is made available by the fact that p 
itself (cf. Schnee 2016).19 That is, when you merely functionally know that it is 
a tomato before you, that it is a tomato is your rational basis for merely 
functionally believing this. In that case we would seem to have an 
epistemological disjunctivism about merely functionally perceptual knowledge 
embedded within an epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental 
perceptual knowledge. I don’t claim to know of any good reasons for thinking 
that that should be so. Nor is it a view that I want to endorse. I claim only that 
it is one way of pursuing the details, a way that is consistent with the thought 
that perceptual knowledge in general requires factive rational support. 
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 But in any case, secondly, I do not think that you have to think that 
knowledge in general requires factive rational support in order to motivate 
epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge—so that if I cannot 
ultimately avail myself of this line of motivation then it isn’t anything to worry 
very much over. After all it is not as though you have to think that knowledge 
in general requires factive rational support in order to begin motivating 
epistemological disjunctivism. For recall some of the other lines of motivation 
reviewed in chapter one. Not only can we point to the apparent 
rapprochement epistemological disjunctivism brings between internalist and 
externalist thinking about perceptual knowledge, but we can also point to its 
enabling a unique ‘undercutting’ anti-sceptical solution to the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical problem (cf. Pritchard 2016a, p. 
132-142).20 Moreover it may be claimed further that epistemological 
disjunctivism makes the best sense of why acquiring perceptual knowledge 
that p can conclude inquiry into whether p in a way that satisfies one’s desire 
to know whether p is true, while also enabling one to responsibly vouch for its 
being the case that p (cf. Millar 2010, 2011c). I submit that our 
epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge is no 
less susceptible of these additional lines of motivation than, say, Pritchard’s 
original account. Thus even if it turns out that our proposal conflicts with the 
thought that knowledge in general requires factive rational support that would 




Perhaps we are used to thinking that so long as the SwK thesis is true then 
seeing that p could not serve as the rational basis for perceptual knowledge, 
so that epistemological disjunctivism must therefore try to motivate a 
rejection of that thesis. Part of what I set out to accomplish in this chapter 
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was to explore the prospects for an unfamiliar response to this problem: one 
that avoids the basis problem without having to reject the SwK thesis. 
 This route scrutinizes rather premise (2) of the basis argument against 
epistemological disjunctivism: the thought that if the SwK thesis is true then 
perceptual knowledge looks self-supporting in some way that must be 
problematic. We saw that premise (2) only seems compelling given one or 
another assumption: viz., either that the disjunctivist means to pursue a 
reductive conception of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge, or else 
that she assumes only a univocal conception of basic perceptual knowledge. 
Interestingly, either one or both of those assumptions may turn out to be 
false, depending upon how the epistemological disjunctivist chooses to 
situate her proposal. In particular if she situates her proposal within the 
context of a knowledge-first approach to the issues then the first assumption 
turns out to be mistaken. And if she instead situates her proposal within the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge then the second assumption 
turns out to be mistaken.  
 Epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge 
employs the later tactic. In doing so it affords a solution to the basis problem 
that is particularly slick. For it makes sense of how one can know that p on 
the rational basis of one’s seeing that p, even if it is the case both that the 
SwK thesis is true and perceptual knowledge is reducible to a kind of 
rationally supported perceptual belief.  
 Very well. That concludes what I have to say by way of promoting 
epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge. In the 
next chapter we move to playing defense. Epistemological disjunctivism 
about judgmental perceptual knowledge is no less susceptible than original 
presentations of the view to certain recent challenges. In the next chapter I 
stage a defense against a particularly important such challenge: what we 
called in chapter one the new evil genius challenge for epistemological 
disjunctivism.  









































Notes to Chapter Three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This chapter is largely adapted from my ‘The Bifurcated Conception of Perceptual 
Knowledge’ forthcoming in Synthese. 
2 In what sense here is seeing that p a way of knowing that p? Not in Cassam’s sense 
(2007). For in that sense a way of knowing is simply a means of acquiring knowledge about 
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something, and a means of knowing needn’t entail knowledge (e.g. reading that p doesn’t 
entail knowing that p). Rather I think what we mean here is something like seeing that p is 
identical to a piece of propositional knowledge, or realizes propositional knowledge. More on 
this below. See French (2014) for discussion.   
3 The “SwK thesis” is terminology borrowed from Ghijsen (2015). 
4 Note that there are ways of formulating epistemological disjunctivism that aren’t 
susceptible to the basis problem. These are formulations on which the rational support at 
issue isn’t characterized in terms of your seeing that p to be the case. See for example 
French (2016) and Haddock (2011). 
5 See Pritchard (2012a) (2016a) and McDowell (2002b) for this line of response. They try to 
motivate a rejection of the SwK thesis by describing cases that suggest that it’s not obvious 
that this thesis is supported by our ordinary thought and talk about epistemic seeing. For 
example, suppose you see a zebra in clear view but suspend judgment on whether there’s a 
zebra since you have a misleading defeater to the effect that it’s a cleverly disguised mule. 
Pritchard and McDowell register the intuition that, after the fact, it’d be perfectly natural for 
you to describe yourself as having seen that there was a zebra, despite your not knowing 
that there was since you didn’t believe that there was a zebra at the time. 
6 For further arguments for the entailment thesis, see French (2012) and Ranalli (2014). For 
a case against the entailment thesis see Turri (2010). 
7 Of course by ‘knowledge-first’ I invoke the orientation in epistemology that most associate 
with the vision of Tim Williamson (2000). 
8 Pritchard (2016a, p. 127) writes that at best it would look like “one can appeal to seeing 
that p to explain how one knows that p, but not to indicate one’s epistemic basis for knowing 
that p.” Ghijsen (2015, p. 1149) adds that “this would make the perceptual knowledge that p 
literally self-supporting (…)”. Thanks to a referee for the journal Synthese for helping me to 
clarify exactly how the SwK thesis makes trouble for disjunctivism. 
9 Objection: isn’t what is going on here rather to do with the ‘basing relation’? One couldn’t 
possibly believe that p for the reason that one sees that p if one sees that p no sooner than 
believes that p. I don’t think that this is the problem at issue. I consider this in more detail 
later in this subsection.   
10 In terms introduced in chapter one, Millar’s epistemological disjunctivism rejects the 
‘warrant option’. This makes his view importantly different from the sort defended by Duncan 
Pritchard and (it would seem) John McDowell. 
11 Millar writes that “instead of explaining the knowledge as, so to speak, built up from 
justified belief, we treat the knowledge as what enables one to be justified in believing” 
(2010, p. 139). 
12 To clarify, by ‘epistemic basis’ I mean that in virtue of which one knows something. One’s 
‘rational basis’ may be that in virtue of which one knows something, in which case it will also 
be one’s epistemic basis for that knowledge. But we should allow that one might enjoy a 
rational basis for their perceptual knowledge, despite one’s not knowing on the basis of this 
rational support. 
13 Compare Millar when he writes: “Since it is constitutive of seeing that there are tomatoes 
in the basket that I believe that there are, it cannot be that I come to believe that there are in 
response to being apprised of the fact that I see that there are. Rather, I am in a position 
such that the reason I have to believe plays a role in sustaining the belief: were a question to 
arise as to whether there are tomatoes in the basket I would be liable to resist any 
suggestion that there are not in view of the fact that I see that there are, and were I to cease 
to believe that I see that there are then, all else equal, I’d cease to believe that there are” 
(2011b, p. 332-33) (emphasis added). 
14 For example, see again footnote 8. 
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15 Indeed, consistent with what may be entailment theses at either level of knowledge: 
consistent both with the thought that merely functionally seeing that p entails merely 
functionally knowing that p, and the thought, if there is one, that judgmentally seeing that p 
entails judgmentally knowing that p (perhaps there is no useful concept of ‘judgmentally 
seeing that p’. I don’t myself see any reason to think that there is). What we do have to 
maintain is that there isn’t a kind of ‘level-bridging’ entailment thesis that is true.  
16 This is why our proposal is also preferable to a view that is like Millar’s, with the exception 
that is offers a reductive externalist account of perceptual knowledge. On such a view we 
have only one kind of perceptual knowledge that receives a reductive externalist analysis. 
But such knowledge is also susceptible of further rational support courtesy of one’s seeing 
that p to be the case. Whatever the merits of a view like this, it is not able to sustain what I’m 
assuming is the relevant advantage secured by our proposal—viz., that it’s consistent with 
the ambition of offering a certain reductive account of perceptual knowledge: one that 
reduces perceptual knowledge to a kind of rationally supported perceptual belief. I’m 
claiming that only a disjunctivism that integrates the bifurcated conception of perceptual 
knowledge is able to sustain that advantage without compromising on the SwK thesis. 
Thanks to a referee for the journal Synthese for encouraging me to make this clearer. 
17 Thanks to a referee for the Journal Synthese for bringing these concerns to my attention.  
18 Perhaps this is the thought behind the worry. Of course our proposal can’t claim for itself 
that it’s able to reconcile both internalist and externalist insights with respect to perceptual 
knowledge, so long as these are supposed to be insights into just any kind of perceptual 
knowledge whatsoever. Not if we allow merely functional perceptual knowledge to take a 
thoroughly externalist analysis (i.e. with no ‘internalist’ admixture). But then why think that? 
Why think that the externalist’s and internalist’s insights are real insights into just any kind of 
perceptual knowledge that there may be? Thanks to a referee for the journal Synthese for 
stimulating me to think about this some more.   
19 Well will return to consider Schnee’s proposal in a different connection in chapter five.  
20 We will return to consider this sceptical problem in more detail in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A Defense of Epistemological Disjunctivism 






By now we have in view a new vision for epistemological disjunctivism, as 
well as reasons for thinking it an improvement over original presentations of 
the view. The positive proposal has judgmental perceptual knowledge that p 
enjoying factive rational support on the basis of something that is the way in 
which one merely functionally knows the proposition at issue. In the second 
chapter I introduced this view arguing that it scores points in connection with 
vindicating the kind of epistemic internalism epistemological disjunctivism so 
clearly aligns itself with. And in the third chapter I argued that it scores points 
in connection with motivating a more attractive solution to the basis problem 
for epistemological disjunctivism—one that is unique insofar as it is 
consistent both with the SwK thesis and the thought that (at least one kind of) 
perceptual knowledge is reducible to a kind of rationally supported perceptual 
belief.  
 In this chapter I switch to playing defense. Here I want to defend the 
view against the so-called ‘new evil genius’ challenge introduced in chapter 
one. Originally this challenge was raised against reliabilism about perceptual 
justification (cf. Lehrer and Cohen 1983). According to this view perceptual 
beliefs are justified only if produced by a reliable belief-forming process.2 The 
problem is that since initially none of the beliefs of a radically deceived BIV 
seem to be produced by a reliable belief-forming process, this entails that 
none of these beliefs are epistemically justified. This is meant to be 
problematic since many internalists think it obvious that such beliefs are 
epistemically justified (indeed justified by virtue of the fact that in such cases 
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a BIV has every reason one has in the good case for accepting one’s 
perceptual beliefs). Reliabilists about epistemic justification, then, seem faced 
with the problem of explaining what otherwise seems like a compelling 
thought: that one’s perceptual beliefs in the bad case are no less justified 
than one’s perceptual beliefs in the corresponding good case.  
 Epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge 
faces a version of the same problem.3 We noted in chapter one that 
epistemological disjunctivism in its original form is defined in opposition to the 
NEG thesis—owing to its making available factive rational support in the 
good case (rational support one obviously does not have in the 
corresponding introspectively indistinguishable bad case). But since our view 
is no different in this respect that means that we owe some explanation why it 
can seem that one is no less justified in the bad case than in the good case, 
if not because one’s rational support isn’t any less strong in the bad case 
than in the good case. Put another way: if we shouldn’t think that 
(judgmental) perceptual beliefs in the good and bad cases are equally 
justified because they enjoy equal rational support, why else should we be 
led to think in this direction? We owe some alternative explanation of the 
intuitions that seem to give rise to the NEG thesis.   
 In matter of fact I think that providing a comprehensive response to the 
new evil genius challenge is slightly more complicated. That is because I 
think that the new evil genius challenge is best conceived in terms of two 
component challenges for epistemological disjunctivism. There is the first-
order challenge and also the diagnostic challenge. The first-order challenge 
invites the epistemological disjunctivist to explain the relevant new evil genius 
intuition in a way that is clearly consistent with epistemological 
disjunctivism—that is, consistent with its being the case that one has much 
better rational support in the good case than in the corresponding bad case 
for adopting a given (judgmental) perceptual belief. The diagnostic challenge, 
on the other hand, invites the epistemological disjunctivist to provide some 
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error theory: some explanation why from the epistemological disjunctivist’s 
point of view classical internalists are misled to accept the NEG thesis in 
response to seemingly intuitive judgments about epistemic justification in 
pairs of good and bad cases. Let’s say that the first-order challenge and the 
diagnostic challenge together comprise the new evil genius challenge for 
epistemological disjunctivism.  
 This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I clarify 
how we ought to think of the relevant intuition driving the first-order 
challenge, before bringing the reader up to speed regarding the state of the 
relevant debate between epistemological disjunctivists and their antagonists. 
Then in the second section I seek to advance that debate by providing a 
better solution to the relevant first-order challenge. I argue that it is open to 
epistemological disjunctivists to claim that what their detractors confuse for 
parity of rational support between pairs of good and bad cases is actually 
something closer to parity with respect to epistemic responsibility and/or 
reasonability, which I clarify further below. Finally in the third section I tackle 
the diagnostic challenge. There I venture to suggest that the reason classical 
internalists are prone to sign up to parity of rational support (and not merely 
responsibility and/or reasonability) is because they are more generally 
influenced to secure a certain vindicatory conception of the rational support 
available for ordinary perceptual (judgmental) beliefs. I then summarize what 
we have said and point our way to the final chapter. 
 
§1 The New Evil Genius ‘First-order’ Challenge:  
The Current Debate 
 
1.1 The New Evil Genius Intuition 
 
Before engaging the first-order challenge directly I think we need to get 
clearer on the relevant intuition in play. I think it is helpful if we conceive of 
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the pre-theoretic judgment about epistemic justification that the classical 
internalist thinks we ought to have when reflecting upon pairs of good and 
bad cases as the new evil genius intuition. What exactly is this intuition 
supposed to be? 
 Brent Madison (2014, p. 66) writes in this connection that when 
considering a good case subject and her radically deceived counterpart in the 
bad case “internalists point out the intuitive plausibility of holding that the 
counterparts are equally justified in believing as they do: their beliefs are 
justified to the very same extent, sharing sameness of justificatory status” 
(note that for the purposes of adapting Madison’s discussion to our own we 
should read ‘beliefs’ here as ‘judgmental beliefs’).4  
 Now I am going to suggest that we cash Madison’s thought out slightly 
differently: in terms of ‘sameness of some epistemic status’, rather than 
‘sameness of justification’. Why? Well first because otherwise it seems we 
come dangerously close to prejudging the relevant issue in favor of the 
classical internalist and against the epistemological disjunctivist. To expect 
the epistemological disjunctivist to explain why perceptual beliefs are just as 
much justified in the bad case as they are in the good case in a way that is 
consistent with their view—that is, consistent with one’s having worse 
reasons in the bad case—nigh looks to be expecting the impossible. If this is 
the intuition then it seems fairly close to the intuition simply that 
epistemological disjunctivism is false. Secondly because I think Williamson 
(forthcoming, p. 3) is correct when he writes that “epistemic justification is 
manifestly technical terminology”, and that “we should be correspondingly 
suspicious of claims to make pre-theoretic judgments about its application.” 
Note also that I don’t mean to suggest here that ‘epistemic status’ is any kind 
of natural language equivalent to ‘justification’. Rather I only intend for it to 
stand as a kind of placeholder term: indicating whatever positive epistemic 
status might be shared between a subject in the good case and a subject in 
the corresponding bad case—whatever it is that drives the classical 
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internalist to think that these subjects are equally justified in sustaining their 
perceptual judgments.5 
 Here then is the thought behind the new evil genius intuition, 




Upon considering the way in which subjects sustain their perceptual 
judgments in pairs of good and bad cases it seems unassailable that 
these judgments share some positive epistemic status—some 
normative quality or other relative to the aims of truth-seeking.  
 
The parity intuition drives our antagonist—whom we are here glossing as the 
‘classical internalist’—to subscribe to a parity thesis about rational support in 
the good and bad cases (also called the new evil genius thesis). They think 
that—as Madison writes—the “best explanation” of the parity intuition, or the 
“lesson to be drawn”, is that one has every bit as much “information to go on” 
in the bad case as in the good case for sustaining suitable perceptual 
judgments (cf. Madison 2014, p. 67). In short they adopt the NEG thesis as 
the best explanation for the parity intuition.  
 Of course this is an explanation that an epistemological disjunctivist 
cannot opt for on pains of giving up her position. By now we know well that 
epistemological disjunctivism is committed as a matter of principle to there 
being a radical difference between the rational support one enjoys in the 
good case and the rational support one enjoys in the bad case for sustaining 
perceptual judgments to the effect that something is so (recall that in the 
good case one sustains the relevant judgmental belief for the reason that one 
sees that p, while in the corresponding bad case at best one’s reason is the 
fact that one seems to see that p). Therefore epistemological disjunctivism 
owes some alterative explanation of the parity intuition: an explanation that is 
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1) consistent with the relevant disparity in rational support that exists 
between good and bad cases, and 2) isn’t otherwise obviously problematic. 
This to my mind is a more perspicuous characterisation of the relevant first-
order challenge for epistemological disjunctivism. 
 At this point it may be tempting to invoke some form of blamelessness 
as a first stab answer to the first-order problem. In any case that is what 
epistemological disjunctivists have been wont to do. But in fact we must do 
better. I’ll motivate this in the next subsection at the same time that I 
summarize where the relevant debate is at.    
 
1.2 The Current Debate: Featuring Epistemic Blamelessness  
       
In response to the first-order challenge it has been standard fare for 
epistemological disjunctivists and fellow travellers to invoke blamelessness. 
A subject in the bad case invites no more impunity than does the subject in 
the corresponding good case for sustaining the relevant perceptual judgment. 
Both subjects are equally above reproach. Here again is Duncan Pritchard 
(2012a, p. 42): 
 
“[…] epistemological disjunctivists are [not] obliged to argue that there 
isn’t an internalist epistemic standing which is common to both the 
subject and her envatted counterpart. In particular, it is widely noted 
about the subjects in the new evil genius example that one epistemic 
standing they share is that they are equally blameless in believing as 
they do.” 6 
 
To help us think this through in terms of a concrete case, imagine again that 
you are seated down at a table upon which sits a bright red tomato. Imagine 
also that you have a non-factive mental state duplicate whose situation 
seems exactly the same as yours ‘from the inside’, except they are not 
seated down at a table upon which sits a bright red tomato. Rather it’s only 
that their brain is being stimulated in all the right ways so as to perfectly 
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simulate this experience. Assume they are a BIV firmly ensconced in the bad 
case. On the proposed solution to the first-order problem under 
consideration, we are to imagine that your radically deceived nonfactive 
mental state duplicate, like you, is faultless for sustaining the relevant 
perceptual belief. And that is meant to exhaust whatever force there is behind 
the parity intuition.  
 Now the first thing to notice is that it cannot be only general 
blamelessness that is at issue here. The parity intuition, after all, concerns 
sameness of some epistemic status between subjects in pairings of good 
and bad cases. It is supposed to be that subjects in the good and bad case 
share some positive evaluative status that is in some way relevant or 
conducive to attaining the truth on the matter at issue. But it is hardly clear 
how one’s being exempt from general blame translates into an epistemic 
evaluation of these subjects in the relevant way. Therefore it must be that we 
have something like epistemic blamelessness in mind here.  
 Very well. But here is an initial problem with invoking epistemic 
blamelessness in service of a solution to the first-order problem. If it were 
specifically epistemic blamelessness that engendered the parity intuition then 
it seems that someone would have to be confused to both accept the force of 
the parity intuition while opposing the existence of epistemic obligations. 
Here is why. ‘Blamelessness’ is certainly an inherently deontic notion—of a 
piece with ‘obligation’ and related notions of duty fulfilment. Plausibly it 
makes little sense to attribute epistemic blamelessness to subjects without 
assuming somewhere in the background the existence of genuine epistemic 
obligations with respect to which the subjects in question are being held 
blameless in relation to. But then for this reason it seems misconceived to 
invoke epistemic blamelessness in service of a solution to the first-order new 
evil genius challenge. Ideally in overcoming this challenge the disjunctivist 
shouldn’t have to represent things such that anyone who finds the parity 
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thesis compelling is thereby implicitly committed to the existence of epistemic 
obligations.7 
 More than that Madison (2014) argues that we have still further reason 
to be suspicious of any purported solution to the first-order challenge that 
invokes only epistemic blamelessness. Madison invites us to compare 
subjects in the bad case not with their epistemic counterparts in the good 
case, but with various other bad case subjects. To this end Madison has us 
consider a small crew of subjects whom he calls Al, Al*, Bert, and Carl.  
 Al and Al* are our good case and bad case counterparts respectively, 
in the standard pairing of good and bad cases. We can imagine that both Al 
and Al* sustain a perceptual judgmental belief to the effect that there is a 
tomato on the table before them for the reason that, as they think, they can 
see that there is a tomato on the table (while this isn’t the example Madison 
uses, it captures the same point). Bert unfortunately has been horribly 
brainwashed so that he also sustains a perceptual judgment to the effect that 
there is a tomato before him, except not on the basis of the reason that he 
sees that there’s a tomato, but for unspecified reasons to do with his 
brainwashing. Finally Carl is your typical brain lesion victim who sustains the 
same judgmental belief although for neither of the above reasons. He thinks 
that there is a tomato on the table before him because he smells freshly cut 
grass (the implication throughout is that only Al enjoys a true belief—although 
this is immaterial). Here then is our group: 
 
Al: Typical good case subject in ordinary circumstances. 
Al*: Al’s counterpart in the corresponding bad case who is a radically 
deceived BIV. 
Bert: Brainwashed BIV victim, who believes poorly owing to his 
brainwashing. 
Carl: Brain lesion BIV victim, who believes poorly owing to his smelling 
freshly cut grass. 
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Madison notes that each of these subjects seem above reproach for 
sustaining their visual-perceptual judgmental beliefs in their respective 
circumstances. But, crucially, although each of these subjects seem 
epistemically blameless in this way, Al and Al* seem to be doing better 
epistemically than either Bert or Carl. It seems as though there is something 
more to be said about the way that Al and Al* sustain their perceptual 
judgmental beliefs—something that cannot be said of either Bert or Carl. 
Madison writes: 
 
“While all are blameless in believing as they do, surely Al and Al* have 
better rational support for their beliefs than Bert or Carl do: they hold 
their beliefs on the basis of evidence which they take to support the 
truth of what is believed, whereas Bert and Carl do not” (2014, p. 68). 
 
Thus Madison takes these comparative judgments to mitigate against the 
plausibility of suggesting that “mere blamelessness is what the internalist 
confuses for justification in the demon world” (ibid., p. 68). That seems 
misconceived if the intuitive judgment here is correct: that Al and Al* both 
enjoy some superior epistemic standing to that of either Bert or Carl. For if 
we insist that Al and Al* are only both epistemically blameless for sustaining 
their judgmental perceptual beliefs then that seems to leave us hamstrung to 
draw the relevant distinctions between Al*, Bert, and Carl. In other words if 
the best positive epistemic evaluation we can offer Al* is that of sustaining his 
judgmental belief blamelessly then we are bereft of concepts for putting him 
in a better light than his brainwashed and lesion suffering comrades—
contrary to intuition. 
 That gives the reader some idea of where the debate is now between 
epistemological disjunctivists and their internalist detractors. For these 
reasons it seems eminently plausible that the parity intuition reflects a 
stronger kind of epistemic agreement between subjects like Al and Al* than 
mere epistemic blamelessness. I think a more suitable response to the 
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relevant first-order question should avoid these difficulties. First, it shouldn’t 
entail that one cannot be moved to accept the parity thesis without being 
implicitly committed to substantive theses regarding epistemic deontology; 
and second it should furnish what we need for explaining why subjects like Al 
an Al* are better poised epistemically with respect to their perceptual beliefs 
than subjects like Bert and Carl. In the next section I move to advance this 
debate by venturing a fresh response to the first-order challenge on behalf of 






§2. Answering the First-order Challenge  
 
2.1 Epistemic Responsibility and Reasonability 
 
How else then might the epistemological disjunctivist explain the parity 
intuition if not by invoking mere epistemic blamelessness? Why else should it 
seem that in pairs of good and bad cases subjects share some kind of 
positive epistemic support for sustaining their perceptual judgments, if not 
because they enjoy the same rational support in each case? 
 Consider first that while perceptual judgments may enjoy one kind of 
positive epistemic status by virtue of being sustained on the basis of 
adequate reasons, surely they can enjoy another kind by virtue of being 
sustained out of an epistemically virtuous character. What makes for an 
epistemically virtuous character is the focus of virtue responsibilists. Virtue 
responsibilism (cf. Zagzebski 1996) is typically distinguished from virtue 
reliabilism.8 While for virtue reliabilists epistemic virtues are typically 
associated with reliable cognitive faculties or mechanisms or even skills, for 
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virtue responsibilists these are typically associated with acquired and 
enduring character traits, or person-level dispositions to be motivated to 
conduct one’s life as a truth-seeker in a particular way (cf. Battaly 2008).  
 It is important to note that it is highly contentious whether epistemic 
character virtues require that one be disposed reliably to find out the truth in 
a given domain of inquiry.9 It is important because if reliability is unnecessary 
for possessing a given epistemic character virtue then there is no reason to 
think that one couldn’t possess and even exercise these virtues in bad cases 
where one is radically deceived. In that case one might possess a full 
compliment of responsibilist character virtues in the bad case just as much 
as in the good case. 
 I submit then that beyond mere epistemic blamelessness we should 
think that subjects in pairs of good and bad cases are equally trait-level 
virtuous for sustaining their perceptual judgments. Al* for example is no less 
trait-level virtuous than Al for sustaining a perceptual judgment to the effect 
that there is a tomato on the table. Al* is no less epistemically responsible 
than Al for maintaining his perceptual judgment in this way. It is open to 
epistemological disjunctivists to claim that the parity intuition is an intuition 
about epistemic responsibility in pairs of good and bad cases.  
 I should be clear here that the claim is not merely that subjects in good 
and bad cases possess epistemic character virtue in equal measure. Rather 
the claim is that by sustaining their perceptual judgments in the relevant way 
they also exercise or manifest this virtue in equal measure. I think we need to 
say that because the parity intuition is explicitly an intuition about perceptual 
judgments in pairs of good and bad cases—that the judgments themselves 
share some positive epistemic status. It is not an intuition, I take it, about 
epistemic characters conceived in isolation from the perceptual judgments 
these characters help to sustain. 
 Objection: But how exactly do subjects in pairs of good and bad cases 
manifest their epistemic character virtue in believing as they do—especially 
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given that the target belief at issue is a simple ‘everyday’ perceptual belief? 
For notice that it is not as though in coming to form perceptual beliefs 
subjects must go through some sustained process of investigation. But then 
do epistemic character virtues really have application in this context?  
 Well first recall that on the account we are defending it is specifically 
judgmental belief that is issue, which we glossed in chapter two as a 
disposition sustained on the basis of a perceptual evidential policy to freely 
affirm the truth of a proposition with the specific aim to thereby affirm 
knowledgably. But now consider for example a paradigm epistemic character 
trait like conscientiousness, an essential component of which is to be 
motivated to believe that p only if p. Now insofar as we have perceptual 
judgmental belief in view, I think it should be relatively clear how in sustaining 
such a belief a subject in either the good or bad case can manifest epistemic 
conscientiousness. For consider that if epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge is true then in either case the subject 
sustains the relevant perceptual judgment that p for the reason that, as she 
thinks, she can see that p is the case. But then ask yourself: Is there a better 
indication that one is motivated to believe that p only if p if one sustains a 
perceptual judgment that p on the basis of a consideration that, if true, entails 
the proposition in question? Now granted the subject in the bad case is 
always wrong that they see that p. But we are already allowing that you 
needn’t be reliable in order to possess and at times exercise a full 
compliment of epistemic character virtues—including epistemic 
conscientiousness. Even though it’s false that one sees that p in the bad 
case, that needn’t preclude that one sustains a perceptual judgment that p for 
the reason that one sees that p in some respectable sense, thereby 
manifesting one’s epistemic conscientiousness. Shouldn’t we allow anyway 
that subjects can believe things on the basis of bad reasons?10 Very well. 
 Now notice that by invoking epistemic responsibility in explanation of 
the parity intuition we explain that intuition in a way that both avoids 
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becoming entangled in epistemic deontology and is consistent with there 
being disparity in rational support between the good and bad cases—just as 
the epistemological disjunctivist needs. We can imagine that the subject in 
the bad case possesses an impeccable epistemic character. But we 
shouldn’t think that that secures her against thinking that she is in possession 
of factive rational support when she is not. And should that be so surprising? 
After all we are assuming that in the bad case one is epistemically doomed. 
Is it so strange to think that in epistemically abysmal circumstances like these 
one can through no fault of their own be tricked into thinking that one has 
rational support for adopting a given perceptual belief that one doesn’t in fact 
have? 
 It remains to be seen whether this also offers the epistemological 
disjunctivist some response to the challenge Madison raises above: whether 
we can appeal to epistemic responsibility (or the manifestation of trait-level 
virtue) to help illuminate what seems like an important epistemic difference 
between Al’s and Al*’s perceptual judgments on the one hand, and brain-
washed Bert’s and lesion suffering Carl’s on the other.  
 Take Carl’s case first, then. Remember that Carl, thanks to his 
suffering a brain lesion, sustains a perceptual judgment to the effect that 
there’s a tomato before him not because he sees a tomato, but because he 
smells freshly cut grass (I take it that we are supposed to imagine that Carl 
doesn’t know that he has a brain lesion and that it’s because he smells 
freshly cut grass that he sustains his perceptual judgment). It seems as 
though there is an easy interpretation of Carl’s case according to which Al* 
but not Carl manifests the relevant epistemic character virtue in sustaining 
his perceptual judgment—so that by appealing to trait-level epistemic virtue 
we are able to distinguish Al*’s (and Al’s) case from Carl’s as is required.  
 For consider again a trait like epistemic conscientiousness. Consider 
that if like Al* Carl were even remotely conscientious then he would not go on 
sustaining a perceptual judgment to the effect that there is a tomato before 
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him, given his circumstances. Rather in such case he would give up this 
judgment, recognizing how highly epistemically irresponsible it is to think that 
there is a tomato before one absent any good reason one takes oneself to 
have for thinking that this is true. Therefore by sustaining his perceptual 
judgment in the teeth of things, in this way, Carl reveals that he does not 
sustain his perceptual judgment out of the same virtuous character as does 
Al*. In short either lesion-suffering Carl acts out of the same virtuous 
disposition as Al* and we don’t have a case (since he suspends judgment), 
or he does not and while we then do have a case, we can distinguish this 
case from Al*’s case by invoking trait-level epistemic responsibility. Either 
way, we avoid the sort of problem Madison raises about Carl in connection 
with invoking mere epistemic blamelessness in order to explain the parity 
intuition. 
 However, while the manifestation of trait-level virtue may fit the bill for 
distinguishing between Al* and Carl in this way, it isn’t so clear that it does 
the job distinguishing between Al* and brainwashed Bert. For even if we 
imagine Bert suffering the most abusive epistemic upbringing that needn’t 
entail that he is any less conscientious or concerned about the truth of things 
than Al*, even if it does entail that he has all the wrong ideas about which 
considerations count in favor of believing a given proposition. For example 
perhaps owing to his brainwashing Bert sustains a perceptual judgment to 
the effect that there’s a tomato before him for the reason not that he sees a 
tomato before him but for the reason that he sees a computer instead (we 
can imagine that Bert has been indoctrinated to believed that all computers 
house tomatoes). Now even if his seeing a computer isn’t in fact a good 
reason for thinking this is true, it is still a consideration he thinks is a good 
reason for thinking this is true. And with the background suitably filled in like 
this I can’t see why in sustaining his judgment about the tomato Bert cannot 
manifest just as much of a concern for the truth about whether there is a 
tomato before him as Al* does.  
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 Thus if in offering an explanation of the parity intuition the 
epistemological disjunctivist needs to invoke some positive epistemic status 
that makes for the relevant difference between not only Al*’s and Carl’s 
perceptual judgment, but Al*’s and Bert’s, too, then more will have to said. 
We should like to have something to appeal to in addition to trait-level virtue 
in order to account for the relevant difference. The first-order challenge is not 
yet settled.  
 Thankfully, I think that there is an intuitive notion of reasonability in the 
offing. I think it is available for the epistemological disjunctivist to say that not 
only can subjects in pairings of good and bad cases manifest the same 
degree of trait-level epistemic virtue, but also the same degree of 
reasonability. In sustaining their perceptual judgments both subjects believe 
as the reasonable person would believe, where, following Jonathan Sutton 
(2005), we can think of the reasonable person as “one whose belief-forming 
faculties and habits (e.g. inferential habits) are such as to deliver knowledge 
when conditions are right” (p. 373). For example while seeming to see a red 
tomato both Al and Al* come to sustain the perceptual judgment that there is 
a tomato before them for the reason that, as each think, they can see that 
there is a tomato before them. But then notice that when conditions are 
right—as they are for Al but not for Al*—this is a habit that generates 
judgmental perceptual knowledge. 
 Crucially however in sustaining his perceptual judgmental belief 
brainwashed Bert follows no such ‘reasonable’ process. For even when 
conditions are optimal one couldn’t enjoy judgmental perceptual knowledge 
that there is a tomato before one by following Bert’s bad belief-sustaining 
habit. One couldn’t come to know that there is a tomato before one (only) by 
believing this for the reason that one sees a computer. Thus Bert does not 
exercise a belief-sustaining habit such that by following that habit he would 
come to have judgmental perceptual knowledge of the target proposition. 
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Unlike Al’s and Al*’s perceptual judgments, then, Bert’s perceptual judgment 
is not a reasonable one.11  
 At last I think that we have landed on a suitable solution to the relevant 
first-order new evil genius challenge. Beyond mere epistemic blamelessness, 
epistemological disjunctivists should think that a subject is no less 
epistemically responsible nor reasonable for sustaining perceptual judgments 
in the bad case than in the good case.12 I submit that these are the positive 
epistemic statuses that motivate the parity intuition. That subjects in good 
and bad case pairings enjoy these positive epistemic statuses to the same 
degree is consistent with their differing with respect to rational support, and 
these are positive statuses that one can recognize without having to implicitly 
commit to the existence of epistemic obligations. Finally, these are status 
with respect to which we can make sense of Madison’s additional intuitions 
regarding Al, Al*, Bert and Carl. 
 I think that this advances the debate between epistemological 
disjunctivists and classical internalist over the parity intuition. The reason why 
we might feel compelled toward the intuitive judgment that the classical 
internalist wants us to make when reflecting upon pairs of good and bad 
cases is that these cases feature perceptual judgments that are sustained in 
ways that are equally epistemically responsible and equally reasonable. Not 
because there exists the same level of rational support in each case. That in 
my view is how the epistemological disjunctivist ought to explain the parity 
intuition. And that seems to me like a satisfactory answer to the relevant first-
order challenge.  
 
2.2 Two Objections 
 
Before moving ahead to address the diagnostic challenge I would like to 
address two objections.13  
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 First, the classical internalist may question the motivation for 
epistemological disjunctivism on the following grounds: Why think that it’s 
because of a difference in rational support that in pairs of good and bad 
cases one subject knows while the other does not? After all, there are so 
many other ways of explaining why the subject in the bad case fails to 
know—ways that need not entail that his or her rational support is any worse 
than the rational support available in the good case. For example we can 
imagine all kinds of pairs of good and bad cases in which subjects enjoy 
equal rational support, but the subject in the bad cases fails to know since his 
or her belief is false, or perhaps not believed on the basis of the relevant 
rational support, or is maybe ‘Gettiered’, or suffers from some other form of 
knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. But then why think that it is because 
of a difference in rational support that the subject in the relevant bad case 
fails to know what our subject in the good case does? 
 I think that we can easily recognize by now that this simply 
misunderstands the motivation behind epistemological disjunctivism. No one 
has tried to motivate epistemological disjunctivism on the grounds that it 
provides the best explanation why in the relevant pairs of good and bad 
cases one subject knows while the subject who is radically deceived does 
not. (For the motivations behind epistemological disjunctivism, see again 
chapter one). 
 But there is something else to be said in this connection. In predicting 
a difference in rational support between subjects in pairs of good and bad 
cases epistemological disjunctivism may be seen to have an advantage over 
classical internalism in the following way. Consider that the subject in the 
relevant bad case is supposed to be in the most dire, most abysmal 
epistemic circumstances imaginable. In no uncertain terms these subjects 
are truly epistemically doomed. It might be seen, then, as a strength of 
epistemological disjunctivism that it accentuates this fact by predicting that 
subjects in bad cases are not only misled in their perceptual judgements, but 
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also in their epistemic judgments—their judgments about what reasons they 
have to sustain their perceptual judgmental beliefs. By contrast those who 
like classical internalists subscribe to the NEG thesis might be accused of 
painting too rosy a view of subjects who are by everyone’s admission 
epistemically doomed. The classical internalists thinks that even in the worst 
epistemic conditions imaginable, at least one has a grip on the reasons one 
has for sustaining their perceptual judgments.  
 Here is a second objection we might consider. The classical internalist 
might agree with us that subjects in pairs of good and bad cases are equally 
trait-level virtuous and reasonable in the ways that I suggest in sustaining 
their perceptual judgments. But, she will continue, it is just plain obvious 
when reflecting upon pairs of good and bad cases that the subjects involved 
also enjoy equal rational support.  
 In response however this isn’t so much an objection to epistemological 
disjunctivism as it is a strategy for insulating classical internalism against its 
detractors. Epistemological disjunctivists will simply deny that it seems 
intuitively obvious that the NEG thesis is true when reflecting upon pairs of 
good and bad cases. Not only that, I think the epistemological disjunctivist 
can tell a story about why classical internalists are mistakenly prone to read 
the NEG thesis into the parity intuition. I come on to this in the next section 
where I address the second of the two challenges associated with the new 
evil genius challenge: viz., the diagnostic challenge.  
 
§3 Answering the Diagnostic Challenge 
 
When reflecting upon perceptual judgments in pairs of good and bad cases it 
seems highly intuitive that there is some positive epistemic status such that 
one’s judgment enjoys it in one case only if it enjoys it in the other. That in so 
many words is the parity intuition. The classical internalist thinks that in 
registering this intuitive judgment we are being sensitive to the rational 
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support available in each case—so that it must be that the rational support 
available for perceptual judgments in the good case is no better than the 
rational support available in the bad case (NEG thesis). The epistemological 
disjunctivist absolutely must disagree. The first order challenge invites the 
disjunctivist to provide some alternative explanation of the parity intuition—
some alternative account of what it is we are being sensitive to in our 
evaluations of pairs of good and bad cases. This we did in the last section. 
But the most comprehensive answer to the new evil genius challenge should 
also do more. It should also provide some error theory, or answer what we 
have called the ‘diagnostic challenge’: what moves the classical internalist to 
think that it must be sameness of rational support at issue in the parity 
intuition, and not merely sameness of epistemic responsibility and/or 
reasonability as the epistemological disjunctivist might maintain? Moreover, 
why is this strain of thinking misguided? Why should it be resisted? I tackle 
this in this section.  
 As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, I suspect that the 
reason why the classical internalist is moved to accept the NEG thesis about 
rational support in light of the parity intuition is because they are influenced 
from outside their thinking on this issue by a tempting idea about what an 
account of rationally supported perceptual knowledge is supposed to be. The 
idea I think is rooted in a familiar anti-sceptical desideratum: that whatever 
one’s rational support for a perceptual belief is, it should be permissible to 
cite that rational support in defense of one’s belief without begging questions 
against the radical sceptic. The hope here is to secure a certain vindicating 
conception of rationally supported perceptual knowledge, according to which 
the rational support at issue is such that one might appeal to it in order to 
vindicate one’s perceptual beliefs in the required way.14  
 Notice immediately that on this interpretation epistemological 
disjunctivism does not secure a vindicating conception of rationally supported 
perceptual knowledge. For the rational support at issue—i.e. one’s seeing 
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that p to be the case—is clearly not such as to be citable in radical sceptical 
contexts without begging questions against the radical sceptic. For if the 
sceptic is correct that one is a BIV, for example, then one would not have the 
fact that one sees that p available to cite in defense of a judgmental belief 
that p.  
 By contrast notice that information that is made available in both good 
and bad cases is suitable for featuring in a vindicatory conception of 
rationally supported perceptual knowledge. For since the bad case is defined 
so that one is radically cut off from the external world in just the way the 
radical sceptic proposes, by citing information available in both the good case 
and the bad case one is guaranteed to be citing information that doesn’t beg 
the relevant question against the sceptic. Of course the standard candidate 
for rational support that satisfies this anti-sceptical stricture is the fact that 
one merely seems to see that p. If one enjoys rationally supported perceptual 
knowledge partly in virtue of one’s seeming to see that p then ultimately one 
enjoys such knowledge on the basis of a consideration that looks like 
something one could cite in defense of one’s perceptual belief—that is, 
without begging any questions against the radical sceptic. The result is that 
we have the beginnings of something that may be a vindicating conception of 
rationally supported perceptual knowledge.  
 What all that means is that if it is not the case that one enjoys equal 
rational support for perceptual judgments in pairs of good in bad cases—if in 
particular one’s rational support in the good case is not made available in 
both the good and bad (radically deceived) cases—then it becomes 
impossible to articulate what could be a vindicating conception of rationally 
supported perceptual knowledge. I venture that it is because of the deep-
seated influence of this popular approach to dealing with scepticism that the 
classical internalist is led to think that the intuitive judgments we feel 
compelled to make when reflecting on the justification available in pairs of 
good and bad cases must be judgments about rational support—and not 
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merely about epistemic responsibility, and not merely about reasonability, as 
those have been glossed above. Now if this influence or motivation can seem 
natural or tempting, I think it is ultimately misguided. It is time to put the ‘error’ 
in our error theory. 
 I think that neither the classical internalist nor anyone should be taken 
in by the idea that we should want to provide a vindicatory conception of 
rationally supported perceptual knowledge. Not merely because the history of 
thinking about this issue suggests that it’s very difficult to obtain. But more 
importantly because, I want to suggest, the very idea of a vindicatory 
conception of rationally supported perceptual knowledge boarders on being 
incoherent. And we should not want or strive or aim for things that don’t make 
sense. Let me explain. 
 The vindicatory conception imagines that out of the information 
available in bad cases we are somehow able to fashion reasons that in good 
cases are supposed to help vindicate our perceptual judgments to the effect 
that a given empirical proposition is true. This is in effect the best that a non-
sceptic can hope for once it is agreed that the rational support available in 
the good case is some function only of the rational support available in the 
bad case. The hope is that the rational support that is common between good 
and bad cases can be shown in some way or other to add up to what in the 
good case is supposed to help vindicate a perceptual judgment to the effect 
that something or other is true. The trouble is that I cannot in principle see 
how rational support so conceived could ever add up to what it is supposed 
to be adding up to here: viz., reasons that in the good case are suitable for 
vindicating our perceptual judgmental commitments. 
 For consider what the present conception says are in the good case 
our supposedly ‘vindicating’ reasons: They will have to be a function of the 
best non-deductive argument one can muster from premises about how 
things merely appear to one to be to how things are in the external world. But 
then notice that, given our starting points, even the most ingenious, most 
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inventive such argument will be such that it is suitable for vindicating 
perceptual judgments in the good case only if it is likewise suitable for 
vindicating perceptual judgments in the bad case. Or in other words: in the 
best case scenario what we will have secured is a rational vindication of our 
perceptual judgments that ‘vindicates’ the perceptual judgments of radically 
deceived and epistemically doomed subjects just as well. But is that really a 
conception worth aiming at? I suggest not. I suggest that any ‘vindication’ of 
one’s perceptual judgments that is designed so that it can be offered in a 
context in which none of one’s perceptual judgments is even remotely 
sensitive to the truth is no vindication of them at all. For this reason I think 
that nothing that begins where the supposed ‘vindicatory’ conception of 
rationally supported perceptual knowledge would have us begin can end up 
looking like what it is supposed to be—viz., a conception of rationally 
supported perceptual knowledge where that rational support can be relied 
upon for vindicating one’s perceptual judgments in radical sceptical contexts. 
In this way I suggest that the familiar anti-sceptical desideratum that can 
seem to motivate acceptance of the NEG thesis borders on incoherence.  
 That concludes what I have to say in response to the diagnostic new 
evil genius challenge. I think that the epistemological disjunctivist can 
diagnose the classical internalist’s disagreement with them over the parity 
intuition in terms of their working under the influence of a tempting although 
misguided picture of what rationally supported perceptual knowledge is 
supposed to be. It’s wrong to aim for a vindicatory conception of rationally 
supported perceptual knowledge, and wrong to be influenced by this ideal in 




Epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge, like 
any view that denies the NEG thesis, confronts the new evil genius 
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challenge. This is actually a two-part challenge: consisting in what we called 
the first-order challenge and the diagnostic challenge for epistemological 
disjunctivism. The first-order challenge invites the epistemological 
disjunctivist to explain what we called the parity intuition: if perceptual 
judgments in pairs of good and bad cases are not equally justified or 
rationally supported then what other positive epistemic status do these 
judgments share? I argued that in registering the parity intuition we are being 
sensitive not to parity in rational support but rather epistemic responsibility 
and/or reasonability between the good and bad cases. In that way the 
epistemological disjunctivist can do better than appeal merely to epistemic 
blamelessness. The diagnostic challenge invites the epistemological 
disjunctivist to explain why their detractors—in this case classical 
internalists—are in disagreement with them over the upshot of the parity 
intuition: what motivates the classical internalist to read into the parity 
intuition parity of rational support, and how is it that they are misguided in 
this? I somewhat tentatively suggested that they may be under the influence 
of a familiar and important strand of anti-sceptical thinking in epistemology 
that trains one to search for a certain vindicating conception of rationally 
supported perceptual knowledge. I offered some reasons for thinking that this 
is a hunt without a quarry, and that therefore it is a motivation that we are 
well advised to resist.  
 In the next and final chapter I say something to defend our view 
against the problems and challenges raised in chapter one associated with 
making sense of the reflective accessibility requirement often readily 
associated with epistemological disjunctivism. In order to arrive at where I 
want I will have to consider in detail epistemological disjunctivism in its 
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1 This chapter is adapted from my ‘A Better Disjunctivist Response to the ‘New Evil Genius 
Challenge’’ published in Grazer Philosophische Studien (2017).   
2 Cf. Goldman (1979). 
3 I should add that the new evil genius challenge is a challenge not only for epistemological 
disjunctivists (and reliabilists), but also for any evidential externalist (anyone who denies the 
new evil genius thesis). For example arguably any proponent of E=K faces this problem, 
such as Williamson (2000). Littlejohn (2015) (2017) (forthcoming b) seems to face it as well, 
as does someone like Schellenberg (2015); and perhaps even evidentialist reliabilists like 
Goldman (2011), Comesaña (2010), and Alston (1988). 
4 See chapter one. 
5 Thanks especially to an anonymous referee for the journal Grazer Philosophische Studien 
for helping me to make this clear.  
6 Compare also John McDowell (2002a, p. 99). Of someone who is tricked with mirrors into 
thinking that there’s a candle in front of her, he writes that “it might be rational (doxastically 
blameless) for that subject—who only seems to see a candle in front of her—to claim that 
there is a candle in front of her [emphasis added].” Williamson (2014, p. 5) puts it in terms of 
excuse: “Although your belief that you have hands is fully justified, the corresponding brain in 
a vat’s belief is not. But the brain in a vat has a good excuse for believing that it has hands, 
because, for all it knows, its belief that it has hands is justified, since, for all it knows, it 
knows that it has hands. Confusion between justification and excuses undermines much talk 
of epistemic justification [emphasis added].” 
7	  Objection: perhaps the very notion of epistemic justification carries with it a commitment to 
some notion of epistemic obligations. But then is it really a liability of an explanation of the 
parity intuition that it commits those of us who have this intuition to the existence of epistemic 
obligations? After all how many among us are ready to deny that there is such a things as 
epistemic justification? But then it seems that most of us are (implicitly) committed to there 
being epistemic obligations anyway. Actually it isn’t so clear that the very notion of epistemic 
justification entrails commitment to epistemic obligations. For example Ernest Sosa (2016, p. 
193) distinguishes a “strict deontic framework” from a more “loose deontic functional 
framework”, where it’s only within the former framework that notions of epistemic obligation 
are at home.	  
8 Note that this is not Zagzebski’s label for her view. Rather Guy Axtell (2000, xiv-xix) first 
draws the distinction between virtue-responsibilism and virtue reliabilism. For another virtue-
responsibilist approach see Montmarquet (1993).  
9 Battaly (2008, p. 645) for example notes that “responsibilists differ over whether virtues 
require reliability.” 
10 One can believe something for a bad reason because the relevant consideration is false. 
Or one can believe something for a bad reason because while the relevant consideration is 
true, it doesn’t in fact indicate what the subject takes it to indicate (cf. Millar 2014).   
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11 Compare Millar (2011, p. 345): “So my belief in the bad case is reasonable, in that, roughly 
speaking, it is a belief that a suitably equipped and competent person might well form in the 
envisaged situation without doxastic irresponsibility. This, or some refined version, is the 
truth behind the intuition [what we are calling the parity intuition].” 
12 Now this isn’t to deny that the subject in the good case and the subject in the bad case 
remain equally epistemically blameless. I should say that if it is right to think of these 
subjects as epistemically blameless then I think the reason why the subject in the bad case 
is epistemically blameless is because they manifest epistemic virtue and reasonability in just 
the way highlighted here. Or in other words it’s in virtue of enjoying these positive epistemic 
statuses that bad case subjects deserve to be excused (cf. Littlejohn forthcoming a).  
13 Thanks to Brent Madison for inspiring me to address these two objections. 
14 I borrow this language from Greco (2010, p. 5) who compares ‘vindicatory’ verses mere 
‘explanatory’ anti-sceptical projects in epistemology.  



































Revisiting Underdetermination-based Radical 






In the last chapter we turned to playing defense, defending epistemological 
disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge against the new evil 
genius challenge for epistemological disjunctivism. Now in this final chapter I 
would like to say something toward a defense of our view against the new 
reflective access challenges briefly surveyed in chapter one. Recall that 
these challenges turn on the idea that in good cases one is supposed to have 
reflective access to one’s factive rational support—which here so far we have 
glossed in terms of one’s seeing that p to be the case. But notice that this 
means that if we can raise doubts about the serviceability of the reflective 
access requirement itself, then that may put us in position to dispense with 
those reflective access challenges by rejecting the reflective accessibility 
requirement altogether. This is something I am going to try to motivate in this 
final chapter, if perhaps in something of a roundabout way. 
 What I’ll do is embark upon a discussion of Pritchard’s reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism in connection with the underdetermination-
based radical sceptical problem—as he presents it—with a view toward 
putting into question the significance of the reflective accessibility component 
of his view. Pritchard (2016a) conceives of this sceptical problem as issuing 
a kind of challenge: the challenge is to explain how the rational support for 
ordinary perceptual beliefs favors those beliefs over competing radical 
sceptical hypotheses, where ‘rational support’ here is of a suitably ‘internalist’ 
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specification. What that means for Pritchard, we will see, is that it is rational 
support that one could legitimately cite or appeal to in defense of one’s 
perceptual beliefs particularly in radical sceptical contexts. Interestingly 
Pritchard wants to suggest that his reflective epistemological disjunctivism is 
indispensable for overcoming this challenge. That is what I will be taking 
exception with.  
 I will draw on a version of the scheme introduced in chapter one for 
differentiating between different kinds of epistemological disjunctivism in 
order to argue that you needn’t anything near as strong as Pritchard’s robust 
reflective epistemological disjunctivism in order to secure the kind of answer 
to the underdetermination-based radical sceptical problem that Pritchard 
thinks the internalist wants. In fact I’ll show that even a minimal 
epistemological disjunctivism—one that rejects Pritchard’s reflective 
accessibility component, among other things—can perform the required 
work.  
 An important result is that it isn’t entirely clear what the incentive is for 
maintaining Pritchard’s ‘reflective accessibility’ component when presenting 
epistemological disjunctivism. For if I am right that this component is optional 
for securing the kind of answer to the underdetermination-based radical 
sceptical problem that Pritchard’s internalist wants, why not simply drop it? 
But if we are free to drop it then there are no longer any reflective access 
problems and/or challenges of the sort reviewed in chapter one. Then those 
problems and challenges, in their current form, entirely lose their footing. A 
nice result indeed. 
 Here is the plan. In the first section I review the underdetermination-
based radical sceptical problem, and Pritchard’s reasons for thinking that his 
reflective epistemological disjunctivism is “vital” (in his words) for overcoming 
it. Then in the second section I repurpose some earlier material in order to 
clearly distinguish Pritchard’s rather robust reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism from a mere minimal epistemological disjunctivism. Then in the 
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third section I argue that even a minimal epistemological disjunctivism—a 
view that abjures among other things the reflective accessibility component—
can secure the kind of answer to the radical sceptical challenge that Pritchard 
thinks the ‘internalist’ wants. The upshot here is that  Pritchard’s 
epistemological disjunctivism offers far more punch than we need. I then 
summarize and conclude, indicating the significance of our discussion for 
epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge in light 
of the new reflective access challenges. 
 
§1 Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism and the 
Underdetermination-based Radical Sceptical Challenge    
 
Recall that on Pritchard’s ‘reflective epistemological disjunctivism’ one can 
know that p by virtue of enjoying rational support for believing that p that is 
both factive and reflectively accessible to the subject—factive insofar as it 
entails that p is the case.1 In particular recall that on his view when one 
knows that there is a tomato before one, for example, on the basis of seeing 
it there that can be because one believes this for the reason that one sees 
that there is a tomato (in paradigmatic cases anyway).2 Now as we just said 
Pritchard is explicit that he thinks his ‘reflective epistemological disjunctivism’ 
is “vital” (2016, p. 138) for overcoming the underdetermination-based radical 
sceptical problem. Before seeing why we’ll need a better grip on how 
Pritchard conceives of the sceptical problem itself.  
 
1.1 The Underdetermination-based Radical Sceptical Challenge 
 
Consider then the following underdetermination-based radical sceptical 
paradox (adapted from Pritchard 2016a, p. 34): 
  
 The Underdetermination-based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
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1) One cannot have rational support that favors one’s perceptual belief 
that p over the hypothesis that one is only a BIV merely hallucinating 
that p (BIV hypothesis). 
2) So long as one knows that p is logically incompatible with the BIV 
hypothesis, then unless one has rational support that favors p over the 
BIV hypothesis one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that p.  
3) But even if one knows that p is logically incompatible with the BIV 
hypothesis, one can have rationally grounded perceptual knowledge 
that p. 
 
Now this is called a paradox because claims (1), (2), and (3) cannot all be 
true, and yet each can seem plausible in its own right. We will assume with 
Pritchard that the best anti-sceptical strategies aim to motivate a rejection of 
claim (1) rather than claim (2). Then if we like we can conceive of the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical problem as issuing a kind of 
challenge: why think that one can after all have rational support that favors 
perceptual beliefs over competing radical sceptical hypotheses—claim (1) 
notwithstanding? Call this the underdetermination-based radical sceptical 
challenge.  
 The challenge stems from the fact that claim (1) can seem compulsory 
given a popular ‘Cartesian’ dogma that by now the reader is well familiar with. 
This is the ‘new evil genius’ (NEG) thesis that says that the kind of rational 
support available for ordinary perceptual beliefs is never any better than the 
kind of rational support one might have anyway if one were a radically 
deceived BIV under the control of an evil neuroscientist.3 Recall that from that 
it follows that on any given occasion one’s best reason for thinking that what 
one sees is a tomato is something like the fact that it seems to one as though 
it is a tomato—or some other reason one might have anyway even if one 
were in some radical deception scenario. Pritchard explains that this renders 
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basic perceptual reasons insular insofar as the effect is that even in ideal 
cases one’s having these reasons is consistent with one’s being widely 
mistaken in vast sweeps of one’s empirical beliefs (ibid., p. 55). The thought 
is supposed to be that if this is our starting place then it seems difficult to 
imagine how one’s perceptual reasons even begin to give one more reason 
to adopt a given perceptual belief over a competing BIV hypothesis.4 In this 
way claim (1) of the underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox can 
seem mandatory; so that the best we can hope for is that claim (2) is 
somehow mistaken.  
 Fortunately for us, Pritchard thinks, we can dispense with the NEG 
thesis since as it turns out it is only a product of misguided philosophical 
theorizing. It has only seemed compulsory since it has been thought 
impossible to accommodate what our ordinary justificatory practises indicate 
is the correct conception: viz., that ordinary perceptual beliefs can enjoy as 
good as factive rational support—rational support that clinches the truth of 
the relevant belief.5 Of course Pritchard contends to the contrary that this 
common sense conception has not been shown not to be in perfectly good 
standing (cf. Pritchard 2012a, parts 1 and 2; 2016a, p. 123-132). It has not 
been shown that our ordinary perceptual beliefs cannot enjoy factive rational 
support—i.e. that his reflective epistemological disjunctivism isn’t perfectly 
viable.  
 This is supposed to be welcome news. Since if reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism is correct then it no longer seems true that one 
cannot have rational support that favors one’s perceptual beliefs over 
competing radical sceptical hypotheses. After all if one’s basic perceptual 
reasons are reflectively accessible factive reasons—reasons of the form that 
one sees that p, on Pritchard’s view—then they are not of a sort one might 
have anyway even if one had been a BIV from birth and so were never in 
perceptual contact with the external world. In fact having such reasons 
entails that one is not in that condition. And so it should be readily apparent 
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how these can provide one with stronger reason for thinking that there is a 
tomato before one as opposed to thinking that one is only a BIV hallucinating 
a tomato that isn’t there. Claim (1) is thereby shown to be not so plausible 
after all, effectively neutralizing what can otherwise seem like a real 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical challenge. Very well. 
 But you will recall that Pritchard thinks that his reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism is not only sufficient for overcoming the relevant 
sceptical problem, but is necessary as well. To better understand his reasons 
for thinking this it will be helpful to consider a tempting but ultimately 
misguided objection to the necessity claim.  
 
1.2 ‘Rational Support’ and Dialectical Propriety 
 
We have just seen that since the NEG thesis is false if Pritchard’s reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism is true, by adopting the latter we can undermine 
what can seem like good support for claim (1) of the underdetermination-
based radical sceptical paradox. But now is the NEG thesis false if and only if 
reflective epistemological disjunctivism is true? Surely one can point to views 
that entail that the NEG thesis is false short of entailing epistemological 
disjunctivism. But if so then that opens up the possibility that while reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism may be sufficient for motivating a rejection of 
claim (1) of the paradox, Pritchard is wrong to think that it is necessary or 
“vital” for this purpose. It will be worth our while to pursue this objection 
further. For while it ultimately fails to appreciate what Pritchard is driving at it 
will be instructive to see why, for it will help to highlight an aspect of 
Pritchard’s overall approach to the radical sceptical problem that in my 
experience is often overlooked. This in turn should help us to better 
understand why Pritchard thinks that his reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism is necessary for overcoming the radical sceptical problem at 
issue. The ‘objection’, we will come to see, misunderstands what Pritchard 
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thinks is the relevant sort of rational support at issue in the radical sceptical 
problem—which is rational support of a distinctively ‘internalist’ character (in 
a sense to be clarified further below). 
 With that in mind consider a view that seems to entail that the NEG 
thesis is false short of entailing that reflective epistemological disjunctivism is 
true. For starters consider a view that says that the rational support available 
for perceptual beliefs is a best only nonfactive rational support. Imagine for 
example that it consists in how things merely look to one on a given 
occasion, so that one’s best reason for thinking that what one sees is a 
tomato is that it looks to one as though one is seeing a tomato. Now clearly 
one’s having such rational support is consistent with one’s suffering a one-off 
hallucination as of a tomato. It is nonfactive rational support, after all. But is it 
also consistent with one’s suffering a hallucination as of a tomato as a result 
of one’s being a life-long BIV? Well not necessarily. It depends. In particular 
it depends upon how we resolve questions about the adequacy of such 
nonfactive reasons to rationally support perceptual beliefs.  
 Consider that one’s nonfactive rational support for a given perceptual 
belief is plausibly a function not only of what we can point to as one’s 
perceptual grounds, but also the adequacy of those grounds to support the 
belief in question (cf. Alston 1988, 2005). But then if part of what makes it the 
case that one’s nonfactive experiential grounds are adequate to rationally 
support suitable perceptual beliefs is that these experiences are, say, reliable 
indicators of goings-on in one’s environment, well then we have a view on 
which one’s having even nonfactive rational support entails that one is not 
hallucinating as a result of one’s being a life-long BIV.6 Then we have what 
looks like non-insular rational support, in Pritchard’s terms: that is, rational 
support the having of which is inconsistent with one’s being mistaken in large 
sweeps of one’s empirical beliefs. For if in fact one were a BIV then one’s 
nonfactive experiential grounds would not be reliable indicators of items in 
one’s environment after all, contrary to hypothesis.  
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 It seems clear that a view like this entails that the NEG thesis is false, 
at least on one perfectly respectable notion of ‘rational support’. For it entails 
that while one only ever enjoys nonfactive rational support for perceptual 
beliefs, it can still be rational support that is better than what one would have 
anyway if one were a radically deceived BIV. After all thanks to the reliability 
condition it’s rational support that entails that one is not a BIV, even if it 
doesn’t yet entail that a relevant perceptual belief is true. With views like this 
on the table, then, it can seem simply false that the NEG thesis is false only if 
Pritchard’s reflective epistemological disjunctivism is true; it can seem that 
even nonfactive rational support can favor one’s perceptual beliefs over 
radical sceptical hypotheses in the way that Pritchard thinks is required. The 
upshot is that you needn’t subscribe to reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism—because you needn’t subscribe to factive rational support—in 
order to motivate a rejection of claim (1) of the radical sceptical paradox. 
Herein lies our putative objection to Pritchard’s necessity claim.  
 The problem however is that this objection assumes a notion of 
‘rational support’ that is much weaker than Pritchard’s notion. Pritchard will 
be quick to contend that if we can escape the radical sceptical problem in this 
way then it is only by diluting what is in fact the operative notion of rational 
support, in effect ignoring the full force behind the radical sceptical challenge.  
 Pritchard will want to highlight that the challenge does not merely 
demand that we explain how perceptual beliefs enjoy favoring rational 
support where we are free to interpret ‘rational support’ however we want. 
Rather the challenge is to explain how perceptual beliefs can enjoy favoring 
rational support where that rational support is of a suitably ‘internalist’ 
specification. For Pritchard this means that it is rational support that one 
could—without dialectical impropriety—cite or appeal to in defense of one’s 
perceptual beliefs in confrontation with the radical sceptic, and in particular 
after the sceptic has raised her favourite radical sceptical hypothesis as a 
putative alternative explanation of one’s perceptual evidence. Put another 
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way: if there is some sense of ‘rational support’ according to which even 
nonfactive rational support can favor perceptual beliefs over competing 
radical sceptical scenarios, then it is not the sort of rational support that 
Pritchard has in mind.  
 To bring this into sharper relief ask yourself whether it would strike you 
as appropriate for one to cite what may be favoring but nonfactive rational 
grounds in defense of one’s perceptual belief in a context where a radical 
sceptical hypothesis has been raised. Imagine for instance that a radical 
sceptic has now joined you at the table upon which sits a bright red tomato. 
Imagine that the sceptic asks you whether you think that there is a tomato on 
the table, and in response to your claim that there is she raises the BIV 
hypothesis as a possible alternative explanation of your evidence.7 Now even 
if as a matter of fact its looking to you as though you see a tomato provides 
you with favoring ‘rational support’ in one sense of the term, Pritchard will 
maintain that this isn’t rational support in the operative sense. That is 
because it would be dialectically inappropriate to cite its merely seeming to 
you as though you see a tomato to the sceptic, here and now, in defence of 
your perceptual belief. Why? Pritchard’s thought is that in citing only these 
nonfactive grounds one has not even begun to address the radical sceptical 
error possibility whose effect is now to call into question the purported 
significance of precisely the grounds you have just now offered. In Pritchard’s 
own words, these grounds are “declared moot in the context of a sceptical 
hypothesis being raised (…)” (ibid., p. 138).  
 You can anticipate where this is going. Pritchard will claim that in this 
respect factive favoring grounds stand out in stark contrast. For unlike citing 
putative nonfactive rational grounds, when one cites factive grounds in 
defense of one’s perceptual belief at least one does not appeal to information 
whose significance has been made contentious in the same way as before. 
On the contrary in citing such factive grounds one seems to be speaking 
directly to the error possibility at issue: You could not be seeing that there is 
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a tomato before you if you are only hallucinating one as a BIV. Again, in 
Pritchard’s own words: 
 
“ […] factive favoring grounds will be incompatible with the sceptical 
hypothesis in question, and thus this particular evidence is not simply 
declared moot in the context of a sceptical hypothesis being raised 
[…] Factive favoring reasons of the kind appealed to by 
epistemological disjunctivism are thus not contentious in the context of 
radical scepticism in the same way that nonfactive reasons are” (2016, 
p. 138). 
 
Now Pritchard anticipates that we may still feel as though citing factive 
reasons like one’s seeing that p in radical sceptical contexts must be 
dialectically inappropriate for some other reason—that is, some reason 
besides being contentious in radical sceptical contexts in the way nonfactive 
reasons are. Pritchard explains that this is a perfectly natural reaction, if 
slightly misplaced in this case, since ordinarily it is dialectically inappropriate 
to cite factive reasons in contexts where an error possibility has been raised. 
That is because ordinarily one raises an error possibility only when one has 
good reasons for doing so (in which case it isn’t sufficient to respond by citing 
only one’s factive reasons). Radical sceptical contexts are no ordinary 
context, however. For it is impossible that one ever has good reasons for 
raising a radical sceptical error possibility (as Pritchard explains they are by 
their nature always “rationally unmotivated”) (ibid., p. 138-42). Pritchard 
concludes that it has not been shown that it is dialectically inappropriate to 
cite the fact that one sees that p in defense of one’s perceptual belief, 
especially in radical sceptical contexts. I will assume that Pritchard is right 
about this in what follows.   
 The important take-home lesson is that we misunderstand Pritchard if 
we imagine him as claiming that reflective epistemological disjunctivism is 
vital for securing favoring rational support for perceptual beliefs, where 
‘rational support’ is open to interpretation. That would lead one to think, 
mistakenly, that the sort of objection considered here has application. Rather 
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Pritchard is claiming that reflective epistemological disjunctivism is vital for 
securing a conception of the grounds of ordinary perceptual beliefs where 
those grounds not only favor those beliefs in the required way, but are also 
appropriately citable in dialogue with the radical sceptic. That is favoring 
rational support properly conceived—or of the sort Pritchard thinks that an 
‘internalist’ is interested in.  
 That concludes our discussion of Pritchard’s reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism in connection with the underdetermination-based radical 
sceptical problem. In what follows we will assume that Pritchard is right about 
what an appropriate ‘internalist’-friendly response to the radical sceptical 
challenge consists in (i.e. that it consists in the availability of favoring rational 
support that is legitimately citable in the relevant way). I’m working up to 
arguing that even if Pritchard is right that some kind of epistemological 
disjunctivism is required for generating the desired solution to the radical 
sceptical problem, it isn’t his reflective epistemological disjunctivism. But 
before coming to that we will need to dissect Pritchard’s disjunctivism more 
carefully. I’ll do this in the next section with a view toward contrasting 
Pritchard’s rather robust reflective epistemological disjunctivism with a much 
weaker minimal epistemological disjunctivism. 
 
§2 Some Varieties of Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
The first part of this section will serve as review. I’ll review some of what we 
said in chapter one to make it as explicit as I can that Pritchard’s reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism is committed to at least three theses that are 
strictly optional for articulating an epistemological disjunctivist view. For 
reasons the reader might already anticipate, I will call these the experience 
thesis, the reflective accessibility thesis, and the warrant thesis. By the end of 
this section we will have a clearer idea not only of Pritchard’s reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism, but also of a minimal epistemological 
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disjunctivism—a view that while committed to the availability of factive 
rational support for perceptual beliefs rejects each of the three theses that 
characterize Pritchard’s view. This will set us up nicely for the third section 
wherein I’ll argue that you need only subscribe to minimal epistemological 
disjunctivism in order to secure the kind of answer Pritchard thinks that the 
‘internalist’ wants to the radical sceptical challenge.  
 
2.1 Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism Among Other 
Epistemological Disjunctivisms 
 
Begin by recalling that on Pritchard’s view perception can provide one with 
knowledge because it’s part of the nature of some perceptual experiences to 
furnish rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible to the 
subject. And the reason it is an epistemological disjunctivism is because: 
since one does not enjoy factive rational support in the corresponding bad 
case where things visually seem just the same, it entails that cases in which 
it visually appears to one as though p are cases either in which one enjoys 
one kind of rational support or else rational support of an entirely different 
kind (cf. Snowdon 2005).8 Or in other words if one is in the good case and so 
knows that, for example, there is a tomato before one on the basis of seeing 
it there, then one enjoys a kind of factive and reflectively accessible rational 
support for believing this that one does not enjoy in every case where it’s 
held fixed how things visually appear to one to be. In what follows I’ll offer by 
way of reminder how Pritchard’s view can be seen to accept several theses 
that are strictly optional for advancing an epistemological disjunctivist view. 
 First off recall we said that Pritchard’s view assigns visual experiences 
a particular role in providing one with factive, reflectively accessible rational 
support in the good case: that in fact Pritchard thinks that it is part of the 
nature of one’s visual experience that it provide such rational support when it 
does. Call this the experience thesis.9 Now while Pritchard commits to the 
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experience thesis we saw in chapter one that in fact this is optional for a 
disjunctivist. For you can easily articulate epistemological disjunctivist views 
that are not committed to the experience thesis. 
 Earlier we highlighted Ernest Sosa’s (2011, pp. 74-78) view as a case 
in point. On his view an experience can furnish one with factive rational 
support for a perceptual belief owing to the experience’s causal history. More 
specifically: owing to whether the experience in question is an apt 
experience.10 Since Sosa needn’t think that it is part of the nature of an 
experience that it is an apt experience, he needn’t think that it is part of what 
individuates a given experience that it provides one with factive rational 
support for suitable perceptual beliefs. We also highlighted that one can even 
imagine a disjunctivist view according to which visual experiences play no 
role at all in furnishing one with factive rational support—much less the sort 
of role that Sosa has for them. For example you could combine a reliabilist 
view of perceptual knowledge—according to which visual experiences do 
nothing to supply one with that knowledge (cf. Lyons 2009)—with the thought 
behind E=K that one’s evidence includes all and only the propositions one 
knows (cf. Williamson 2000). But then since in the good case one knows for 
example that there is a tomato before one, one might draw the conclusion 
that in such case one enjoys a kind of factive evidential or rational support for 
believing this—rational or evidential support consisting of the fact itself.11 
Therefore it seems clear that an epistemological disjunctivism need not 
commit to the experience thesis.  
 Secondly, recall we said that Pritchard advances his reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism in service of an account of basic perceptual 
warrant—that is, an account of whatever it is that turns merely true 
perceptual belief into perceptual knowledge. He wants to say that perceptual 
knowledge can be partly constituted by factive and reflectively accessible 
rational support, so that it is because one enjoys this rational support that 
one can know what one does.12 Call this the warrant thesis. But we 
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suggested that this second thesis is no more obligatory than the first; that in 
fact there are epistemological disjunctivist views in the literature that explicitly 
reject it.  
 Here we highlighted Alan Millar’s (2010) (2014) (2016) view as a case 
in point. In particular recall from our discussion of Millar’s view in chapter 
three that while he thinks that it typically happens that we enjoy factive 
rational support for what we know on the basis of perception, it’s not as 
though we know what we do in virtue of enjoying such factive rational 
support. Rather it is in virtue of exercising certain perceptual-recognitional 
capacities that we know what we know, where these are not themselves 
capacities to believe things on the basis of reasons. Therefore it seems clear 
that epistemological disjunctivism need not commit to the warrant thesis, 
neither.  
 The third and final thing we noted about Pritchard’s reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism is that, plainly, he thinks that the factive rational 
support at issue should be reflectively accessible to the subject. Call this the 
reflective accessibility thesis. It is in virtue of accepting this third thesis, of 
course, that Pritchard’s reflective epistemological disjunctivism is susceptible 
to the reflective access problems and challenges raised in chapter one. Now 
perhaps it is mandatory that one sign up to this thesis in order to generate 
the kind of solution to the radical sceptical problem that Pritchard imagines 
that the internalist wants. I am getting set to argue that that is not the case. 
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. For now recall that at least it doesn’t 
seem mandatory for advancing an epistemological disjunctivism that one 
commit to this thesis.  
 In this connection we highlighted Susanna Schellenberg’s view (2013 
(2016). Recall she thinks that in good cases one’s experiences provide one 
not only with “phenomenal evidence” but also “factive evidence” for suitable 
perceptual beliefs. And yet she thinks that, in her own words, “it’s always 
unbeknownst to the subject” whether she enjoys factive evidence in addition 
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to merely phenomenal evidence, adding that “we need not think that what is 
accessible from the first person perspective dictates what is rational to heed” 
(2016, pp. 880-81). But now if that isn’t enough we also pointed to Ian 
Schnee’s (2016) project where he argues that when one knows that p one’s 
basic perceptual reason for believing that p can consist entirely in the fact 
that p itself. And yet surely no one should think that empirical facts 
themselves are reflectively accessible to subjects. Both authors then commit 
to views on which when you know that p you enjoy a kind of factive rational 
support for believing p where this rational support is not reflectively 
accessible to the subject. It therefore seems clear, lastly, that an 
epistemological disjunctivism needn’t commit to the reflective accessibility 
thesis.  
 We noted also in chapter one that this helps us to imagine a range of 
possible epistemological disjunctivist views. For our purposes let’s locate on 
one end of a spectrum of such views Pritchard’s robust reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism—a view that accepts each of the experience, 
warrant, and reflective accessibility theses—and at the opposite end a 
minimal epistemological disjunctivism: a view that eschews all of those 
theses while subscribing to the availability of factive rational support for 
perceptual beliefs. Before proceeding to the next section it will be helpful to 
have a clearer idea of what a minimal epistemological disjunctivism might 
look like. So let’s imagine an example. 
 
2.2 Minimal Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
Begin then by recalling Schnee’s view about basic factive perceptual 
reasons. On that view when one is in the good case and so perceptually 
knows that p one enjoys a kind of factive rational support for believing this 
that one does not enjoy in the corresponding bad case—rational support 
comprised solely of the fact that p itself. Now I think that there is a 
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straightforward way of filling in some of the details so as to satisfy a minimal 
epistemological disjunctivism: one that commits to the existence of basic 
factive rational support without the trappings of the experience, reflective 
accessibility, and warrant theses.  
 We noted already that this sort of view is committed to rejecting the 
reflective accessibility thesis. Clearly if one’s basic rational support for 
thinking that there is a tomato before one can consist in the fact that there is 
a tomato before one, then this is not rational support to which one has 
reflective access. Whatever ‘reflective access’ amounts to in this connection 
surely one cannot know just by reflection alone that there is a tomato before 
one when there is. Very well. But then what about the experience and 
warrant theses? 
 Well notice that, whatever Schnee himself thinks, one is not forced to 
think that it is owing to the nature of one’s perceptual experience as of p that 
one enjoys factive rational support in the good case furnished by the fact that 
p itself. Perhaps for example one comes to have this rational support on 
account of truly believing that p as a result of a reliable belief-forming process 
where conscious experiences here function as mere epiphenomena. That 
would be to develop Schnee’s view in a direction that rejects the experience 
thesis. But more than that this also naturally lends itself to a rejection of the 
warrant thesis as well. After all perhaps it is natural to assume that if one has 
one’s factive reason that p by virtue of truly believing that p on account of a 
reliable belief-forming process then one has one’s factive reason by virtue of 
knowing the matter at issue.13 But then—contrary to what the warrant thesis 
might otherwise suggest—one hardly knows the matter at issue by virtue of 
enjoying such factive rational support (which of course need not imply that 
one does not or cannot justifiably believe what one does on account of this 
fact).14 I do not claim that this is Schnee’s view, nor anyone’s view for that 
matter. I do claim that it is a natural and not entirely implausible way of 
pursuing the details. It is a view available for the taking.  
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 To my mind this represents a nice example of what a minimal 
epistemological disjunctivism might look like—a view that rejects each of the 
experience, warrant, and reflective accessibility theses while holding out for 
the availability of factive rational support for perceptual beliefs. I will now go 
on to argue that even a minimal epistemological disjunctivism like this is 
sufficient for overcoming the underdetermination-based radical sceptical 
problem; that it supports a conception of favoring rational support of a 
suitably ‘internalist’ variety that Pritchard thinks is relevant. If I succeed then I 
will have shown that Pritchard’s robust reflective epistemological 
disjunctivism—notably featuring a reflective accessibility component—while 
certainly sufficient, is not necessary or “vital” for providing Pritchard’s 
internalist’s solution to the relevant sceptical challenge. 
 
§3 Minimal Epistemological Disjunctivism and The 
Underdetermination-based Radical Sceptical Challenge   
 
So here is where we are. According to Pritchard the underdetermination-
based radical sceptical problem challenges us to provide some account of 
how perceptual beliefs enjoy rational support of a suitably ‘internalist’ 
specification that favors those beliefs over competing radical sceptical 
hypotheses—that is, rational support that is citable without dialectical 
impropriety in defense of one’s beliefs in conversation with the radical 
sceptic. Pritchard argues that it is a point in favor of his robust reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism that it can provide such an account—even 
suggesting that his view is “vital” on this score. But in this section I will argue 
that it is hardly clear that that is the case. For in fact even a minimal 
epistemological disjunctivism—one that eschews each of the experience, 
warrant, and reflective accessibility theses that characterize Pritchard’s 
view—can sustain the kind of ‘internalist’-friendly answer to the sceptical 
problem that Pritchard thinks we need.  
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 It should be relatively clear how our minimal epistemological 
disjunctivism could support the idea that the rational support for perceptual 
beliefs favors those beliefs over radical sceptical hypotheses—provided that 
we can show that this rational support also satisfies the relevant ‘internalist’ 
citability requirement. For if one’s basic perceptual reason for thinking that 
there is a tomato before one can be the fact that there is a tomato before 
one, then clearly one has rational support that favors this belief over the 
radical sceptical hypothesis that one is a life-long BIV only hallucinating a 
tomato that isn’t there. Why? Well for the same reason that Pritchard thinks 
that one’s seeing that there is a tomato does the trick—viz., that it entails that 
what one believes is true at the same time that it entails that the competing 
radical sceptical hypothesis is false. It cannot be that one is only hallucinating 
a tomato that isn’t there if it is a fact that the thing before one is a tomato. 
That much seems straightforward. 
 But now recall that in order to sustain the sort of solution to the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical problem that Pritchard thinks the 
‘internalist’ is after it isn’t enough that perceptual beliefs merely enjoy 
favoring rational support on just any conception of ‘rational support’ that we 
might help ourselves to. Of course it must be rational support of the sort 
Pritchard thinks that the ‘internalist’ has in mind. Here that means: rational 
support that it would be dialectically appropriate for one to cite or appeal to in 
defense of one’s beliefs in radical sceptical contexts. But at this point you 
might wonder: can one really properly cite p itself in defense of one’s 
perceptual belief that p in an exchange with the radical sceptic? Below I will 
contend that one can. If I can make my case then I will have shown that even 
a minimal epistemological disjunctivism is sufficiently ‘internalist’ to provide 
the kind of solution to the radical sceptical problem that Pritchard is 
interested in. An interesting upshot here is that since our minimal 
epistemological disjunctivism abjures the reflective accessibly thesis (among 
other theses) the effect is that we put into question what might otherwise be 
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thought of as an important motivation for maintaining a reflective accessibility 
component in presentations of epistemological disjunctivism.  
 Very well then. I propose that it can be perfectly appropriate in radical 
sceptical contexts for one to cite p in defense of one’s perceptual belief that 
p. One might immediately bulk at this idea: maybe it can be appropriate to 
cite p in defense of one’s belief that p when p is a proposition about one’s 
conscious mental states. But when p is an empirical proposition about the 
external world? Surely not. Well hold on a moment. 
 To warm you up to the proposal imagine yourself again with the 
sceptic seated at a table upon which sits a bright red tomato. Don’t forget that 
you know that the tomato is sitting there in plain view just as much for the 
sceptic as it is for you. Now consider the following exchange: 
 
Sceptic: True or false? There is a tomato on the table. 
You: True, obviously. 
Sceptic: Okay. But why think that? 
You: (looking again at the tomato) What do you mean? Because there 
is a tomato on the table. 
Sceptic: Ah but perhaps things only seem that way because you are a 
BIV hallucinating a tomato that isn’t actually there.  
You: What? Why think that I am a BIV? 
Sceptic: I don’t know. But isn’t it possible? But then why think that 
there is a tomato on the table, after all? 
You: (becoming impatient) Because there is a tomato on the table. 
 
Now for my own part I cannot see why it must be conversationally 
inappropriate for you to defend your perceptual belief that p at the end—after 
the radical sceptical hypothesis has been introduced—by simply citing again 
what it is you believe. In fact it seems to me that this represents what may be 
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a perfectly natural exchange between oneself and a sceptic whom one 
knows is only out to make trouble. 
 For starters we know at least this much. We know that citing p in 
defence of one’s belief that p in this context cannot be dialectically 
inappropriate for the reasons Pritchard claims that citing nonfactive reasons 
is dialectically inappropriate. For unlike citing nonfactive reasons—and like 
citing the different factive reason that one sees that p—by citing p itself one 
speaks directly against the radical sceptical error possibility in question. That 
is to say that in citing this factive reason one does not merely cite information 
whose significance with respect to p has already been called into question by 
the raising of the radical sceptical error possibility. Rather since it cannot be 
true both that <p> and that <not-p since one is only hallucinating that p>, in 
citing p itself one cites something that speaks directly against the error 
possibility at issue.  
 More than that we also know that citing p itself in this context cannot 
be conversationally inappropriate for what Pritchard thinks is the usual 
reason. As noted already in the first section, in the usual case one’s 
interlocutor has some good reason for raising an error possibility against 
one’s perceptual belief. Perhaps for example one’s interlocutor raises the 
possibility that the thing before one is only a fake tomato, citing that she 
knows that tomatoes are often switched out for fake look-alikes in this 
environment. Then it would be inappropriate for one to defend one’s original 
claim by citing again what one believes—viz., that there just is a tomato there 
on the table—just as much as it would be inappropriate to cite other factive 
reasons like that one can see that there is a tomato. However, recall that as 
Pritchard points out it is part of the nature of radical sceptical hypotheses that 
whenever these are raised they are always “rationally unmotivated.” And so it 
remains unclear why in such cases one should be prohibited from appealing 
to what a given theory indicates is one’s basic factive perceptual reason—be 
it the fact that one sees that p, or, in our case, the fact that p itself. 
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 It looks like so far so good. But we are not finished without anticipating 
this further important objection. You might think that at least with respect to 
alleged empirical knowledge one should somehow communicate how one 
knows that p in citing one’s basic factive perceptual reasons in response to a 
relevant challenge. But then it would seem like it should never be dialectically 
appropriate to cite only p itself in defense of one’s perceptual belief that p, 
since in that case it is hardly clear from what one says how one knows or has 
any access at all to the matter in question. 
 To illustrate the worry consider Pritchard’s favourite case (cf. 2012a, p. 
17). If your manager is on the phone with you wanting to know whether 
Spencer is at work then in defense of your claim that he is it would hardly be 
appropriate to cite over the phone “he just is at work”—even if this could 
otherwise be your reason for believing this since he is standing right in front 
of you. Rather Pritchard seems to be correct that the more fitting response in 
this case is to cite something like the fact that you can see that Spencer is at 
work. But then doesn’t this give us good reason to think that it is never 
permissible to cite something in defense of a perceptual belief without 
explicitly communicating how you know the matter in question? I don’t see 
why we have to think so. But then that leaves me with further explaining to 
do: if it is not appropriate to cite p itself in defense of your perceptual belief 
that p over the phone with your manager then why should it permissible to do 
so at the table with the sceptic—as I want to maintain? Here is how I have 
come to see things.  
 It seems to me that conversational exchanges of the sort under 
consideration are governed by the following general rule. I call it very simply 
the “how you know” rue. 
 
“HOW YOU KNOW” RULE 
If it is not part of the shared background between one and one’s 
interlocutor how one knows that p if one knows that p, then in defense 
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of a claim that p one owes it to one’s interlocutor to somehow 
communicate that information. 
 
Notice immediately that in Pritchard’s manager case it is not part of the 
shared background between you and your manager how you know that 
Spencer is at work if you know this at all. Did a co-worker tell you this? Are 
you inferring this from other information? Are you recalling an event from 
earlier in the day? Or perhaps can you simply see that Spencer is at work? 
Needless to say your manager hasn’t a clue. But then assuming that we in 
fact hold one another to the “how you know” rule, your manager has every 
right to expect that you provide her with this information in defense of what is 
in fact an item of perceptual knowledge. The effect is that when you do not—
when you merely cite the fact that “Spencer just is at work” in defense of your 
perceptual belief—then on pains of violating Grice’s maxim of quantity15 you 
generate an implicature to the effect that you haven’t a clue how you know 
that Spencer is at work. Otherwise why else would you withhold such readily 
available information?16 But if you haven’t a clue how you know that Spencer 
is at work then why are you claiming this to begin with? You see how it 
works. 
 I submit that this is why in cases like Pritchard’s manager case it can 
seem dialectically inappropriate to cite p in defense of one’s perceptual belief 
that p. In these cases the relevant background is such that in citing one’s 
reason one owes it to one’s interlocutor to communicate how one knows 
what one presents oneself as knowing. The result is that by merely citing 
what one believes one effectively says to one’s interlocutor that one hasn’t a 
clue how one knows what one presents oneself as knowing.  
 But now compare the relevant background at issue in your exchange 
with the radical sceptical over there being a tomato on the table. Crucially, 
things are very different here from how they are in Pritchard’s manager case. 
In particular here it is not as though it isn’t common knowledge between you 
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and the sceptic how you know that there is a tomato before you if you know 
this at all. Plausibly you and the sceptic both know, and both know that the 
other knows, that if you know that there is a tomato on the table before you 
then it is by seeing it there. The result is that by citing only the fact that p in 
defense of your perceptual belief that p you do not give yourself to be 
interpreted as withholding some bit of readily available information that in 
other contexts you might be expected to provide. A fortiori no Gricean maxim 
of quantity is seemingly violated here. Rather in simply citing what it is you 
believe it seems you are being as informative as is required since you and 
the sceptic both know that if you know that there is a tomato before you then 
it is by way of seeing it there. The result of course is that you don’t generate 
any implicature to the effect that you haven’t a clue how you know that there 
is a tomato on the table before you, despite citing only p itself in defense of 
your perceptual belief that p.  
 This gets the two cases just right, it seems to me. With the “how you 
know” rule in effect we can explain why it can seem perfectly natural for you 
to cite p itself in defense of your perceptual belief that p with the radical 
sceptic at the table, consistently with its being inappropriate to do likewise 
with your manager over the phone. 
 I can’t immediately think of any other reason for thinking that it must 
be dialectically inappropriate to cite p itself in defense of one’s perceptual 
belief that p in radical sceptical contexts, especially if we are already allowing 
with Pritchard that it could be permissible for one to cite the fact that one 
sees that p in radical sceptical contexts.17 I have to conclude that far from 
requiring Pritchard’s very robust reflective epistemological disjunctivism, we 
need only subscribe to a minimal epistemological disjunctivism in order to 
secure the sort of answer to the underdetermination-based radical sceptical 
challenge that Pritchard thinks that the ‘internalist’ is after: viz., rational 
support that not only favors perceptual beliefs over competing radical 
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sceptical hypotheses, but it also legitimately citable in defense of those 
beliefs in radical sceptical contexts. 
 
 
§4 Epistemological Disjunctivism about Judgmental 
Perceptual Knowledge and The New Reflective Access 
Challenges(s)   
 
Before concluding I would like to draw the reader’s attention what seems like 
an important upshot of all this for our thinking about the reflective 
accessibility component usually associated with epistemological 
disjunctivism. We have just seen reason to think that in order to secure what 
Pritchard thinks of as the internalist’s solution to the underdetermination-
based radical sceptical problem it is not essential that we appeal to factive 
rational support that is reflectively accessible to the subject (among other 
theses associated with Pritchard’s reflective epistemological disjunctivism). 
Granted it seems that we do need to appeal to factive rational support to 
which one has some kind of access. But not necessarily, it seems, reflective 
access.  
 This may turn out to be crucial. For if in order to properly treat the 
radical sceptical problem is isn’t required that rational support be reflectively 
accessible as opposed to accessible in some other way—i.e. perhaps in a 
way that constitutively depends upon one’s acquiring the perceptual 
knowledge at issue (cf. Kraft 2015)—then it isn’t entirely clear what the 
motivation is for insisting that perceptual knowledge should be grounded in 
rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible. And that 
irrespective of whether we think one’s basic factive perceptual reasons are 
the fact that one sees that p, as we suggest in this thesis, or merely the fact 
that p itself as suggested above. In other words we now have grounds for 
questioning what work the reflective accessibility component is performing 
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that could not be performed equally well by some theory of non-reflective 
access to factive rational support for perceptual beliefs. Absent further 
motivation on this score it seems that the epistemological disjunctivist is best 
advised to simply give up the reflective accessibility component stock and 
barrel. 
 In fact giving up on the reflective accessibility component suits 
epistemological disjunctivism remarkably well, I think. For just now there exist 
a small battery of putative problems and challenges for epistemological 
disjunctivism that turn on just this issue (see again chapter one). I don’t mean 
to suggest that these problems are insurmountable for a reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism. But better yet to pull the proverbial rug from 
under these problems and challenges by simply dislodging the thought that 
they depend upon: viz., that there can be such thing as rational support that 
is both factive and reflectively accessible. Especially if this thought seems to 
be an idle one anyway—as I have tried to argue here. 
 For this reason I am not prepared to say with respect to judgmental 
perceptual knowledge that sustaining a perceptual judgment to the effect that 
p on the rational basis of merely functionally knowing that p in a visual-
perceptual way requires that one have reflective access to the merely 
function perceptual knowledge at issue. I don’t have a theory to present here 
of the kind of non-reflective access that certainly is required. That is an item 
for further research. But for the reasons presented here I see no reason to 
feel backed into a corner to admit that the sort of access to one’s basic 
factive perceptual reasons here must be reflective access. Certainly I have 
not shown here that there is no way to further motivate the reflective 
accessibility requirement now commonly associated with epistemological 
disjunctivism. But for the time being, and for the reasons indicated here, my 
suspicion is that the new reflective access challenges are in fact innocuous.   
 
Conclusion 
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In this chapter I aimed to say something in defense of epistemological 
disjunctivism—and in particular epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge—against the problems and challenges we 
raised for the view back in chapter one that turn on its alleged reflective 
accessibility requirement. At the end we arrived where I wanted through what 
at first may have seemed like a deviant route.  
 Our discussion centred on the underdetermination-based radical 
sceptical problem. According to Pritchard the problem trades on the thought 
that the rational support for ordinary perceptual beliefs should not only favor 
those beliefs over competing radical sceptical hypotheses, but also be citable 
in contexts where radical sceptical hypotheses have been raised. That is how 
the ‘internalist’ approaches the sceptical problem. Pritchard suggests in 
recent work that in order to overcome this problem we must subscribe to his 
robust reflective epistemological disjunctivism—which plainly incorporates a 
‘reflective accessibility’ thesis, among others. I tried to show that that is 
mistaken. By carefully distinguishing Pritchard’s robust reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism from only a minimal epistemological 
disjunctivism I tried to show that certain crucial elements of Pritchard’s view 
are in a way dispensable. In particular you needn’t subscribe to either the 
experience thesis, warrant thesis, or importantly the reflective accessibility 
thesis in order to provide the kind of ‘internalist’ solution to radical scepticism 
that Pritchard thinks we should be aiming for. At the end of the day the 
experience, warrant, and reflective accessibility theses look to be wheels 
turning idly in the debate with the underdetermination-based radical sceptic. 
 That has potential to be an important outcome not least when we turn 
back to consider the challenges epistemological disjunctivism can seem to 
face in light of its subscribing to rational support that is both factive and 
reflectively accessible. For if this is sufficient to undercut the motivation for 
maintaining a reflective accessibility component, proponents of 
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epistemological disjunctivism should feel free to drop it from their view. The 
best part is that then the problems and challenges that hinge on that 
component become dislodged. For these reasons I make no claim to 
incorporate a reflective accessibility component in my epistemological 
disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge. With respect to those 
access problems raised in chapter one for epistemological disjunctivism I 
claim immunity for my view.  
Notes to Chapter Five 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Recall that here Pritchard takes himself to be receiving inspiration from John McDowell (cf. 
1982, 1994, 1995, 2011) 
2 Unlike McDowell (cf. 1994, 1995) remember that Pritchard reserves the right to allow for 
perceptual knowledge in cases other than paradigmatic ones—that is, in cases where one 
doesn’t enjoy factive and reflectively accessible rational support.    
3 Compare Schonbaumsfeld (2016, p. 2) who identifies this with “the Cartesian picture of 
[perceptual] evidential grounds”. The Cartesian picture supports what she calls the reasons 
identify thesis—the idea that “even the good case cannot provide us with better reasons than 
the bad case [for accepting perceptual beliefs]” (ibid., p. 14). See Lehrer and Cohen (1983) 
for initial discussion surrounding the ‘new evil genius’.   
4 Notice that there’s no general claim being made here that if one knows that p and q are 
logically inconsistent and yet both are allowed by one’s evidence, one has rational support 
for believing p only if one’s rational support entails not-q. For example one may roll the dice 
and before looking at the result have more reason to think that it has landed something 1-5 
rather than 6, despite the fact that before looking one’s evidence allows for both outcomes. 
Plausibly that’s because of the availability of suitable background information. By contrast, 
as Pritchard notes, all such information is rendered moot in radical sceptical contexts (ibid., 
p. 138). This is the force behind my claim that if one is limited only to the kind of information 
one would have anyway if radically deceived then it seems that one’s basic perceptual 
reasons don’t even begin to prefer ordinary perceptual beliefs over suitably specified radical 
sceptical hypotheses.   
5 See again chapter 1, §2.2, and chapter 2, §1. 
6 Silins (2005, p. 400, note 11) calls the view under consideration ‘indicator evidence 
externalism’. Here it may be better called ‘simple indicator reliabilism’ to make plain the 
sense in which visual experiences need to be reliable at the world where one is in order to 
rationally support suitable perceptual beliefs. Compare Graham’s (2016, p. 86) ‘simple 
reliabilism’ about justification: “In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima facia justified in W if 
and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process that caused or sustained the belief 
reliably produces true beliefs in W.” 
7 Of course if epistemological disjunctivism is true then in matter of fact the BIV hypothesis is 
an alternative explanation only of a subsection of one’s total perceptual evidence (your 
phenomenal evidence, we might say). That is because on disjunctivism you also have 
available factive evidence, which is hardly alternatively explained by the BIV hypothesis.   
8 Commenting on John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism, Paul Snowdon (2005, p. 
140) writes: “We can, therefore, read McDowell as claiming something along these lines; we 
can divide cases where it is true that it appears to the subject as if P into two sorts; one is 
where the subject is in a position to know that P, in that the fact that P is manifest to him, and 
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others where a subject is in a position to know merely that it appears to be that P. The 
fundamental division between the cases is to be drawn in epistemological terms.”   
9 The way I understand it, an epistemological disjunctivist who commits to the experience 
thesis thereby commits to a kind of metaphysical disjunctivism about perceptual 
experiences. While Pritchard never explicitly commits to what I’m calling the experience 
thesis in any of his books, he does commit to it elsewhere. Here is a relevant quote: “In the 
[2012] book, I […] left the question of whether the epistemological disjunctivist should in 
addition endorse metaphysical disjunctivism (which is itself a controversial position) 
completely open. That said, I do endorse both views […]” (emphasis added) (forthcoming).    
10 Sosa writes that an experience is suitably apt when “its veridicality manifests the 
competence of [one’s] visual system, its ability to deliver apt deliverances” (2011, p. 77) 
11 Never mind just yet what sort of ‘rational support’ this is, if any. In the next section I’ll 
argue that it can measure up even to Pritchard’s desired specification.    
12 According to Pritchard the ‘core thesis’ of epistemological disjunctivism says that “in 
paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has perceptual knowledge that p 
in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R, for her belief that p that which is both 
factive […] and reflectively accessible to S” (first emphasis mine) (2012, p.13). 
13 Indeed there are independent reasons for thinking that this is plausible anyway (cf. 
Littlejohn 2016, 2017, forthcoming b). 
14 We haven’t the space to consider objections to the effect that you can’t believe that p on 
the rational basis of p if you need to believe that p at all times you have the relevant reason. 
Although see Schnee (2016) for a defense. 
15 Roughly, Grice’s maxim of quantity demands that one make one’s contribution to the 
conversation as informative as is required. See Grice (1989). 
16 Surely not because while you know that you know, you don’t know how you on the matter 
in question. Perhaps that’s possible in some cases. But it would require some very special 
explanation for you to know that you know Spencer is at work without knowing how you know 
this. The more natural interpretation of what you say is that you don’t know that you know 
that Spencer is at work. 
17 Ram Neta (2011) has defended the following view of privileged access: S has privileged 
access to the fact that p “just if and just when: the fact that p is itself a justification for S to 
believe that p” (ibid., p. 20). If this is right then what I am suggesting might entail that one 
can have privileged access to the fact that p where p is an empirical proposition.  
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Final Conclusion  
 
In this thesis I advanced a novel proposal concerning the grounds of 
specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge within the context of what I 
called the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. The key idea is 
that one enjoys judgmental perceptual knowledge that p by virtue of 
sustaining a perceptual judgment that p for the reason that one sees that p—
where this is simply knowledge that p on the lower merely functional level. 
The view—I said—is an epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental 
perceptual knowledge. I argued that our proposal enjoys at least two 
important advantages when compared to Pritchard’s more austere 
presentation of epistemological disjunctivism. 
 First in chapter two I argued that an epistemological disjunctivism 
about judgmental perceptual knowledge is clearly inoculated against what I 
called “the internalist challenge” for epistemological disjunctivism. It is 
supposed to be a virtue of epistemological disjunctivist views that they 
ground basic perceptual knowledge in motivating reasons. It is thereby 
supposed to secure an important internalist insight that perception provides 
one with knowledge by providing one with reasons for belief. The problem is 
that it isn’t clear why we should follow internalists to begin with in linking 
perceptual knowledge with motivating reasons in this way. It might have been 
thought that this was required for securing a certain kind of robust epistemic 
responsibility for perceptual knowledge. But recall Clayton Littlejohn’s worry: 
why think that being epistemically responsible for sustaining perceptual 
beliefs requires anything more than being merely sensitive to reasons for 
abandoning those beliefs. In particular why think that is requires that there be 
something that is the subject’s reasons for sustaining the belief in question? 
That we said was the internalist challenge for epistemological disjunctivism.  
 Crucially, there is no such challenge for an epistemological 
disjunctivism targeted at specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge. For 
	   142	  
judgemental perceptual knowledge—we saw—is by nature linked to 
motivating reasons. Following Ernest Sosa we highlighted that this is a kind 
of believing that is most distinctive of human beings: rooted in dispositions—
or freely chosen evidential policies—to affirm on a matter in question with the 
aim of thereby affirming knowledgably. In this way we can explain why the 
epistemological disjunctivist has every reason to side with the internalist in 
thinking that perception provides one with knowledge by providing one with 
reasons for thinking that a given perceptual belief is true. For it makes sense 
to offer an epistemology of judgmental perceptual knowledge: that is 
perceptual knowledge that is a kind of intentional action performed in light of 
reasons for thinking that by affirming on a matter in question one would 
thereby achieve the relevant end: viz., knowledgable affirmation. And so by 
the end of chapter two we concluded that the internalist challenge fails to get 
a grip on epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual 
knowledge. 
 In chapter three I argued that our positive proposal enjoys an 
additional advantage in connection with the well-known basis problem for 
epistemological disjunctivism. Recall that the problem here concerns the 
possibility of enjoying perceptual knowledge on the rational basis of one’s 
seeing that p to be the case. For if seeing that p entails knowing that p on 
account of simply being the way in which one knows that p (SwK thesis, or 
the ‘entailment thesis’) then it is hard to see why seeing that p does not 
presuppose knowing that p in way that precludes knowing that p on the 
rational basis of one’s seeing that p. We compared Pritchard’s solution to this 
problem with Alan Millar’s solution, inspired by his knowledge-first 
epistemological disjunctivist approach. We saw that while Pritchard’s strategy 
committed him to rejecting the seemingly plausible SwK thesis, Millar’s 
committed him to rejecting the idea of advancing epistemological 
disjunctivism in service of a reductive account of the epistemic basis for 
perceptual knowledge. I argued that epistemological disjunctivism about 
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judgmental perceptual knowledge potentially enjoys a unique advantage over 
both Pritchard’s and Millar’s view insofar as it offers a solution to the basis 
problem without having to make these concessions. 
 It was important here that we invoke what I called the bifurcated 
conception of perceptual knowledge. This creates a context in which there 
are at least two very different kinds of perceptual belief (and perceptual 
knowledge) in play: belief at the intentional judgmental level, and belief at the 
merely functional level. But now, crucially, it isn’t so clear why it should be 
problematic if one judgmentally perceptually knows that p on the rational 
basis of one’s seeing that p—so long as seeing that p entails not judgmental 
perceptual knowledge but merely functional perceptual knowledge. For 
example we highlighted that there is no clear sense in which perceptual 
knowledge is rationally supporting itself in any vicious way: for the picture is 
such that perceptual knowledge at the judgmental level enjoys rational 
support consisting of perceptual knowledge at the separate merely functional 
level. And so epistemological disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual 
knowledge—by invoking the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge 
in this way—represents an epistemological disjunctivist approach that is 
consistent both with the SwK thesis and the thought that perceptual 
knowledge is reducible to a kind of rationally supported perceptual belief.   
 In chapters four and five I turned to play defense—defending our 
positive proposal against what I called the ‘new evil genius’ challenge and the 
new reflective access challenges reviewed in chapter one.  
 In chapter four I defended epistemological disjunctivism against the 
familiar ‘new evil genius’ challenge. We said that this challenge really 
involves two component challenges. The first challenge is to provide some 
explanation of what we called the ‘parity intuition’: the intuition that subjects in 
pairs of good and bad cases enjoy some positive epistemic support for their 
perceptual beliefs in equal measure. Many internalists think that this is 
because subjects in the bad case enjoy just as much rational support for their 
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perceptual beliefs as subjects in the good case. This explanation is 
unavailable to epistemological disjunctivists—of course—and so they owe 
some alternative explanation that is consistent with their view. This we called 
the ‘first-order’ challenge. In response to this challenge we argued that 
subjects in pairs of good and bad cases can be equally epistemically 
responsible and/or reasonable for sustaining their perceptual judgments. 
Crucially—however—that is consistent with differing in rational support in the 
operative sense. 
 The second component of the ‘new evil genius’ challenge we called 
the ‘diagnostic challenge’. This challenge invites the epistemological 
disjunctivist to provide some error theory: some explanation why or how it is 
that their detractors are misled to think that since subjects in pairs of good 
and bad cases share some positive epistemic status they must share in 
rational support for their perceptual beliefs. Here I conjectured that perhaps 
this is owing to the influence of wanting to secure a vindicatory conception of 
the rational support available for ordinary judgmental perceptual beliefs. On 
this conception rational support for perceptual beliefs is such that one could 
appeal to this rational support without begging questions against the radical 
sceptic, thereby vindicating one’s entitlement to one’s perceptual beliefs in 
this way. We noted that since only rational support that is available in both 
the good case and the bad case enjoys this dialectical quality, a philosopher 
committed to the vindicatory conception has this much antecedent reason to 
think that the rational support one enjoys in the good case is the same as 
that enjoyed in the corresponding bad case. However before concluding 
chapter four I offered reasons for thinking that the vindicatory conception is 
fundamentally misguided.  
 Finally in chapter five I said something to defend epistemological 
disjunctivism about judgmental perceptual knowledge against the new 
reflective access challenges reviewed in chapter one. However rather than 
addressing the latter challenges directly, I tried to dislodge the thought that 
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those challenge turn on—i.e. that factive rational support for perceptual 
(judgmental) knowledge is not only factive but reflectively accessible as well. 
I engaged in an in-depth analysis of epistemological disjunctivism and the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical problem in order to create 
suspicion about whether the epistemological disjunctivist really has any good 
reason to insist that factive rational support ought to be reflectively (as 
opposed to empirically) accessible to the subject. In the end then I remain 
sceptical whether we have any good reason to think that judgmental 
perceptual knowledge should enjoy rational support that is both factive and 
reflectively accessible, and so I have serious doubts about whether the new 
reflective access challenges pose any ultimate threat to the view endorsed in 
this thesis.  
 For this reason I stop short of calling epistemological disjunctivism 
about judgmental perceptual knowledge a version of reflective 
epistemological disjunctivism. I certainly think that some form of access is 
required to one’s factive rational support—but I don’t yet see why that access 
cannot depend essentially on one’s coming to acquire the relevant empirical 
knowledge at issue. Needless to say this is something that deserves further 
scrutiny than what I have been able to provide here. But in the end, for the 
reasons outlined, it seems to me that epistemological disjunctivism about 
judgmental perceptual knowledge is the best motivated and least vulnerable 
of any version of epistemological disjunctivist currently on offer. 



































A Plea for the Theist in the Street: 
In Defense of Dogmatism in the Epistemology 






In this thesis we have been concerned with epistemological disjunctivism 
about visual perceptual knowledge. In this appendix I say something to 
motivate a religious epistemological disjunctivism: an epistemological 
disjunctivism about religious perceptual knowledge. For our purposes we can 
state the position up front like this: in paradigmatic cases in which one knows 
that God is manifesting Himself to one in a given way on the basis of a 
suitable religious experience, one enjoys rational support for this 
manifestation belief that is both factive and reflectively accessible to the 
subject. An important part of what I hope to accomplish in this appendix is to 
highlight how religious epistemological disjunctivism might serve to unlock a 
novel position in religious epistemology—specifically with respect to the 
epistemic support available for ordinary theistic belief. The position entails 
that even the ‘theist in the street’ is well placed to offer independent rational 
support for believing that God exists. This will all become clearer as our 
argument unfolds. I begin by situating our discussion in the relevant context, 
before outlining more clearly the plan for the appendix. 
 
* * * 
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It is commonly held that the ‘theist in the street’ is unable to offer independent 
rational support in defense of their theistic belief—and so in a strict sense 
cannot be in possession of rationally grounded knowledge that God exists.1 
After all many think that only dialectically effective arguments—like the 
traditional theistic arguments—can supply such independent rational support. 
And the theist in the street is stipulated to be unfamiliar with any such 
arguments.  
 Many reformed epistemologists suggest that the situation is tolerable. 
For even if theistic belief is not ordinarily rationally grounded in the operative 
sense it may still enjoy epistemic support on the basis of its being 
produced/sustained by suitable proper functioning cognitive faculties (cf. 
Plantinga 2000), for example, if not (also) on the basis of good evidence (cf. 
Dougherty and Tweedt 2015, Tucker 2011). We are encouraged to relax: folk 
in the street can still know that God exists even if they are unable to offer 
independent rational support for thinking so. However I think that there are 
still reasons to doubt that this represents a very satisfying nonsceptical 
religious epistemology.  
 First there is the familiar complaint raised against any ‘externalist’ view 
in epistemology. If it is true that the theist in the street really has nothing to 
offer by way of independent considerations for believing that God exists it 
can seem as though she cares less about the truth of the matter than the 
pragmatic benefits that come along with sustaining theistic belief. For this 
reason even if she knows that God exists she can still seem irresponsible for 
believing so—at least from an epistemic point of view that values truth above 
all else. This to me still seems undesirable. Second there is a problem 
looming here for rationally grounded religious knowledge more generally. For 
example: rationally grounded knowledge that God loves one, or that Jesus is 
God incarnate, or that Moses met with God on Mount Sinai. Notice that all 
these propositions entail that God exists. But then so long as a highly intuitive 
closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge is true it follows that 
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unless one has rationally grounded knowledge that God exists one cannot 
have rationally grounded knowledge of these more detailed religious 
propositions (cf. Pritchard 2012b, 2017).2 I assume that this is also an 
undesirable result. Finally we should ask ourselves this. Should we really 
think the theist in the street has absolutely nothing to offer by way of 
independent rational support for believing that God exists? I mean is it really 
very plausible—especially from a theistic point of view—that she is utterly 
rationally defenceless in this regard? Frankly that is not my face value 
assessment. If true that seems like a philosophical result to me, and not a 
common sense one.  
 And so in this appendix I would like to motivate a position in religious 
epistemology that I suspect many think is simply unavailable: a position 
according to which even the theist in the street is in position to offer 
independent rational support for believing that God exists. I will try to 
convince the reader of this by defending against attack what I will call the 
‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God: what I will argue is a perfectly 
cogent (if dialectically ineffective) proof for theism beginning from premises 
that are rationally supported on the basis of religious experiences. I think this 
helps us to see that it is a mistake to think that one cannot be in position to 
offer independent rational support for theism unless one can offer some 
effective argument like one of the traditional theistic arguments for thinking 
that God exists. The important upshot is that both philosophers of God and 
perceivers of God can be seen to enjoy knowledge that God exists that is 
rationally grounded in the operative sense. 
 Here is the plan. In the next section I build on ideas from William 
Alston (1991) in order to introduce the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism—a proof for 
the existence of God that parallels in structure G.E. Moore’s famous proof for 
the existence of the external world. In section two I evaluate what I think are 
three important objections to the idea that our ‘Moorean’ proof for God 
represents a cogent proof—or equivalently—can confer independent rational 
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support upon theistic belief. We will find that each of these objections is 
inconclusive at best. Of particular interest here will be our engagement with 
the final of these three objections: the objection from ‘cognitive locality’. For 
we will see that we can easily dispense with this objection by appealing to a 
form of religious epistemological disjunctivism. Finally in the third section I 
anticipate and respond to what may be some of the reader’s further concerns 
regarding our positive proposal. Here I relate the ‘Moorean’ proof for God to 
the more familiar argument from religious experience, consider whether we 
should think that there are cogent proofs for God rooted in claims from 
Scripture, and then finally offer some brief remarks in connection with 
reformed epistemology. I then summarize and conclude. 
 
§1 Introducing the ‘Moorean’ Proof for Theism 
 
2.1 Alston and Religious Perception 
          
Begin by considering Bill. We will say that Bill fits the description of our theist 
in the street who, recall, while religiously devout is entirely unfamiliar with any 
of the traditional arguments for God’s existence. Now imagine that Bill has 
just been denied an absolutely crucial job opportunity despite being given 
every reason to think that it would be offered to him. It would not be unusual 
under these circumstances for someone like Bill to enjoy a conscious mental 
condition that—if asked—he might describe as an experience as of God’s 
helping him to take courage and to trust Him for his provision into the future. 
 Famously William Alston (1991) argued that there is no good reason 
not to think that in cases like this Bill might enjoy rational support (or 
‘justification’ in Alston’s terms) for believing something like ‘God is 
encouraging me’ on the basis of this religious experience—or else no good 
reason that would not likewise count against the thought that visual 
experiences can provide rational support for ordinary visual perceptual 
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beliefs. Alston thought that religious experiences often serve to mediate 
religious (or ‘mystical’) perceptions of God, and can even serve to rationally 
support (and even warrant) beliefs about God’s manifesting himself to an 
individual in a given way. 
 The religious beliefs at issue here Alston calls ‘manifestation’ beliefs 
(or M-beliefs for short). These Alston writes “are a particular species of 
perceptual beliefs; they are beliefs, based on mystical perception, to the 
effect that God has some perceivable property or is engaging in some 
perceivable activity” (1991, p. 77). Plausibly paradigmatic M-beliefs concern 
God’s activity vis-à-vis a particular subject at a time: for example beliefs 
about God’s admonishing one for some wrongdoing; strengthening one 
through some adversity; or demonstrating His love toward one in some 
tangible way.  
 In his book Perceiving God Alston argues that these M-beliefs are at 
the heart of a perfectly viable ‘doxastic practice’ in which religious 
experiences are properly taken at face value to indicate what they purport to 
indicate to a given subject. On Alston’s picture these M-beliefs enjoy a 
distinctively religious perceptual rational support (or justification) when 
sustained in light of suitable religious experiences—even affording one 
perceptual knowledge of M-beliefs when conditions are right (i.e. in 
conditions where God exists and has orchestrated things such that human 
beings are in sufficiently reliable contact with Him via ‘mystical’ or religious 
perceptual experience, etc.). Alston is at great pains to show in his book that 
these doxastic practises are on all fours with more run-of-the-mill visual 
perceptual doxastic practices. 
 For our purposes we needn’t become further involved in the finer 
details of Alston’s proposal. What I have represented here is sufficient for 
what we need: viz., a perfectly coherent account of how, in worlds where God 
exists and is concerned to manifest Himself to His creation in perceivable 
ways, one could come to know that God is doing thus and so on the basis of 
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a suitable religious experience. Neither is this the place to anticipate 
objections to Alton’s overall project. Here I will be taking for granted Alston’s 
account of religious-based perceptual warrants in order to argue that if it is 
true that one can enjoy rational support for M-beliefs on the basis of suitable 
religious experiences then this puts one in position to offer independent 
rational support for believing that God exists. 
 Before moving ahead it is probably worth noting at this juncture that 
while our proposal depends quite crucially upon the groundwork that Alston 
(1991) supplies, here we go well beyond anything that Alston envisions 
himself arguing for. For as we have just seen Alston is primarily interested to 
substantiate and defend the claim that a certain class of religious beliefs—M-
beliefs—are susceptible of a distinctively religious perceptual rational 
support. By contrast he has comparatively very little to say regarding theistic 
belief—or belief in the existence of God. He certainly does not claim—as I 
maintain here—that there may be a cogent proof for theism from premises 
that rely on one’s having rational support (or justification) for M-beliefs.3 It is 
one thing if on the basis of suitable religious experiences one can have 
rational support for thinking that God is manifesting Himself to one in a given 
way. It is another thing entirely if this puts one in position to offer independent 
rational support for believing that God exists. Here—of course—we are 
primarily interested to motivate the latter claim. Very well. 
 
2.2 The ‘Moorean’ Proof for the Existence of God 
 
We are now in position to state more clearly the idea at the heart of our 
positive proposal. I submit that if one knows that—for example—God is 
encouraging one on the basis of enjoying a religious experience to this effect 
then we can make sense of one’s being in position to offer independent 
rational support for one’s theistic belief. We can make sense of that with 
reference to what I will call the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God, 
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which I display here alongside G.E. Moore’s original proof for the existence of 
the external world for comparison. 
          
Now to be clear the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God is not a proof 
that Moore himself advocated for. I give it this name however because I think 
that it is analogous in crucial respects to Moore’s famous proof for the 
existence of the external world. Here is what I mean. 
 Recall that in his paper ‘Proof of an Externalist World’ (1939) Moore 
was keen to point out that his original proof satisfied what he said were three 
important conditions of any “sound proof” (his words). First its conclusion is 
different from the premises insofar as it may have been true even if the 
premises were false. Second the conclusion clearly deductively follows from 
the truth of the premises. And third Moore claimed that the premises were all 
known to be true: the second premise a priori and the first by means of visual 
perceptual experience.  
 This should strike us as interesting straight off since there is no 
obvious reason why the theist could not also claim that the ‘Moorean’ proof 
for the existence of God meets these same three conditions. For its 
conclusion too is different from the premises in the relevant way, and also 
follows from them with no less deductive certainty. Moreover why cannot the 
theist also maintain that each of its premises can be known to be true? 
Premise (2) of course is obvious a priori—just like premise (2) of Moore’s 
original proof. But notice that premise (1) is just one of Alston’s M-beliefs, 
The ‘Moorean’ Proof for the Existence 
of God  
 
1) God is encouraging me just now.  
2) God is encouraging me just now 
only if God exists. 
 ---------- 
3) Therefore, God exists.  
	  
Moore’s Proof for the Existence of the 
External World  
 
1) Here are my hands. 
2) Here are my hands only if an 
external world exists. 
 ---------- 
3) Therefore, the external world 
exists. 
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and so—the theistic can maintain—knowable on the basis of its enjoying 
religious perceptual rational support.  
 So then initially it seems as though the ‘Moorean’ proof for the 
existence of God is on equal footing with Moore’s original proof for the 
existence of the external world. The reader may have anticipated, however, 
that so far this is not very much to recommend it. For it is now widely agreed 
that a ‘proof’ might satisfy each of Moore’s original three conditions without 
being cogent—or without yet conferring upon its conclusion independent 
rational support.4 
 For example this is precisely what Crispin Wright (2002) (2003) (2004) 
(2007) (2014) has argued is wrong with Moore’s original proof for the 
existence of the external world. Wright has long held that having visual-
perceptual rational support for empirical beliefs presupposes having rational 
support for believing that there is an external world. It follows from that 
however that having rational support for believing that one has hands—for 
example—cannot constitute having independent rational support for believing 
that there exists an external world. For this reason Wright and fellow 
travellers are convinced that Moore’s original proof is not cogent—despite 
satisfying each of the three conditions Moore highlights in his 1939 paper. 
 The important question for us then is this. Do claims (1) and (3) of the 
‘Moorean’ proof for theism stand in the same epistemic relation that Wright 
thinks claims (1) and (3) of Moore’s original proof stand in? Or in other words 
should we think that having rational support for an M-belief on the basis of a 
suitable religious experience presupposes having rational support for 
believing that God exists? If so then for similar reasons the ‘Moorean’ proof 
for God cannot be cogent, and then we are in trouble. For then having 
rational support for M-beliefs cannot be a way of having independent rational 
support for believing that God exists—contrary to our positive proposal. 
 I imagine that it is widely assumed that one must already have rational 
support for believing that God exists in order to have rational support for a 
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given M-belief.5 However if this is commonly assumed it is rarely argued for. I 
will try my best then to construct such arguments in the following section. In 
the end I’ll argue that none of them are clearly convincing. The result is that 
there is no clear obstacle to viewing the ‘Moorean’ proof God as a perfectly 
cogent proof—capable of conferring via the relevant entailment independent 
rational support for believing that God exists. 
 
§2 Assessing Objections to Cogency 
 
2.1 The Objection from Defeasibility 
 
 Before introducing the thought behind our first objection it may be helpful to 
consider the following rendition of our ‘Moorean’ proof for God, which is 
designed to help make explicit the religious-perceptual rational support that it 
purports to (independently) confer upon theism: 
 The ‘Moorean’ Proof for God (I-II-III) 
 
 GOD (I) Religious experience as of God’s encouraging me. 
 GOD (II) God is encouraging me (M-belief). 
        ---------- 
 GOD (III) Therefore, God exists 
   (Since God is now encouraging me only if God exists)6 
 
Notice that coming to have rational support for doubting GOD (III) tends to 
defeat or more specifically undermine the kind of rational support Alston 
suggests one can have for GOD (II) on the basis of GOD (I).7 This clearly 
seems to be one way in which having rational support for an M-belief 
depends upon the claim that God exists. We can illustrate this phenomenon 
with the following example. 
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 Return again to consider Bill from section one. While before Bill was 
prone to undergoing mental events that he would readily describe as 
religious experiences, imagine now that after long study in the problem of evil 
Bill has now come to harbor serious doubts regarding God’s existence. 
Imagine now that Bill has an experience that in times past he would have 
very quickly taken to be a religious experience as of God’s admonishing him 
for some wrongdoing. Plausibly Bill’s circumstances are now such that any 
rational support he might have had for accepting the relevant M-belief on the 
basis of this experience is now defeated or more specifically undermined. 
After all it now seems as though Bill’s putative religious experience gives him 
just as much reason for thinking that it only seems as though God is 
admonishing him since he is suffering a delusory experience in a naturalistic 
world. 
 The relevant objection then is this: since earlier nonsceptical Bill’s 
rational support for accepting an M-belief depends upon the claim that God 
exists in the way that our example brings out, it must be that having that 
rational support presupposes having rational support for believing that God 
exists (i.e. it must be that having rational support for GOD (II) on the basis of 
GOD (I) presupposes having rational support for GOD (III)). If that follows 
then that is bad news for us since that effectively precludes religious 
experiences from conferring independent rational support upon theistic belief 
via the relevant entailment. 
 Thankfully the problem with this objection is that the phenomena don’t 
exactly show what the objection presents them as showing. The relevant 
dependency of the premises upon the conclusion shows only that having 
rational support for GOD (II) on the basis of GOD (I) presupposes that one 
lacks rational support for doubting GOD (III). But plainly lacking rational 
support for doubting GOD (III) is not the same as having rational support in 
favor of GOD (III). And it is only if the phenomena show the latter that we turn 
a result that is detrimental to our proposal.8 What is needed is some further 
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argument to the effect that if one has rational support for p and p entails q, 
and having rational support for doubting q tends to undermine one’s rational 
support for p, then having rational support for p presupposes having rational 
support for q.9 It is hardly clear what an argument for that might look like. 
 For now I think we can safely conclude that the relevant objection is 
benign. Even if having rational support for an M-belief presupposes or 
(‘assumes’) in some sense that God exists—it is not at all clear that this 
entails having rational support for thinking that God exists as opposed to 
merely lacking rational support for thinking that He does not.10 So far there is 
no clear obstacle to holding that the premises of the ‘Moorean’ proof for 
God—once rationally supported in the relevant way—cannot generate 
independent rational support for believing that God exists. 
 
2.2 The Objection from Circularity 
 
Here I consider what I suspect is the objection that more readily springs to 
mind. Perhaps so far the reader has been unable to shake this thought: But 
isn’t the ‘Moorean’ proof for God—like Moore’s original proof—clearly 
question-begging? Is it not viciously circular? But then how can it be 
conferring independent rational support upon theistic belief—as we 
suggest—if it is so blatantly circular in this way? 
 We can frame this complaint in the form of a challenge: If the 
‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God really is cogent—really can confer 
independent rational support upon theistic belief as we suggest—then what 
explains its appearing like a viciously circular proof? The challenge is to 
provide some explanation here that is consistent with out positive proposal. I 
think that this challenge can be met. The trick is not to confuse cogent proofs 
for dialectically effective arguments. I will explain this further below. 
 I submit that the reason the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism seems 
viciously circular is because it is dialectically circular or (alternatively) 
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dialectically question begging. Clearly it would be entirely ineffective if 
presented as an argument for the existence of God: for example if presented 
in dialogue with the religious sceptic in an attempt to rationally convince her 
to change her mind. It ought to be fairly clear why that is the case.  
 For recall that we have just finished saying that having rational support 
for GOD (II) (above) on the basis of GOD (I) requires as a precondition that 
one does not doubt or have strong grounds for doubting GOD (III). But then 
since it is stipulated that the religious sceptic is in just such a state, this 
means that she is in no position to rationally accept GOD (II) on the basis of 
GOD (I) without first abandoning her sceptical position. It is in this sense that 
the ‘Moorean’ proof for God offers premises for its conclusion that are 
dialectically question begging in religious-sceptical contexts. Borrowing a 
locution from Jim Pryor we can say that a religious sceptic is “rationally 
obstructed” from accepting the relevant premises until she gives up her 
religious scepticism. What we should not assume—I maintain—is that since 
the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism is ineffective in this way that therefore it 
cannot confer for the religious nonsceptic independent rational support upon 
theistic belief.   
 It is important to note at this juncture that I am not engaging in any 
special pleading. I am not the first to appeal to some such distinction 
between cogent proofs and dialectically effective arguments in epistemology. 
For example Jim Pryor (2000) (2004) argues that this is precisely what is 
required for properly interpreting Moore’s original proof for the existence of 
the external world. Pryor argues that while Moore’s proof is dialectically 
ineffective in the context of radical external-world scepticism that should not 
lead us to think that there is anything “wrong with the justificatory structure 
the argument articulates, or with Moore’s own reasoning” (2004, p. 369). In 
effect Pryor maintains that even though Moore’s original proof is dialectically 
question begging against the external world sceptic that should not lead us to 
think that having visual-perceptual rational support for thinking that one has 
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hands cannot be a way of having independent rational support for believing 
that there exists a material world.   
 Moreover Ernest Sosa (2009) appeals to a more quotidian example for 
recommending a distinction between persuasive proofs and display proofs.11 
Sosa writes that his persuasive proof is “a valid argument that can be used to 
rationally persuade one to believe its conclusion, if one has put the 
conclusion in doubt” (ibid., p. 7). By contrast a mere display proof, Sosa 
writes, “is a valid argument that displays premises on which one can 
rationally base belief in the conclusion, without vicious circularity” (ibid., p. 7). 
Adopting for the moment Sosa’s terminology, then, what I am driving at is 
that the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God represents a perfectly 
legitimate display proof for theism. If that is true then I think that the theist in 
the street cannot be told that she cannot offer independent rational support 
for believing that God exists—even if she can be told that she cannot offer an 
argument for believing that God exists that might bring the religious sceptic 
around to her point of view.12 
 Very well then. It seems to me that the relevant challenge with which 
we started has now been overcome. Even if the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism is 
cogent—or epistemically noncircular—that is not to say that it is in no sense 
a viciously circular proof. Plausibly proofs can be evaluated against different 
criteria. And just because a proof is good for furnishing independent rational 
support for theistic belief, that needn’t entail that it is good for rationally 
convincing the religious sceptic over to one’s side.13  
2.3 The Objection from Cognitive Locality 
 
2.3.1 Motivating the Objection 
 
In her book Extended Rationality (2014) Annalisa Coliva presents an 
objection against the idea that having rational support for ordinary visual-
perceptual beliefs could constitute having independent rational support for 
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believing that there exists an external world. There she refers to this as “the 
problem of surpassing our cognitive locality” (ibid., p. 61, my emphasis). A 
similar kind of objection can be raised against the proposal advanced here. 
Again we will see that this objection threatens to undue our proposal 
according to which appealing to the kind of rational support one enjoys for M-
beliefs can be a way of appealing to independent rational support for 
believing that God exists—rational support that does not presuppose having 
rational support for theism. In what follows I will motivate this objection before 
supplying a response. The response—we will see—appeals to a form of 
religious epistemological disjunctivism: a disjunctivism about religious-
perceptual based knowledge.  
 Start out then by considering this. Consider that for any ‘good’ case in 
which one actually perceives that God is doing thus and so we can define a 
corresponding ‘bad’ case. The corresponding bad case is introspectively 
indistinguishable from the good case—except in this case in only seems to 
one as though God is doing thus and so because one is suffering from a 
delusional religious experience (to keep things simple assume that in the bad 
case one is in a world where metaphysical naturalism is true). The bad case 
is bad—of course—because one is unwittingly misled by one’s experience to 
adopt an M-belief that is false. Now notice that since the good case is 
introspectively indistinguishable from the bad case this means that even 
when one is in the good case—and so actually successfully perceives that 
God is doing thus and so—one cannot tell by introspection alone that this is 
what is going on. That is to say that one cannot tell by introspection along 
that one’s religious experience is actually the result of a real encounter with 
God as opposed to being produced in some purely naturalistic fashion.  
 Now it can be tempting to think that this must mean that one has the 
same rational support in the bad case as one has in the good case for 
accepting the relevant M-belief. The result however is that since in the bad 
case the relevant M-belief is false this means that even in the good case—
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where one knows the relevant M-belief—one cannot enjoy better than 
defeasible or nonfactive rational support for accepting it. For example many 
will think that this rational support is constituted by its ‘mystically’ seeming to 
one that God is doing thus and so: rational support that is decidedly neutral 
between one’s being in the good case and one’s being in the bad case. Very 
well.  
 With this much in mind consider the following problem. How is it that 
one can have rational support for accepting that God is in fact doing thus and 
so by virtue of its seeming to one that God is doing thus and so—when so 
easily from the subject’s point of view one might be suffering a delusional 
religious experience in the naturalist’s world? To paraphrase and adapt what 
Coliva (ibid., p. 25) says in a related context: even if it were the case that the 
theist was lucky enough to have mostly veridical religious experiences, she 
needs some “subjectively available reason” to think that these experiences 
are at least more likely caused by real encounters with God than by purely 
natural causes in the brain/central nervous system. Otherwise—in Coliva’s 
terms—one seems confined to the “realm of experience” in way that makes it 
seem entirely arbitrary whether one takes one’s religious experiences to 
rationally support particular M-beliefs over relevant competing naturalistic 
sceptical hypotheses.14  
 By contrast notice the intuitive difference it makes if we imagine that 
the theist already has rational support for accepting things like ‘God exists’, 
‘God acts in ways that can be perceived by human beings’, and etc. In that 
case it would no longer seem mysterious how one could have rational 
support for accepting that God is in fact doing thus and so by virtue of its 
seeming to one that God is doing thus and so.15 For if it is really the case that 
one has such collateral rational support for accepting theism (among other 
things) then it seems clear why it is then nonarbitrary for the theist to take its 
seeming to her that God is doing thus and so to favor believing that God is in 
fact doing thus and so over believing instead that God does not exist and that 
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one’s religious experiences are the product of purely natural causes in the 
brain (i.e. the naturalistic sceptical hypothesis).16   
 Unfortunately these considerations do nothing to favor our positive 
proposal. For if having rational support for an M-belief on the basis of a 
suitable religious experience entails as a precondition having rational support 
for theism, then clearly appealing to the latter rational support cannot be a 
way of offering independent rational support for theistic belief—i.e. rational 
support that does not presuppose rational support for believing that God 
exists. Here is the argument against our proposal stated slightly more 
formally. It consists of two sub-arguments. 
 
 The Argument from Cognitive Locality 
 
  Sub-argument One 
 
1) The good case in which one perceives that God is doing thus and so 
is introspectively indistinguishable from the corresponding bad case in 
which it only seems to one as though God is doing thus and so 
because one is suffering a delusional religious experience. [Premise] 
2) If the two cases are introspectively indistinguishable in this way, then 
the rational support one enjoys in the good case for a given M-belief is 
the same at the rational support one enjoys in the corresponding bad 
case. [Premise] 
3) Therefore: One enjoys at best nonfactive rational support for M-beliefs 
on the basis of suitable religious experiences. [Intermediate 
Conclusion, from (1) and (2) MP] 
 
 
  Sub-argument Two 
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4) One enjoys nonfactive rational support for M-beliefs on the basis of 
suitable religious experiences only if one has antecedent rational 
support for believing that God exists. [Premise] 
5) Therefore: One enjoys rational support for M-beliefs on the basis of 
suitable religious experiences only if one has antecedent rational 
support for believing that God exists. [Final Conclusion, from (3) and 
(4) MP] 
6) Therefore, having rational support for an M-belief on the basis of a 
suitable religious experience presupposes having rational support for 
believing that God exists. [Restatement of Final Conclusion] 
 
It may better yet be an argument along these lines that undergirds the 
impression among religious epistemologists that one cannot offer 
independent rational support for theism by appealing to the kind of rational 
support conferred upon M-beliefs on the basis of religious experiences. As 
the reader may suspect, however, I think it is open to the theistic 
epistemologist to reject at least one of the argument’s premises. Below I’ll 
present my preferred strategy: one that motivates a rejection of premise (2) 
by way of appealing to a form of religious epistemological disjunctivism. 
 
2.3.2 Religious Epistemological Disjunctivism 
 
If the argument from cognitive locality is vulnerable anywhere then I think it 
must be at premises (2) and (4). However to keep our discussion at a 
manageable length I’ll target only premise (2). Specifically I’ll argue that we 
can reject premise (2) by way of appealing to a version of religious 
epistemological disjunctivism. With premise (2) then kicked away this 
argument no longer clearly poses any threat, and this will be the last putative 
obstacle to our proposal turned aside.  
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 Notice that premise (2) makes a claim about the rational support a 
religious experience can confer upon a given M-belief. It states that since the 
relevant good and bad cases are introspectively indistinguishable, then even 
when in the good case one successfully perceives that God is doing thus and 
so one’s rational support for believing this is the same as one would have 
anyway if one were in the corresponding bad case and were suffering a 
religious delusion. In other words the idea is that even in the good case one’s 
rational support for a suitable M-belief is the ‘highest common factor’ of the 
rational support made available in both the good and the bad cases.17 But 
then since in the bad case one doesn’t enjoy better than nonfactive rational 
support for an M-belief—i.e. rational support that fails to entail that p—one 
cannot enjoy better than nonfactive rational support in the good case, neither. 
And then sub-argument two proceeds. 
 But by now we know that it is by no means clear why it should follow 
from the fact that the two cases are introspectively indistinguishable that 
one’s rational support in the good case should consist of what is the ‘highest 
common factor’ between the good and bad cases. We have already seen in 
this thesis that epistemological disjunctivism about visual-perceptual rational 
support explicitly denies this, and in fact I see no good reason not to take up 
the disjunctivist stance with respect to the rational support furnished by 
religious perceptual experiences as well. 
 For example elsewhere I have motivated a religious epistemological 
disjunctivism according to which the good and the bad cases of religious 
experience are not on a par with respect to the kind of rational support 
available for suitable M-beliefs (cf. Shaw 2016). More specifically the idea is 
that when one knows some M-belief on the basis of a suitable religious 
experience one can enjoy factive rational support for believing what one 
does—‘factive’ insofar as it entails the truth of the M-belief at issue.18 Of 
course one cannot enjoy rational support that entails the truth of the relevant 
M-belief in the corresponding bad case, since in that case it is stipulated that 
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the relevant belief is false since one is simply deluded. Even still the idea is 
that we should not think that just because the good case is introspectively 
indistinguishable from the bad case that therefore one cannot have better 
than nonfactive rational support in the good case.19 It’s the same here as the 
epistemological disjunctivist thinks it is with cases of visual perceptual 
knowledge. The result is a view according to which a ‘religious experience’ is 
either an experience that puts one in position to know the relevant M-belief 
by virtue of supplying one with factive rational support, or an experience that 
merely appears ‘from the inside’ to be doing that. That is what makes the 
view a kind of epistemological disjunctivism about religious-perceptual based 
knowledge. 
 For my own part I think that religious epistemological disjunctivism is a 
view worth taking quite seriously, not least because it promises to pay 
dividends in religious epistemology of the sort that I am presently trying to 
highlight. For if the position is available then we can adopt it for motivating a 
rejection of premise (2) of the above argument, freeing our positive proposal 
from what otherwise might look like a fairly serious difficulty. For if religious 
epistemological disjunctivism is true then it simply doesn’t matter that one 
can enjoy nonfactive rational support for M-beliefs on the basis of religious 
experiences only if one enjoys antecedent rational support for believing that 
God exists. That is because the antecedent is false if religious 
epistemological disjunctivism is true—that is, if one can enjoy as good as 
factive rational support for M-beliefs on the basis of suitable religious 
experiences. In this way religious epistemological disjunctivism can seem 
even more attractive than I initially let on in previous work (2016)—since I 
didn’t there recognize that it may be a key to unlocking a view in religious 
epistemology according to which even the theist in the street can enjoy 
knowledge that God exists that is rationally grounded in a robust fashion—
such that he or she is in position to offer independent rational support in 
defense of their theistic belief. 





§3 Additional Remarks: Concerning The Argument from 
Religious Experience, ‘Proofs’ from Scripture, and 
Reformed Epistemology   
 
By now I hope to have said enough to convince the reader that there is no 
clear reason for thinking that the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God 
cannot represent a perfectly cogent proof for theism; so that if there really are 
perceptions of God of the kind that Alston highlights, then this puts even the 
theist in the street in position to offer independent rational support for 
believing that God exists. At the very least I hope to have said enough to put 
the position on the table for further consideration. I think there is much at 
stake. For if what I have been arguing for is on the right track then contrary to 
popular opinion rationally grounded knowledge that God exists is actually 
ubiquitous—not only the property of academically-minded theists.  
 Before closing I would like to briefly address three further issues that 
the reader may wish to get clearer about. I’ll say something about why 
appealing to the premises of the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism in defense of 
one’s theistic belief is different from offering a version of the more familiar 
‘argument from religious experience’. I’ll say something about whether I think 
this opens the door to there being cogent proofs for theism beginning from 
premises rooted in Scripture. And finally I’ll offer some remarks relating our 
discussion to reformed epistemology.  
 
3.1 Concerning the ‘Argument from Religious Experience’ 
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Needless to say throughout we have been highly dependent upon the notion 
of religious experience. Perhaps it is tempting to think that by appealing to 
the rational support one enjoys for M-beliefs in defense of one’s theistic belief 
one is offering only a variant of the better-known ‘argument from religious 
experience’. But that is wrong. To see why consider this relatively recent 
representation of the argument from religious experience advanced by 
Richard Swinburne (2004): 
 
 Swinburne’s Argument from Religious Experience  
 
1) People not uncommonly have experiences that purport to be 
experiences of God’s doing thus and so.  
2) It is rational to believe what an experience apparently reports unless 
there is special reason not to (Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity). 
3) There is no special reason to be dismissive of religious experiences in 
this respect. 
 ---------- 
4) Therefore, it is rational to believe that God exists.  
 
Notice that the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God differs from this 
argument in at least three respects. 
 First from the premises of the ‘Moorean’ proof for the existence of God 
it follows that God exists, not that it is rational to believe that God exists. 
Clearly these are very different conclusions. The first is a metaphysical claim, 
while the second an epistemic one. My contention has been that religious 
experiences put one in position to offer independent rational support for 
believing that God exists—not for believing that it is rational to believe that 
God exists.  
 Second—even if we framed the argument from religious experience so 
that it delivered the relevant metaphysical claim—notice that the concept 
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‘religious experience’ figures nowhere in the premises of the ‘Moorean’ proof 
for God. That is a relevant difference and a significant one at that. For 
plausibly the average theist in the street does not have the concept of 
religious experience as this notion figures in the above argument—i.e. as the 
mental condition that is neutral between religious perceptions and merely 
delusional religious experiences. But while this may preclude one from being 
able to appeal to the argument from religious experience in defense of their 
theistic belief, it isn’t clear that it precludes one from being able to appeal to 
the premises of the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism for offering independent 
rational support for accepting theistic belief.  
 Finally clearly the argument from religious experience is designed to 
be a dialectically effective argument for its conclusion. The ‘Moorean’ proof 
for God is not: it is designed merely to show how appealing to rational 
support for M-beliefs can be a way of appealing to independent rational 
support for theism (i.e. latter proof is a mere display proof, and not a 
persuasive proof, in Sosa’s terms). 
 
3.2 Concerning ‘Proofs’ from Scripture 
 
In light of the forgoing consider now this putative display proof for the 
existence of God presented again in terms of Wright’s (I-II-III) structure: 
 
 Scripture (I-II-III) 
 
 SCRIPT (1) The Scriptures report that God met with Moses on Sinai. 
 SCRIPT (II)   So, God met with Moses on Mount Sinai. 
    ----------- 
 SCRIPT (III)  Therefore, God exists 
    (Since God met with Moses only if God exists) 
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Notice that this proof seems to satisfy all of G.E. Moore’s three original 
criteria for any “sound proof”. Its conclusion both deductively follows from the 
premises and is different from them in the relevant way. Moreover it seems 
open to the theist to claim that each of the premises can be known. The next 
question is whether we should also think that it is cogent—whether or not 
having rational support for SCRIPT (II) on the basis of SCRIPT (I) 
presupposes having rational support for SCRIPT (III). The reader may be 
concerned that the ‘Moorean’ proof for God is cogent only if such proofs from 
Scripture are as well—and yet it is implausible to think that proofs from 
Scripture can be cogent. This requires more comment that I can offer here—
but I will offer two remarks.  
 First proofs from Scripture may be vulnerable at a point where the 
‘Moorean’ proof for God is not. Recall the objection to our proposal from 
cognitive locality just discussed. Pressed into service here the objection is 
that SCRIPT (I) provides nonfactive rational support for SCRIPT (II) only if 
one has antecedent rational support for theism (i.e. SCRIPT (III)), among 
other propositions. For otherwise it can seem arbitrary to take oneself to have 
rational support for SCRIPT (II) on the basis of SCRIPT (I) when so easily—
for all else one has rational support to believe—it may be that there is no God 
and the Scriptures at best present a highly embellished historical account. 
Above we rendered innocuous the parallel objection in application to 
religious-perceptual rational support by appealing to an independently 
motivated epistemological disjunctivism about religious perceptual 
knowledge. Notice however that it is hardly clear whether we can avail 
ourselves of the same strategy here. That would require adopting an 
epistemological disjunctivism about distinctively religious-testimonial based 
knowledge—a view that seems hardly plausible on its face.20 And so there 
may be scope for thinking that even if the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism can 
generate independent rational support for its conclusion, proofs from 
Scripture cannot.  
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 Secondly even if proofs from Scripture are cogent in some sense that 
needn’t entail that there are not yet other important differences between such 
proofs and proofs that follow the pattern of the ‘Moorean’ proof for the 
existence of God. For instance, notice that while the ‘Moorean’ proof for God 
purports to confer perceptual-based rational support upon theism, the proof 
from Scripture purports to confer testimonially-based rational support instead. 
Potentially that is an important difference. The difference is between having 
rational support for theism that is primarily attributable to the subject’s 
epistemic agency, and having rational support for theism that is not. For 
notice that in order to acquire rational support for a given M-belief one need 
only lean on one’s own epistemic powers—powers to perceive God’s 
manifesting Himself in certain ways. By contrast notice that in order to 
acquire the relevant rational support for a claim rooted in Scripture one must 
crucially be relying on the epistemic powers of another—potentially countless 
others—whomever ultimately is creditable for obtaining, recording, and 
preserving the information contained in Scripture. In this way one who has 
rational support for theism by virtue of having rational support for claims 
rooted in Scripture can seem less creditable than one who has rational 
support for theism by virtue of having rational support sourced from religious 
experiences. The latter individual—we can say—is fully epistemically 
creditable for having the relevant rational support for theism. 
 Perhaps this is sufficient for privileging the ‘Moorean’ proof for God 
over proofs from Scripture, even if both—at the end of the day—constitute 
cogent proofs for their conclusions. If it seems natural to complain that proofs 
from Scripture are too easy—not evincing enough of an epistemic 
accomplishment on the part of the subject—then we may be able to 
accommodate that short of having to deny that these proofs can be cogent in 
some sense. While there is plenty more here to think about I really must 
move on to make my final comment.    
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3.3 Concerning Reformed Epistemology 
 
Perhaps it is tempting to think that our positive proposal is somehow in 
tension with what is known as ‘reformed epistemology’.21 For doesn’t 
reformed epistemology set itself against the picture that has now come into 
view: a picture according to which even the theist in the street is in position to 
offer independent rational support for believing that God exists? I maintain 
that nothing that I have proposed here is in any tension with reformed 
epistemology.  
 As I think most understand reformed epistemology it describes an 
approach to thinking about familiar epistemic statuses—like for example 
rationality, justification, or warrant—in application to theistic belief. In 
particular a reformed epistemologist will say that a subject can enjoy some 
positive epistemic standing with respect to theistic belief independently of 
possessing any good argument for thinking that God exists. 
 But the first thing to notice is that here I have made no claims at all 
about rationality, justification, or warrant with respect to theistic belief. I have 
simply wanted to suggest that the theist in the street is in position to offer 
independent rational support for believing that God exists. I have made no 
claims about whether being in such a position is either necessary and/or 
sufficient or neither for enjoying any familiar epistemic status with respect to 
theistic belief. In this way I have refrained from making any claims about what 
reformed epistemology makes claims about.  
 The second thing to notice is that—in any case—reformed 
epistemology is supposed to oppose the importance of having convincing 
arguments when it comes to sustaining theistic belief. Not the importance of 
what we have here carefully distinguished as being in position to offer 
independent rational support for theistic belief. I am happy to agree with the 
reformed epistemologist if she thinks that ordinary theistic belief is not 
	   172	  
typically rationally supported on the basis of an argument that could be used 
to help bring the religious sceptic around.  
 Now this is not to suggest that reformed epistemology should have no 
interest in what is at stake here. For if our proposal is defensible then at the 
very least it affords ordinary theistic belief a kind of epistemic insurance. 
Perhaps eventually we will be offered good reasons for thinking that theistic 
belief cannot enjoy some coveted positive epistemic status without one’s 
being in position to offer independent rational support for believing that God 
exists. Religious nonsceptics have nothing to fear from this prospect if I have 
sustained the claim that the ‘Moorean’ proof for God represents a perfectly 





At the beginning I said that I was going to endeavour to unlock a position in 
religious epistemology that many today assume is simply out of reach. The 
position is one according to which even the theist in the street can enjoy 
rationally grounded knowledge that God exists—where this requires one to 
be able to offer independent rational support for their theistic belief. The 
position has seemed out of reach—I suggest—partly because it has been 
thought that unless one is in possession of a dialectically effective argument 
then one cannot be in a position to offer independent rational support for 
God’s existence. Here I have tried to dislodge that idea by conducting a more 
careful study of the relationship between having rational support for 
‘manifestation’ beliefs and having rational support for theism. The result—I 
suggested—may be a picture according to which you need only be a 
perceiver of God in order to be in position to offer independent rational 
support for theism—philosophers of God do not have the monopoly here 
(even if they still have the monopoly on effective arguments). 
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 The discussion has also served to motivate a form of religious 
epistemological disjunctivism. For we have seen that if such a position is 
available, then we have an easy way of undercutting the force of the 
objection from cognitive locality. It isn’t immediately clear what other options 
there are for diffusing that objection. I think this certainly provides us with 
some incentive for investigating further the prospects of religious 
epistemological disjunctivism.     
 At the very least I hope to have piqued the readers interest in the 
position that I have tried to show is available. As I say I think it is a position 
that is little occupied in religious epistemology today, if at all. Today those 
working in this area suggest that even if ordinary theistic belief isn’t rationally 
supported on the basis of an effective argument, it may still be epistemically 
support by virtue of being produced by suitable proper functioning cognitive 
faculties, or even on the basis of good evidence. None yet have ventured the 
thought that even if one cannot offer a good argument for thinking that God 
exists, one may still be in position to offer independent rational support for 
believing so. That in any case represents my plea for the theist in the street. 
Perhaps we should call it ‘Mooreanism’ or ‘Liberalism’ in the epistemology of 
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1 Here I follow Duncan Pritchard (2012 a) (2017): one does not have rationally grounded 
knowledge that God exists unless one is in position to offer independent rational support for 
believing that. We need not deny that there are other weaker notions of what ‘rationally 
grounded’ knowledge is such that it is uncontroversial that the theist in the street enjoys 
rationally grounded knowledge of theism. 
2 Here is Pritchard’s closure principle: “If S is in possession of rational support R for her 
belief that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby coming to believe that q on 
this basis while retaining R, then R is also rational support for S’s belief that q.” In order to 
accommodate rationally grounded knowledge of ordinary religious propositions Pritchard 
recommends that we abandon the thought that there is any such thing as rationally grounded 
belief that God exists, adopting instead his Wittgensteinian quasi-fideistic approach (cf. 
Pritchard 2012 a, 2017).  
3 Although some of his remarks suggest that he may have been sympathetic to our proposal. 
Very early on in his book he writes “Am I suggesting that the belief in the existence of God is 
susceptible of a perceptual justification? Well, yes and no. […] there is the point nicely made 
by Alvin Plantinga (1983, p. 81) that even if ‘God exists’ is not the propositional content of 
typical theistic perceptual beliefs, those propositional contents self-evidently entail it. ‘God is 
good’ or ‘God gave me courage to meet that situation’ self-evidently entail ‘God exists’, just 
as ‘That tree is bare’ or ‘That tree is tall’ self-evidently entail ‘That tree exists’. Hence if the 
former beliefs can be perceptually justified, they can serve in turn, by one short and 
unproblematic step, to justify the belief in God’s existence” (1991, p. 3-4). It isn’t clear that 
Alston realized that if he is right about this, then there is available a kind of ‘Moorean’-style 
proof for theism that can confer independent rational support upon theistic belief just as well 
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as any of the classical theistic arguments. Neither is it clear that Alston realized that there 
may be good objections to this idea, which we will consider here in great detail.    
4 Such cases are otherwise known as cases of ‘transmission failure’. For overview and 
discussion see Moretti and Piazza (2013). 
5 For example here is Duncan Pritchard: “Notice that it is hard to see what specifically 
rational support is available to the theist to justify the foundational status of this [her theistic] 
belief. In particular, the kind of rational support that would leap immediately to mind—e.g., 
personal religious experience, testimony from peers in one’s religious community, the 
evidence of scripture, and so on—would not be apt to the task since it already presupposes 
that one’s belief in God’s existence is rationally held (2012, p. 145, emphasis added). 
6 Here I am applying the same (I-II-III) structure that Crispin Wright has made famous in 
connection with discussion of Moore’s original proof for the existence of the external world 
(for a recent presentation see Wright 2014).  
7 That is to say that the proposition that God exists functions here as an authenticity 
condition, in Wright’s terminology. As he explains: “Absent other relevant information, any 
doubt about the 3-proposition must tend, in a rational subject, to undermine the force of the 
evidence described in 1 for the 2-proposition” (2014, p. 215). 
8 Note that this is precisely the observation made by contemporary ‘dogmatists’ like Pryor 
(2000) (2004) (2014) (see also Davies 2002) in defense of the cogency of Moore’s original 
proof against similar charges. I am simply applying this insight as the charge arises here in 
connection with the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism.    
9 Or in other words what we need is an argument to the effect that if a proof exhibits what 
Jim Pryor calls type-4 dependence then it must also exhibit what he calls type-5 dependence 
(2004, p.359). 
10 The reader might have anticipated that there may be a further objection lurking here from 
the phenomena of religious disagreement. The relevant objection states that actually the 
theist in the street does have rational support to doubt that God exists since she is aware of 
there being substantial disagreement over this question. But since we have just said that 
having rational support for an M-belief on the basis of a suitable religious experience 
presupposes that one lacks such rational support, the result is that religious experiences 
cannot give one rational support to accept M-beliefs, much less independent rational support 
for believing that God exists. In response the first thing to say is that this is less an objection 
to our positive proposal as it is to Alston’s idea that here we are taking for granted. Recall 
that I am only out to motivate the conditional that if Alston is right that religious experiences 
furnish rational support for accepting M-beliefs, then there is no good reason to deny that 
this can constitute independent rational support for believing that God exists. But the current 
objection targets the antecedent of that conditional, not to the conditional itself. The second 
thing to say—in defense of Alston—is that even if we adopt a conciliatory approach here—so 
that being aware of the relevant disagreement means that one should lower one’s level of 
confidence in theism, it is by no means clear why this should entail that one now has positive 
reason to doubt that God exists—in particular enough to defeat rational support one might 
enjoy for an M-belief on the basis of a suitable religious experience.         
11 Sosa considers a proof whose two premises are < A > and < B > and whose conclusion is 
< A & B >. He points out that this proof is clearly dialectically question-begging since it would 
be impossible to rationally accept either of the premises while remaining sceptical about the 
conclusion. But that shouldn’t lead us to think that someone who is not already sceptical 
about the relevant conjunction could not acquire independent rational support for believing it 
by acquiring rational support for believing < A > and rational support for believing < B >. Or in 
other words that should not lead us to think that this cannot function as a perfectly legitimate 
display proof.         
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12 Now this may incline us to think that the ‘Moorean’ proof for God then in no sense at all 
represents a rationally persuasive proof for God’s existence. But some caution is in order 
here. If the proof cannot effect a rational transition from religious doubt to belief in God, so 
long as it is cogent it may still effect a rational transition from mere unbelief to belief in God. 
In this context I think ‘religious doubt’ refers to some substantial disbelief that God exists. By 
contrast mere unbelief is no attitude toward theism at all. A mere unbeliever, then, is not so 
clearly “rationally obstructed” from accepting GOD (II) on the basis of GOD (I) for the same 
reasons the religious sceptic is. And so perhaps the ‘Moorean’ proof for God can constitute a 
potentially persuasive proof at least for the theistic nonbeliever. Probably this calls for more 
discussion than I have time for here.      
13 Of course this is certainly what distinguishes the ‘Moorean’ proof for theism from the more 
familiar ‘classical’ arguments for the existence of God. For arguably the religious sceptic 
could rationally accept each of the premises of any well-formed classical proof for God’s 
existence—like the ontological or cosmological argument—without first having to abandon 
her sceptical position. If there really is a distinction between merely cogent proofs and 
dialectically effective proofs then this helps us to see that the classical theistic proofs are 
really serviceable in at least two ways. For not only might they constitute independent 
rational support for theistic belief, but they are also effective in dialogue with the religious 
sceptic to help rationally convince her to change her mind. 
14 Here is Coliva commenting on a version of the same problem elsewhere: “If one’s 
experiences could be just the same no matter how they are produced, why should they 
justify beliefs about material objects rather than their sceptical counterparts? It seems 
entirely arbitrary to take them to favor the former rather than the latter. […] We are (…) 
looking for conditions whose satisfaction would allow us to take a mind-dependent kind of 
evidence to bear on beliefs whose content is eminently mind-independent” (2014, p. 61, my 
emphasis). 
15 We need not bother here about what it would take for the theist in the street to enjoy such 
collateral rational support (although perhaps we may appeal to some notion of ‘rational trust’ 
(cf. Wright 2004, 2014)). For our purposes we need only note that on the current objection 
one must first enjoy some such collateral rational support before enjoying the relevant kind of 
rational support for a given M-belief. Of course if the present objection is successful and we 
cannot make our how one can enjoy this collateral rational support, then the idea that M-
beliefs enjoy rational support at all becomes jeopardized. 
16 Compare: the reason why—before looking—one’s evidence gives more reason to believe 
that the dice has landed on something one through five rather than on six is because one 
has collateral rational support for believing that a fair die, when tossed, will more likely land 
on something one through five rather than on six. Plausibly this is why one has more reason 
to believe the former rather than the latter, even though one’s rational support is nonfactive 
or consistent with either hypothesis.   
17 The ‘highest common factor’ is one of John McDowell’s favorite locutions used to 
characterize the sort of idea motivating premise (2), which we are presently seeking to 
undermine under his inspiration. See McDowell (1982) (1994) (1995) (2011). 
18 Specifically Shaw states that “the big idea is that in paragon cases of religious perceptual 
knowledge that p one knows that p by virtue of enjoying rational support furnished by one’s 
pneuming that p, there this mental state is both factive and accessible on reflection” (2016, 
p. 265, my emphasis). Shaw intends “pneuming that p” to stand as a kind of religious-
perceptual analogue to “seeing that p”—or a case of epistemic seeing.  
19 But how does one really have access to factive rational support in the good case unless 
the good case really isn’t introspectively indistinguishable from the bad case—contrary to 
hypothesis? This Pritchard calls the ‘indistinguishability problem’. For relevant discussion 
see Pritchard (2012 b, pt 2.). The interested reader will discover that the response Pritchard 
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makes available to that problem can easily be pressed into service in defense of religious 
epistemological disjunctivism against the parallel objection.   
20 Although that is not to say that there isn’t precedent for an epistemological disjunctivism 
about testimonially-based knowledge. See McDowell (1994).   
21 For an accessible introduction to reformed epistemology see the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry on the topic by Bolos and Scott. For a recent discussion of reformed 
epistemology in relation to other approach in religious epistemology, see Dougherty and 
Tweedt (2015). For an overview of recent work in this area see Moon (2016). 
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